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TRANSNATIONAL DISCOURSE, RELATIONAL
AUTHORITY, AND THE U.S. COURT:
GENDER EQUALITY
Vicki C. Jackson*
Global developments in domestic constitutionalism and
international human rights law have engendered a new set of
dynamic relationships between and among legal systems. Scholars
and jurists have taken note of "transnational judicial conversations,"
"dialogue" or "transjudicial communication" about human rights,' of
a rise in "world constitutionalism," 2 of a global "community of
law,"3 of the possibilities of "comparative constitutional law ' and
for "comparative reasoning,, 5 and of the globalization not only of

* With thanks to Judith Resnik (who envisioned a law school course on
"Gender, Locally, Globally," and invited me to teach it with her, thus inspiring
this essay, and who generously gave much needed comments on earlier drafts
of this paper), Alex Aleinikoff, Jane Stromseth, Susan Deller Ross, Kim
Rubenstein, Bob Taylor, Mark Tushnet and Robin West for helpful
conversations and comments and to Amber Dolman, Emily O'Brien, and

Kristy Martin for superb research assistance.
1. See Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights?:
TransnationalJudicialConversations on ConstitutionalRights, 20 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 499, 527-30 (2000); Claire L'Heureux-Dub6, The Importance of
Dialogue: Globalizationand the InternationalImpact of the Rehnquist Court,
34 TULSA L.J. 15, 21-23 (1998); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of
TransjudicialCommunication, 29 U. RICH L. REv. 99, 103-12 (1994).
2. Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV.

771 (1997).
3. Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of
Effective SupranationalAdjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 366-73 (1997).
4. Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law,
108 YALE L.J. 1225 (1999); see also David Fontana, Refined Comparativismin
ConstitutionalLaw, 49 UCLA L. REv. 539 (2001).
5. Sarah K. Harding, Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28
YALE J. INT'L L. 409 (2003).
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constitutional interpretation,6 but also of judging and judiciaries.7
Focusing on developments in gender equality, this Article explores
distinctive features of the new transnational legal discourse and its
relationship to domestic constitutional law (with special attention to
the United States).
Gender equality is a particularly fruitful area in which to explore
transnational judicial discourse. First, there have been enormous
legal changes in the last half century on gender equality, reflected in
large numbers of national and transnational legal sources and a broad
area of at least formal agreement among many countries on core
values. Gender equality claims under both national and international
legal sources are being heard in national courts, 8 transnational legal
bodies 9 and international human rights tribunals. 10 Second, there
6. See Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search ofJustification: Toward a
Theory of Comparative ConstitutionalInterpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819, 821
(1999).
7. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L.
1103, 1103-04 (2000) [hereinafter Slaughter, Globalization];see also Helfer &
Slaughter, supra note 3, at 370-73; Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global
Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191, 202-04 (2003) [hereinafter
Slaughter, Global Community].
8. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Benner v.
Canada, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358; see also Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493;
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). For a helpful discussion of gender
equality cases in Colombia, see Martha I. Morgan, Taking Machismo to Court:
The Gender Jurisprudence of the Colombian Constitutional Court, 30 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 253, 283-85, 294-97 (1999) (describing decisions
finding equal protection violations in laws providing lesser penalties for
marital rapes than others and due process violations in exclusion of gay student
from military school).
9. The European Court of Justice has decided a number of gender equality
cases. See, e.g., Case C-158/97, Badeck & Others v. Germany, 2000 E.C.R. I1875, [2001] 2 C.M.L.R. 6 (2000) (affirmative action for women in
employment); Case C-409/95, Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1997
E.C.R. 1-6363, [1998]; Case C-285/98, Kreil v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
2000 E.C.R. 1-69 (invalidating law prohibiting military service by women);
Dory v. Germany, 2003 ECJ LEXIS 99 (April 2003) (upholding limitation of
compulsory military service to men); Case C-273/97, Sirdar v. Army Board,
1999 E.C.R. 1-7403, [1999] 3 C.M.L.R. 559 (1999) (upholding exclusion of
women from Royal Marines); Case C-109/100, Tele Danmark A/S v. Handels,
2001 E.C.R. 1-06993, (precluding dismissal of pregnant workers for failing to
disclose pregnancy when being hired for limited term contracts). So, too, has
the European Court of Human Rights. See, e.g., Willis v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 36042/97 (2002) (finding denial of widow's pension to widower
violated European Convention's prohibition on gender discrimination); cf,

Fall 2003]

GENDER EQUALITY

remains significant opposition to the idea of full gender equality,
reflected not only in wide departures in practice from the stated norm
e.g., Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981)
(prohibition of sodomy violated privacy rights); Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) (1988) (same); Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1993) (same). Other regional human rights bodies have also addressed issues
of gender equality. See, e.g., Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa
Rica/Advisory Opinion, reprinted in 5 HuMAN RTS. L.J. 161, 163, 171-75
(1984) (gender distinctions found to violate articles twenty-four and seventeen
of the American Convention).
10. See, e.g., Aumeeruddy-Cziffra v. Mauritius, U.N. CCPR Hum. Rts.
Comm., 12th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/12/D/35/1978 (1981) (constitutional
provisions discriminating between foreign male and female spouses
concerning application for residence violate International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR)); Avellanal v. Peru, U.N. CCPR Hum. Rts.
Comm., 34th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/34/D/202/1986 (1988) (matrimonial
property laws discriminating against women violated ICCPR); Zwaan-de Vries
v. The Netherlands, U.N. CCPR Hum. Rts. Comm., 29b Sess., U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/29/D/182/1984 (1987) (denying women, but not men, unemployment
benefits based on marital status violates ICCPR); Brooks v. The Netherlands,
U.N. CCPR Hum. Rts. Comm. 29th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/29/D/172/1984
(1987) (requiring women, but not men, to prove that they were the
breadwinners in order to receive unemployment benefits violates ICCPR); Vos
v. The Netherlands, U.N. CCPR Hum. Rts. Comm., 34 t Sess., U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/35/D/218/1986 (1989) (rejecting challenge to law that in some cases
had the effect of giving a disabled widow less in the way of pension than a
disabled widower). Cf Toonen v. Australia, U.N. CCPR Hum. Rts. Comm.,
50th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/5/D/488/1992 (1994), (finding Tazmanian
sodomy law in violation of ICCPR); Lovelace v. Canada, U.N. CCPR Hum.
Rts. Comm., 13th Sess., CCPR/C/13/D/24/1977 (finding violation of
indigenous peoples rights in statute excluding female Indian married to a nonIndian from status and rights as Indian), discussed in Anne F. Bayefsky, The
Human Rights Committee and the Case of Sandra Lovelace, 20 CANADIAN
Y.B. INT'L L. 244, 263 (1982) (suggesting that Lovelace was in essence a
gender discrimination case even though decided under Article 27, dealing with
cultural minority groups). The Optional Protocol of the Convention on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW") was opened for
signature in December 1999. As of September 26, 2003, there are 56 parties
and
75
signatories
to
the
Optional
Protocol.
See
www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/sigop.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
Under the Optional Protocol, individual complainants may now file complaints
before the CEDAW committee, in a procedure analogous to that which has
long been available before the U.N. Human Rights Committee, the monitoring
body of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. For helpful
description of different sources and categories of transnational gender equality
law, see Judith Resnik, CategoricalFederalism:Jurisdiction, Gender and the
Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619, 656-64 (2001).
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but also in articulated defenses of discriminatory practices."' A rich
context thus exists in which to explore the possibilities for
transnational consideration of decisions on seemingly universalized
norms together with the limitations imposed by deep differences in
institutional, historical and cultural context and by disagreement over
12
the content and enforceability of international human rights norms.
Transnational legal sources are often discussed as tools for the
development of domestic enforcement and advancement of gender
equality. 13 Since World War II there has been a dramatic shift in
international legal sources towards formal endorsement of gender
equality rights.' 4 The U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of
11. See text accompanying notes 275-291, 294-306 (discussing cases
upholding gender classifications in the United States, Bangladesh, Pakistan,
and South Africa).
12. It is worth noting that gender equality was not a central concern of the
"constitutional moment" of the world community in the 1940s, though a
formal commitment to gender equality in public life begins to emerge at this
point in documents like the U.N. Charter and Universal Declaration. See infra
note 15. For discussion of contemporary development of transnational
consensus around some gender equality norms (opposition to violence against
women) rather than others, see MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK,
ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS 160-98 (1998).

13. See, e.g., Anne F. Bayefsky, General Approaches to Domestic
Application of Women's InternationalHuman Rights Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS
OF

WOMEN:

NATIONAL

AND

INTERNATIONAL

PERSPECTIVES

351,

353

(Rebecca J. Cook ed. 1994); see also Andrew Bymes, Using International
Human Rights Law and Procedures to Advance Women's Human Rights, in 2
WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 189, 190 (Kelly D. Askin
& Dorean M. Koenig, eds., 2000). By "transnational" I mean to include
international law and legal sources, regional human rights law and sources, and
national constitutional law being considered by other countries' domestic
courts.
14. Although New Zealand extended the vote to women in 1893, women
were not guaranteed the right to vote in Britain or the United States until the
end of World War I; in France not until near the end of World War II; and in
Switzerland not until 1990 were women allowed to vote in all elections. (On
April 30, 1989, the canton of Appenzell Ausserrhoden gave women the vote
and Appennzell Innerrhoden finally allowed women to vote on November 27,
1990). See LEE ANN BANASZAK, WHY MOVEMENTS SUCCEED OR FAIL:
OPPORTUNITY, CULTURE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR WOMAN SUFFRAGE 3-4

(1996). The participation of women as voters in plebiscites on territorial status
following World War I was a milestone, but did not lead immediately to
domestic constitutions allowing women to continue to exercise the vote. See
KAREN KNOP, DIVERSITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
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Human Rights named women as well as men as rights holders, 15 as
did the two major international human rights conventions of 1966,
16
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.1 7 In 1979, the General Assembly of the United Nations
approved and opened for signature the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW),18 which obligates state parties to take measures to end
discrimination against women and assure treatment on an equal basis
with men.19 Its substantive provisions target not only intentional acts
277-309 (2002) [hereinafter KNOP, DIVERSITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION].
Today, women are formally allowed to vote in all but a small handful of

countries in the world. (In the United Arab Emirates, neither men nor women
vote; in Kuwait, women are excluded from the franchise exercised by men. See
Website of the International Organization of Parliaments at
http://www/ipu.org/wmn-e/suffrage.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
15. The U.N. Charter's Preamble grounds its existence in a belief "in the
equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small." U.N.
CHARTER pmbl. See also U.N. CHARTER art. 55 (calling for "universal respect
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion"). The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights' preamble affirms "the dignity and worth of the human
person and... the equal rights of men and women .... ." G.A. Res. 217A (Ill),
U.N. Doc., 1/810. at 71 (1948). It includes both a general anti-discrimination
principle (declaring that "[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms
set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status." id. at Art. 2, and special emphasis on
equality rights in marriage. Id. at art. 16. ("[m]en and women of full age...
are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its
dissolution[;]" marriage requires "the free and full consent of the intending
spouses.").
16. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 3, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16,
at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (state parties "undertake to ensure the equal
right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set
forth in the present Covenant").
17. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 3, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16,
at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
18. G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N.
Doc. A/34/46 (1979) (entered into force 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW].
19. CEDAW broadly defines discrimination as "...any distinction,
exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or
purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by
women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and
women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic,
social, cultural, civil or any other field." CEDAW, supra note 18, at art. 1.
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of discrimination but acts which effect substantive inequalities; they
reach both private and state conduct; and they obligate states not
merely to refrain from discrimination but actively to seek to redress
and remedy private discrimination against women.2 ° More than
ninety-percent of the U.N. members are parties to CEDAW; the
United States has signed but not ratified the convention. 2 1 Moreover,
a number of regional human rights conventions also are explicit in
declaring rights to be free from gender discrimination. 22 Looking
The Convention also specifically addresses equality rights in, e.g. education
(art. 10), employment (art. 11), health (art. 12), law (art. 15), family (art. 5),
political life and government positions (art. 7), and citizenship and nationality
(art. 9).
20. See id. at art. 2(e) (state parties shall "take all appropriate measures to
eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization or
enterprise."); id. at art. 5 ("State Parties shall take all appropriate measures: (a)
To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with
a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of
either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women"). CEDAW
reaches into deeply entrenched gendered views of family relations. For
example, Article 5(b) requires state parties "[t]o ensure that family education
includes a proper understanding of maternity as a social function and the
recognition of the common responsibility of men and women in the upbringing
and development of their children." Id. at art. 5. Article 16, to which a number
of parties have reservations, requires states to "take all appropriate measures to
eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and
family relations." See id. at art. 16.
21. According to the U.N. website, 174 countries are parties to CEDAW.
See United Nation's Division for the Advancement of Women, at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm (last visited Oct.22,
2003). CEDAW has more parties than any other U.N. human rights
convention, with the exception of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
See ANNE F. BAYEFSKY, THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM:
UNIVERSALITY AT THE CROSSROADS 21 (Martinus Nijhof, 2001) [hereinafter
BAYEFSKY, UNIVERSALITY].

22. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 14, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into
force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights]
("The enjoyment of rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race colour....");
American Convention on Human Rights, art. 1, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36,
1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (1978) (undertaking "to respect the rights and freedoms
recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the
free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination
for reasons of race, color, sex, language.. ."); Inter-American Convention on
the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women, June
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outward to these transnational legal sources to encourage domestic
adoption of and compliance with gender equality rights is an obvious
legal strategy.23
Yet looking beyond national borders is fraught with normative
and strategic questions.
Many CEDAW ratifications are
accompanied by significant reservations to central substantive
provisions,2 4 reflecting what the U.N. Special Rapporteur for
Violence Against Women has called an "ideological resistance to
human rights for women. 25 Some argue that international human
rights law, such as CEDAW, is ineffective, or worse, may actually
obstruct advances toward gender equality in developing countries,
through perceptions of hegemonic western imposition of values on

9, 1944, art. 5, 33 I.L.M. 1534, 1536 ("Every woman is entitled to the free and
full exercise of her civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights... [and
signatories] recognize that violence against women prevents and nullifies the
exercise of these rights."); African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art.
2, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) ("Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of
the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the present Charter
without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, color, sex,
language.. .").
23. See Bayefsky, supra note 13, at 353. A rights-based strategy grounded
in international law is subject to the critique of rights as, inter alia, a
misrepresentation of women's social experiences, a distraction from
substantive focus on material improvement in women's lives, and a strategy
that to the extent it provides legitimacy to other rights, such as to religious
freedom, may oppress women. For a discussion, see, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth,
What Are "Women's International Human Rights,? in HUMAN RIGHTS OF
WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 58, 60-63 (Rebecca
J. Cook, ed., 1994); Adetoun 0. Ilumoka, African Women's Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 307, 319-23; Johanna E. Bond, International
Intersectionality: A Theoretical and Pragmatic Exploration of Women's
InternationalHuman Rights Violations, 52 EMORY L.J. 71, 79-89 (2003). For
a different perspective, see Karen Knop, Here and There: InternationalLaw in
Domestic Courts, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 501, 505-07,525-35 (2000)
(viewing international law, like comparative law, as opportunity for different
domestic court's interpretations and constructions of meanings).
24. See Madhavi Sunder, Piercingthe Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399, 1425-27
(2003); Bayefsky, supra note 13, at 352-53.
25. Radhika Coomaraswamy, To Bellow Like a Cow: Women, Ethnicity and
the Discourse of Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 39 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994) (suggesting

that "it would be wrong to assume that the values contained in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights are truly universal."). Id. at 41.
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the less powerful.2 6 And, like many international human rights
regimes, CEDAW is a "softer" form of law at the enforcement
level-there is no adjudicator with binding authority in most cases to
rule on whether practices or conditions are in compliance or to assess
sanctions for noncompliance.2 7
CEDAW's widespread adoption-but with reservations- and
its reliance on reporting as a way to encourage but not coerce

compliance stands in sharp contrast with important understandings of
domestic constitutional law as judicially enforceable constraints that
As such, CEDAW is in some ways
"bind" governments. 2 8
emblematic of broader differences between international human
rights law and domestic law in litigation in national courts. Like
other international human rights conventions, CEDAW (even where
not clearly made binding as law for courts to enforce) is at times
invoked in national constitutional decisions interpreting and
29
enforcing internal constitutional norms favoring gender equality.
26. For discussion of this concern generally about international law, see
Knop, supra note 23, at 522, 527-30; see also Frederick Schauer, The Politics
and Incentives of Legal Transplantation,in GOvERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING
WORLD 253 (Joseph S. Nye Jr. & John D. Donahue eds., Visions of
Governance for the 21 st Century 2000).
27. Article 29 of CEDAW, which has never been invoked, does authorize
state parties to bring disputes about CEDAW to the International Court of
Justice. See CEDAW, supra note 18, at art. 29. See also Andrew Byrnes &
Jane Connors, Enforcing the Human Rights of Women: A Complaints
Procedurefor the Women's Convention? Draft Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms ofDiscriminationAgainst Women,
21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 679 (1996) But the basic model of CEDAW
enforcement is a report, discuss, and recommend model, similar to those
employed in other human rights conventions. For discussion of CEDAW's
Optional Protocol, see text accompanying note 10. For concerns about the
efficacy of the optional protocol of the ICCPR, see BAYEFSKY,
UNIVERSALITY, supranote 21, at 33-35.
28. Of the regional human rights regimes, the European Convention has
become the subject of regular judicial interpretation by the Court of Human
Rights and fairly consistent compliance by member nations. The ECHR's
gender equality decisions are of importance not only in Europe but around the
world. See Slaughter, Globalization,supra note 7, at 1109-12.
29. It is unlikely that an international Convention like CEDAW would
come into force without a substantial number of countries in the world already
prepared internally to endorse gender equality as at least a formal norm. The
mobilizations needed to persuade decision-makers to endorse such a move
would necessarily occur at many national levels in order to obtain international
approval and national approval. Indeed, absent existing domestic commitments
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So, too, are decisions of other national courts or regional bodies on
similar issues.
What is the role of judicial references to these outside sources,
which may occur even when the sources are not regarded as legally
binding? Are they mere window dressing or even an unwarranted
diversion from more locally grounded reasoning? Many post-World
War II constitutions have equality provisions that address or could be
read to encompass gender equality, but gender equality regimes in
different countries differ across a number of vectors; 30 international
commitments to gender equality may rightly be regarded as more
formal than real in many places. And yet, multi-layered and
decentralized development of gender equality as a norm (including
disagreements about its scope and implementation) seems to be
to such a norm, countries might well be reluctant to ratify. Cf Oona A.
Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1821 (2003)
(explaining expected compliance costs as component of decision-making on
joining international treaties).
30. Some constitutions specify or authorize affirmative measures based on
gender to redress historic discrimination or qualify equality clauses by
reservations to permit "special provision for women and children." INDIA
CONST., art. 15(3); see also, e.g., CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I,
(Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 15(2) (anti-discrimination
clause "does not preclude any law.., that has as its object the amelioration of
conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those...
disadvantaged because of... sex); cf European Community Directive on
Equal Treatment, Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976, art. 2 (3)
(anti-discrimination rules to operate "without prejudice to provisions
concerning the protection of women, particularly as regards pregnancy and
maternity"). A number of countries' domestic constitutions require reserved
seats for women in government bodies. See, e.g., BANGL. CONST., pt. V, ch. I,
§65 (3); PAK. CONST., pt. III, ch. 11, §51(4); see also, e.g., Nodlle Lenoir, The
Representationof Women in Politics: From Quotas to Parity in Elections, 50
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 217 (2001) (noting amendment of French Constitution to
permit legislation requiring "parit6" on electoral list between women and men).
Other countries, like the United States, have elaborated constitutional rules
against gender discrimination from more general equality clauses, extending
the reach of the antidiscrimination principle to public employment, family law,
education, and eligibility for public benefits. See generally Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Constitutionalizing Women 's Equality, 90 CAL. L. REv. 735, 747-62
(2002) (discussing choices in constitutional design around gender issues
including generality or specificity of clauses, whether rights are positive or
negative, whether the measure of equality is formal or substantive, whether
rights apply against private parties or only against the state, and whether to
prohibit classifications using sex or instead protect the class of women, which
relates to whether special measures based on gender are authorized).
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providing the foundations for an increasingly self-aware
transnational discourse among a number of countries. Why would
nondomestic sources be considered relevant in resolving domestic
questions of gender equality?
Although this Article cannot answer all of these questions, it
makes a beginning by first, trying more fully to describe what is
occurring in the cases and second, by considering some objections to
transnational judicial discourse about equality rights. Part I explores
the developing practice in human rights cases, sometimes expressed
as an obligation, to consider a wide range of legal sources that are
not "binding" in any conventional legal sense,3 ' offers some reason
for this development and suggests a vocabulary for describing it.
Although it is common to refer to nonbinding sources of law as
"persuasive authority," this phrase may not fully capture the sense of
joint venturing or even of obligation to consider other courts'
decisions that informs some of this conversation. 32 There is a
connectivity of human rights discourse suggesting that there are
mutually shared interests in defining the content of national,
transnational and international norms, perhaps captured by the
phrase, "relational authority," 33 reflecting nonhierarchical judicial
31. Professor Slaughter has drawn attention to the rise in use of persuasive
authority in several valuable articles. See Slaughter, Global Community, supra
note 7, at 193, 199-202; see also MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 158 (The Free Press, 1991)
(noting the "brisk international traffic in ideas about rights," in which "national
law is increasingly caught up in a process of cross-fertilization among legal
systems.").
32. "Persuasive authority" is also misleading as a description for thoughtful
consideration of the jurisprudence of other nations that are then distinguished,
as in the South African Constitutional Court's treatment of U.S. and Indian
approaches to the death penalty, see infra note 54, or more generally, for the
treatment of other constitutional systems as "negative precedents". See
Choudhry, supra note 6, at 851-55; Sujit Choudhry, The Lochner Era and
ComparativeConstitutionalism,2 INT'L J. CONST'L L. (I'CON) 1 (forthcoming
Jan. 2004) [hereinafter Choudhry, The Lochner Era].
33. The relational quality of domestic courts' discourse on constitutional
issues may be a byproduct or a part of the broader transnational legal processes
Professor Koh has described. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational
Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2394-98 (1991) (noting benefits
of dialogue between U.S. courts engaged in transnational public litigation and
law-declaring international bodies over content of international law); Harold
Honguu Koh, Review Essay: Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?, 106
YALE L.J. 2599, 2645-58 (1997) (arguing that international law becomes seen
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relationships experienced as shared locations of the authority to
interpret the law. 34 Reasons for this development include the postWorld War II reaction against gross human rights abuses, judicial
self-conceptions as protectors of rights, the influence of international
and regional conventions on domestic constitutional drafting, and
increased awareness of the possibilities of judges' decisions
influencing understandings of law beyond borders.
In Part II, I consider arguments that resort to foreign or
international law as nonbinding authority in resolving questions of
domestic constitutional law is inconsistent with commitments to
democratic self-rule and with the role and competence of the courts.
Originally made without the participation of women and itself thus in
some tension with norms of democratic self-rule,35 the U.S.
Constitution, like older constitutions more generally, may benefit
from the insights of courts interpreting newer constitutions that have
integrated commitments to gender equality at the same time as other
rights. Being aware of other legal regimes' approaches, however,
does not necessarily mean following them; comparison may provide
the basis for reasoned disagreement with fundamental assumptions or
greater awareness of contextual particularities; the question is how to
interpret one's own domestic norms, in the light of experience
elsewhere. 36 Consulting transnational legal sources has the capacity
to improve the quality of judicial reasoning, a basic aspect of judicial
legitimacy and accountability.37 But doing so also raises questions
of training, expertise and competence in understanding international
and foreign sources. There are, no doubt, differences between the

as norms to be obeyed through repeated processes of interaction, interpretation,
and internalization which reconstitute nations' understandings of their identity
and interest).
34. See Slaughter, Globalization,supranote 7, at 1112-15.
35. For related discussion, see Deborah Cass & Kim Rubenstein,
Representationof Women in the Australian ConstitutionalSystem, 17 ADEL. L.
REv. 3, 28-39 (1995).
36. Thus, in a sense, the decision to treat another system's authority as
helpful is itself grounded in domestic norms. See Bayefsky, supra note 13, at
359.
37. This paper will focus primarily on national courts' resolution of
domestic constitutional issues which refer to transnational human rights legal

materials. See supra note 13.
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persuasive value of different sources on different issues. 38 But on
many issues of gender, to which jurists may bring deeply entrenched
senses of the "natural," comparative awareness may provide helpful
perspectives from which to test initial reactions to legal challenges.
I. FROM PosrrIvE LAW TO OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS:

"RELATIONAL" AuTHORiTY
As Professor Slaughter observes, there has been apparent growth
in recent years in references to "persuasive rather than coercive
authority" by courts around the world. 39 The functions of these
references are many. Thus, it has been argued, some courts rely on
40
other courts' decisions in order to enhance their own legitimacy,
avoid adverse reputations in international or transnational
communities,41 or even to reflect shifting political relationships
between countries.42 Consideration of foreign or international law
may be part of a more expressive project of constitutionalism, in

which references may help establish that a country is breaking from a

38. See infra text at notes 167-68, 248-53 (discussing differences between
settled and new issues and between standards in international conventions and
adjudicated judgments of domestic courts in other countries on similar
questions).
39. See Slaughter, supra note 1, at 122.
40. For a sophisticated description of the mutually legitimating references
between the two major European courts, and of their "wooing" national courts,
see Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 3, at 308, 323-28. Transnational discourse
can be found in lower national courts as well as in transnational courts and the
highest national courts. See e.g. infra note 99 (referring to lower court
decision in Tanzania), text at notes 112-13 (discussing lower court decision in
New Zealand). An interesting project, not undertaken here, would be a
comparative study of the use of transnational sources by judges at different
levels within national judicial hierarchies.
41. See Reem Bahdi, Globalization of Judgment: Transjudicialismand the
Five Faces ofInternationalLaw in Domestic Courts, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L.
REV. 555, 590-95 (2002)
42. See G.L. Davies" & M.P. Cowen, The PersuasiveForce of Decisions of
United States Courts in Australia, 15 AUSTL. B. REV., 1996 ABR Lexis 27, *8
(suggesting that Australia's interest in independence made it "more open to
influence" from countries other than the U.K., including the U.S.). Professor
Schauer proposes that "the transnational... spread of law and legal ideas is
not.., largely a matter of the power and value of the ideas themselves but may
instead be substantially dependent, both on the supply side and on the demand
side, on political and symbolic factors.. ." Schauer, supra note 26, at 254.
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troubled past,43 or is concerned with appearing to comply with
international human rights law (or contrariwise, that a country's view
of binding law is highly exceptionalist and excludes international
norms absent domestic implementing legislation). Citations to
foreign authorities may also reflect a national court's effort to
distinguish itself from countries or legal norms with which it
disagrees, 44 an important form of comparison not foreshadowed by
the term "persuasive authority."
References to transnational sources may relate not only to the
place of the court's nation in the community of nations, but also to
the status and relationship of courts to each other in the development
of law, thus fostering an autonomous professionalism of independent
courts (to which end the display of knowledge alone may have some
perceived value) and/or the autonomous content of law under the
interpretive control of judges.45
Recognizing the dignity and
authority of other decision-makers may add to their legitimacy
within their own legal orders,46 or confer it on others.47 This kind of
recognition may go beyond interests in establishing the autonomy
and professionalism of courts, insofar as it focuses on the dignitary
sense that all national courts and transnational tribunals may have
something to contribute to transnational discourse.48 Interests in
43. See Bahdi, supra note 41, at 587-90; Schauer, supra note 26, at 254-55
(noting incentives of countries emerging from colonial control to manifest
autochthonous constitutional choices).
44. See Choudhry, supra note 6; Heinz Klug, Model and Anti-Model: The
United States Constitution and the "Rise of World Constitutionalism," 2000
WiS. L. REV. 597, 601-02 (2000).
45. See McCrudden, supra note 1, at 512-16; Slaughter, supra note 1, at
114-17; see also Slaughter, Global Community, supra note 7, at 200-02.
Judicial commitments to human rights may also be reinforced by judges'
concern for judicial independence in adjudication which, like human rights,
requires a certain tolerance for disagreement in politico-legal culture.
46. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
47. See, e.g., Beth Lyon, Discourse in Development: A Post Colonial
"Agenda" for the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and
CulturalRights Through the Post-ColonialLens, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL'Y & L. 535, 578 n.235 (2002) (noting the South African Constitutional
Court's citation to the work of the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights as a potentially important "source of recognition" for the
authority of that committee's work).
48. See Slaughter, Global Community, supra note 7 at 194, 205-10.
(emphasizing comity among courts as well as among legal systems); see also
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163--64 (1895). For exploration of the concept
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recognizing the dignity of other courts can be seen as an embodiment
in the practice of judicial discourse of normative commitments to
values of participation and equal dignity of national courts.4 9
In addition to dignitary forms of citation designed to recognize
or enhance the stature of particular courts or countries, a related
function of transnational citations may be that of expressing
agreement with the content of decisions of other courts in ways that
tend to enhance the precedential value of a decision. 50 This function
may be linked to the idea of the autonomous development of law.
However, the ideological or substantive values of the decisions may
be the most important factor rather than their autonomous
of the dignity of sovereigns or political groups, with particular emphasis on
dignity as part of the "political vocabulary" of indigenous peoples and other
"marginalized groups," see Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult
to Injury: Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1921, 1941-46 (2003).
49. Dignitary interests, for example, may be particularly at stake in
reversing the "one way" direction of constitutional influence that U.S.
constitutional law was seen, until the early 1990s, as having. See Peter
McCormick, The Supreme Court of Canada and American Citations, 19451994: A StatisticalOverview, 8 (2d) S.CT. REv. 527 (1997); Davies & Cowen,
supra note 42 at *8; cf Bahdi, supra note 41, at 599-601 (urging that western
courts consider decisions from non-western cultures, to send a message that
international human rights law constitutes a shared undertaking and to afford
"due recognition" to rebut concerns that international human rights law is
imperialist). Note that even critical references to another nation's or tribunal's
judicial decisions might convey respect for their dignity; conversely, even if
positive, references may be seen as condescending. Cf infra text at notes 6772 (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court's mid-twentieth century references to
foreign practices).
50. See, e.g., Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 995-97 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (discussing decisions by courts that
otherwise "accept or assume the lawfulness of the death penalty" concluding
that long delays in carrying out a death sentence "renders ultimate execution
an inhuman, degrading or unusually cruel" and prohibited practice, including a
Privy Council decision for Jamaica, and decisions of the Supreme Courts of
India and Zimbabwe and of the European Court of Human Rights; noting that
each faced a "roughly comparable" issue in a roughly comparable context).
But see id. at 990 (Thomas, J., concurring) (if there were any American
authority, "it would be unnecessary for proponents of the claim to rely on the
European Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, the
Supreme Court of India, or the Privy Council"). For more recent iterations of
the disagreement between the Justices on the relevance of foreign law on
issues relating to the death penalty, see, e.g., Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990
(2002); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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development by courts as such. For example, when the Canadian
Supreme Court held in Vriend v. Alberta5 1 that it violated the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms to discriminate against a person in
employment because of his homosexuality, it quoted with approval
from the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Romer v. Evans,5 z but did
not refer to Bowers v. Hardwick.53 By contrast, the South African
Constitutional Court canvassed constitutional decisions both
affirming and rejecting the validity of the death penalty in the State
v. Makwanyane54 decision, exploring their reasoning before deciding
that in South Africa the death penalty was barred by its
Constitution. Ignoring contrary authority may be consistent with
some uses of foreign authority, for example, to demonstrate that a
court is not alone in holding views, or to align oneself with or against
the views based on the country they emanate from, but it is open to
51. [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493.
52. Id. at 549 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating a
state constitutional amendment prohibiting extension of anti-discrimination
protections for gays and lesbians)).
53. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (rejecting constitutional challenge to criminal
prohibition of homosexual sodomy), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.
Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003). Consider also Justice Breyer's reference to the
commandeering practices of Germany, Switzerland and the E.U., as relevant
to the constitutionality of a federal statute that required state officials to
perform background checks on gun purchasers in Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 976 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Neither Justice Breyer, nor the
majority opinion, which disagreed with Breyer on the relevance of comparative
constitutional law, cited Canadian authority (probably far less well known and
more ambiguous than Printz) that seems to look in different directions.
Compare Reg'l Municipality of Peel v. MacKenzie, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 9 (treating
federal mandate to municipalities to spend money on particular kind of
juvenile detention facility as beyond federal constitutional power over criminal
law) with Reference re Goods and Services Tax, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 445, 482-85
(upholding application to provinces of obligations for suppliers of goods to
collect a federal consumption tax and distinguishing Peel).
54. State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC), 1995 SACLR LEXIS
218; see also Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. at 996 (Breyer, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (recognizing that "[n]ot all foreign authority reaches the
same conclusion" on lawfulness of delay in carrying out death sentence); cf
South Africa v. Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC), 2000 SACLR
LEXIS 126 (discussing the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, distinguishing its text from that of South Africa's
Constitution, and distinguishing institutional competence of domestic court
from that of the U.N. Human Rights Committee).
55. See Makwanyane, 1995 (6) BCLR 665(CC), 1995 SACLR LEXIS at
*64, *70-81.
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claims either that such selective use of foreign sources reflects an
increase in the unconstrained discretion of judges to decide in accord
law, or that foreign authority is mere
with preferences rather than
6
after-the-fact decoration.
Transnational judicial discourse may also reflect a more open,
deliberative judicial decision process, one that draws on a broader
range of sources for challenge and critique of analytical assumptions,
both for elaboration of common normative values in different
institutional settings and for developing understandings of national
distinctiveness. Scholars have noted the rise in "constitutional crossfertilization," a sharing of knowledge and possible innovation
sparked by greater familiarity with other countries' practices, a
knowledge not necessarily reflected in citations.5 7 Sometimes
citations reflect acknowledgment that the decision of another court
has been helpful because it is analyzing a similar problem in a
similar context,58 or because the subject area has some universal
quality to it, 59 or because one polity's approach helps illuminate the
consequences of a particular interpretive choice. 60 Consideration of
the reasoning of other constitutional courts, whether referred to in
56. See McCrudden, supra note 1, at 527-29; Pradyumna K. Tripathi,
Foreign Precedents and ConstitutionalLaw, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 319, 322,
328-29 (1957); Fontana, supra note 4, at 557 n.81. For discussion, see text
accompanying notes 240-45 infra.
57. See Slaughter, Global Community, supra note 7, at 193, 194-204; see
also Michael Kirby, Think Globally, 4 GREEN BAG 2D. 287 (Spring 2001).
58. Cf Tushnet, supra note 4, at 1238-69 (exploring functionalism while
expressing skepticism about empirical and theoretical bases for useful
functional comparison). Additionally, where an international instrument is
binding in a country its courts might refer to decisions by courts of another
country concerning the same instrument, even though the interpretive decision

is not binding.
59. See Donald P. Kommers, The Value of Comparative Constitutional
Law, 9 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 685, 692 (1976) (noting capacity of
comparative study to identify "constitutional values and ideas about man and
his relationship to the state [that] are commonly shared across national
boundaries.. .[as part of] a search for principles of justice and political
obligation that transcend... a particular political community"); Bahdi, supra
note 41, at 568-69 (discussing the "universalistic impulse" in cases involving
torture and gender discrimination).
60. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); see also Tushnet, supra note 4, at 1229-30; cf Stephen Breyer,
Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245 (2002) (discussing role
of consequentialism in constitutional interpretation).
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citations or not, may reflect efforts to improve the quality of judicial
reasoning by eliciting more complete understanding of differences
between systems
and of the reasons for one or another approach to
61
similar issues.

A. PersuasiveAuthority, Then andNow: SeparatedSovereignties to
RelationalReferences

The phrase "persuasive authority" is invoked to describe all of
these practices of courts in considering materials that are not binding
within the positive hierarchy of controlling legal norms. In contrast
to the hierarchic obligation to apply "binding" law, 62 Professor Glenn
treats "persuasive authority" as "authority which attracts adherence
as opposed to obliging it" and which is consulted primarily because
of its persuasiveness, in a quest to find better answers or solutions to
legal issues. 63 But the range of reasons for transnational references
extend well beyond those suggested by such a definition; the phrase
61. Compare Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative

Action: An InternationalHuman Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDozo L. REv. 253,
261-81 (1999) (describing status of affirmative action in the U.S., India, and
European Union) with Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2347 (2003)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (discussing international covenants contemplating
temporary affirmative measures); Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2442
(2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Neither of Justice Ginsburg's written
opinions referred to foreign national practices, such as those in India described
in her paper, although she asked at oral argument in Gratz about constitutional
experience in other countries:
General Olson-we're part of a world, and this problem is a global
problem. Other countries operating under the same equality norm have
confronted it. Our neighbor to the north, Canada, has, the European
Union, South Africa, and they have all approved this kind of, they call
it positive discrimination. Do we-they have rejected what you recited
as the ills that follow from this. Should we shut that from our view at
all or should we consider what judges in other places have said on this
subject?
See Official Transcript Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the United
States, Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003) (No. 02-516), at 24-25, at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oralarguments/argument-transcripts/02516.pdf.
62. See McCrudden, supra note 1, at 502. For a helpful discussion of
precedent, see Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior
CourtPrecedents?,46 STAN. L. REv. 817 (1994).
63. See H. Patrick Glenn, Persuasive Authority, 32 MCGILL L.J. 261, 263
(1987); see also id. at 263-64, 268, 272, 277; Fontana, supra note 4, at 55759.

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 37:271

"persuasive authority," when used to cover the multitude of functions
described above, may obscure some of their distinctive aspects.
There are important "negative" use of foreign precedents (i.e., as
"aversive" rather than "persuasive" authority), 64 as well as "dialogic"
references, in which a foreign source may be persuasive within its
system but distinguishable from the other. 65 Such uses fit well
within Professor McCrudden's broader definition of persuasive
authority as any "material... regarded as relevant to the decision
which has to be made by the judge, but ...not binding on the judge
under the hierarchical rules of the national system determining
authoritative sources. 66
In some of the current transnational discourse of rights, there is a
qualitatively new tone to references to nonbinding authority,
consisting of an implicit assumption of relationality. A contrast may
help illustrate what I mean. In the mid-twentieth century, the U.S.
Supreme Court's occasional references to constitutional practices of
nations proceeded on the basis that "they" and "we" were entirely
separate polities.67 One note accompanying some comparative
references is that of exceptionalism, or superiority. In Miranda v.
Arizona,68 after canvassing foreign practices concerning warnings for
or limitations on the admissibility of custodial statements, the Court
wrote:
[I]t is consistent with our legal system that we give at least
as much protection to these rights as is given in the
jurisdictions described. We deal in our country with rights
64. See supra text accompanying note 44; Kim Lane Scheppele,
Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for Studying CrossConstitutional Influence Through Negative Models, 1 INT'L J. CONST'L L.

(I'CON)296 (2003); see also Klug, supra note 44, at 605-07 (noting that the
U.S. served as a negative model for India, which declined to include a due
process clause to avoid Lochnerization, and South Africa, that drafted a clause
protecting property so as to distinguish carefully between expropriations and
regulations); Choudhry, The Lochner Era, supra note 32 (Lochner as negative
model in Canada).
65. See Choudhry, supra note 6, at 835-38, 855-65.

66. McCrudden, supra note 1,at 502-03.
67. There may have been more use of foreign law on constitutional issues
in the 1940s-60s than in more recent decades. See McCrudden, supra note 1,
at 509-10 (noting decline in usage of foreign law after Frankfurter left the
Court).
68. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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grounded in a specific requirement of the Fifth Amendment
of the Constitution, whereas other jurisdictions arrived at
their conclusions on the basis of principles of justice not so
specifically defined.69
In other words, given that the United States has a written
constitution, one with "specific requirement[s]," it should do at least
as well as those other jurisdictions. Oblique references to the
dangers of Nazism or fascism (from which the U.S. Constitution
protected) in the Court's decisions in cases such as Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,70 represent a second kind of reference
to other nations, here as a basis for sharper differentiation. In Justice
Frankfurter's reference to Canadian decisions on intergovernmental
tax immunity,71 we see a third use, this time of other countries'
69. 1d. at 489-90 (emphasis added). In addition to the competitive
overtones in the text quoted above, the Court made a more functional
argument, relying on experience in England, Scotland, Ceylon, and Canada to
suggest that the dangers to law enforcement of requiring warnings had been
overstated. Miranda'suse of foreign authority seems to build on Frankfurter's
opinion in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961). In discussing the
relationship between custodial confessions and the personal liberty protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment, Frankfurter engaged in a wide-ranging
treatment of other systems' approach and of state and federal statutory law
about custody and interrogations, which, he concluded, demonstrated a broad
consensus of concern about custodial interrogations with considerable
difference on details. See id. at 576-602 (discussing English and continental
practice and contrasting Scottish rule with English, Canadian, and inquisitorial
systems).
70. 343 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (implicitly
referring to fascist government as reason to enforce separation of powers even
though it "is absurd to see a dictator" in Harry Truman); see id. at 641
(Jackson, J.) (noting "instruction from our own times" in dangers of
"totalitarian" government); see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949)
(referring to what sets the United States apart from totalitarian regimes);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (distinguishing totalitarian
regimes that limit family size); United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S.Ct.
2297, 2322 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting the impact of European
fascism on resistance to library censorship).
71. See United States v. Allegheny Co., 322 U.S. 174, 198 (1944)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("In respect to the problem we are considering, the
constitutional relation of the Dominion of Canada to its constituent Provinces
is the same as that of the United States to the States. A recent decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada is therefore pertinent. In City of Vancouver v.
Attorney-General of Canada, [1944] S.C.R. 23, that Court denied the
Dominion's claim to immunity in a situationprecisely like this, as I believe we
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constitutional decisions as "persuasive authority" based on an
assumed similarity in the details of domestic constitutional
allocations of functions. Notwithstanding Frankfurter's references to
"English federalisms," 72 many of these mid-century forms of usage
proceeded on the basis of a world of entirely separate and distinct
national states generating their own sovereign law.
There is beneath the surface of some of the more contemporary
transnational constitutional discourse, particularly outside the United
States, a different sense of "persuasive authority," a broad sense of a
common venture, 73 of related national entities, captured in Justice
Albie Sachs' phrase of a "world jurisprudence." 74 In many countries
courts with jurisdiction over constitutional questions-both those
acting with and those acting without explicit constitutional
permission to consider foreign or international law-invoke
international human rights conventions and the decisions of other
national courts as an interwoven part of the interpretive fabric of
decision-making.
1. Constitutional authorization to consider foreign authority
Some constitutions specifically or implicitly authorize
consideration of foreign or international law in the resolution of
constitutional rights questions. 75 The South African Constitution
should deny the claim of the Government.") (emphasis added); see also Graves
v. New York (ex rel O'Keefe), 306 U.S. 466, 491 (1939) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (noting that despite the gravitational pull of the U.S. constitution
on the other great "English federalisms," Canada and Australia, those systems
had shifted view on the intergovernmental tax immunity issue before the

Court).
72. See Graves, 306 U.S. at 490-91 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (referring
to Canada and Australia as the "two other great English federalisms").
"Genetic" uses of English materials, that are designed to reflect on original
understandings of U.S. constitutional provisions, are distinct from other uses of
comparative materials. For discussion, see Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent
Resistance and ComparativeConstitutionalism:Opening Up The Conversation
on "Proportionality," Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST'L L. 583, 588
n.25 (1999) [hereinafter Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance].
73. See Slaughter, supra note 1, at 122; Slaughter, Global Community

supra note 7, at 193 (referring to sense of "common judicial enterprise").
74. Albie Sachs, Social and Economic Rights: Can They Be Made

Justiciable?,53 SMUL. REv. 1381, 1388 (2000).

75. A number of constitutions, for example, specifically authorize
interpretation of rights in light of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
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specifically provides that "When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a
court... must consider international law; and... may consider
foreign law, 76 and the South African Court has done both on a
number of occasions. 77 The Constitutional Court has repeatedly held

that the constitutional mandate to consider international human rights
law "would include nonbinding as well as binding law," an

interpretation by no means obvious though apparently accepted as
correct. 78

In addition to provisions

specifically authorizing the

See Hurst Hannum, The Status and Futureof the Customary InternationalLaw
of Human Rights: The Status of the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights in
National and InternationalLaw, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 287, 313 (Fall
1995/Winter 1996) (citing provisions in Portuguese, Romanian, and Spanish
constitutions); see also id. at 377-91 (listing domestic decisions in twentyeight countries citing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
76. See S. AFR. CONST., § 39 (1997); see also CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, Vol. XVI (Gisbert H. Flanz, ed., 1997). Section 35
of the predecessor Interim Constitution of South Africa also required
consideration of international law and authorized consideration of foreign law.
Separate provisions of the South African Constitution govern when
international law applies of its own force. See id. §§ 231-32.
77. See, e.g., State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC), 1995
SACLR LEXIS 218, *53-56 (citing foreign approaches to role of legislative
history in constitutional interpretation); Id. at *64, *70-81 (discussing
international and foreign comparative law on substantive issues relating to the
death penalty); South Africa v. Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC), 2000
SACLR LEXIS 126, *47-57 (discussing international law bearing on
interpretation of constitutional right to housing, including International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights).
78. See Makwanyane, 1995 SACLR LEXIS at *73, quoted with approval
Grootboom, 2000 SACLR LEXIS 126 at *49; see generally John Dugard,
InternationalHuman Rights, in RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONALIsM: THE NEW
SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 191-95 (Dawid van Wyk et al. eds., 1996)

(noting that because the South African bill of rights was inspired by
international human rights conventions, drawing on their language and
structure, even without the direction to consider international law "there can be
little doubt" that the courts "would have been obliged to turn to international
human rights law for guidance"). Id. at 193. Dugard also argued from the
language of other provisions of the then interim constitution that the intention
was plain to require consideration of sources of international law to which
South Africa was not a party; "it would be ridiculous to limit [consideration of
human rights treaties] to those to which South Africa is a party (or may
become a party) as this would prevent a court from considering the
jurisprudence of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights, which
provides the most valuable source of international human rights law." Id. at
194. Dugard points out as an advantage of this approach that courts may
consider sources of international law, without having to determine "whether a
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consideration of foreign law, clauses like Canadian Charter Section
1, permitting only those limitations of rights demonstrably justified
in a "free and democratic" society, implicitly invite consideration of
the practices of other democratic nations. 79 Similar language is
found in some provisions of the ICCPR and of the regional human
rights conventions.8 0
2. Other consideration of international or foreign law for
constitutional interpretation
Yet the felt need to consider foreign and international authority
is not limited to settings with these forms of constitutional
authorization. The Chief Justice of Norway in 1998 wrote of "the
duty of national courts-and especially in the highest court in a small
country-to introduce new legal ideas from the outside world into
national judicial decisions.'
There appear to be a number of cases
in domestic national courts (whose constitutions do not expressly
particular principle.., is backed by sufficient practice (usus) and opiniojuris
to qualify as a customary rule binding on South Africa [under another
constitutional provision]." Id.
79. See also Lorraine Weinrib, Canada's ConstitutionalRevolution: From
Legislative to Constitutional State, 33 ISR. L. REV. 13, 30 (1999) (discussing
how Charter language by which rights could be restricted only in manner
justified in a "free and democratic society" "tie[s] the limitation analysis to the
post-war international and national rights-protecting systems"); cf Mary Ann
Glendon, A Beau Mentir Qui Vient De Loin: The 1988 Canadian Abortion
Decision in Comparative Perspective, 83 Nw. U.L. REV. 569, 579 (1989)
(noting uses of foreign cases to illustrate "more than one vision of... a free
and democratic society").
80. See e.g., ICCPR, supra note 10, at art. 22(2) (prohibiting restrictions on
freedom of association right except for "those which are prescribed by law and
which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security
or public safety, public order, ... the protection of public health or morals or
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others"); European Convention of
Human Rights, art. 8 (prohibiting "any interference" with privacy right "except
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of national security, public safety or ... economic well being.
. . for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others"); id. at art. 9
("Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or
morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others").
81. Carsten Smith, The Supreme Court in Present-Day Society, in THE
SUPREME COURT OF NORWAY 96, 145 (Stephan Tschudi-Madsen ed., 1998).
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authorize resort to foreign or international law for interpretive
purposes) that refer to foreign decisions or international human rights
sources not yet legislatively incorporated into domestic law. In India,
82
for example, the Supreme Court in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan,
concluded that the state's failure to prevent rape and sexual
harassment violated equality provisions of the Indian Constitution as
well as CEDAW. Although the status of treaties as internal law is
unclear from India's constitutional text,83 in Vishaka, the Court wrote
that "[a]ny international convention not inconsistent with the
fundamental rights [of the Indian Constitution] and in harmony with
its spirit must be read into these provisions to enlarge the meaning
and content thereof, to promote the object of the constitutional
guarantee." 84 In the same opinion the Court relied on an Australian
82. A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3011, reprinted in 3 Butterworths Human Rights
Cases 261 (1997).
83. See AM. SOC'Y INT'L LAW, NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE,
STUDIES IN TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL POLICY No. 27 85-86, 91-92 (Monroe

Leigh & R. Blakeslee eds., 1995). India became a party to CEDAW in 1993
but evidently no implementing legislation existed at the time of the Vishaka
decision. Article 51 of the Indian Constitution provides that "[t]he State shall
endeavor to... foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the
dealings of organised peoples with one another," while article 19(2) authorizes
restrictionson rights in order to preserve friendly relations with foreign states.
See INDIA CONST., arts. 19(2), 51, in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF

THE WORLD, Vol. VIII (Gilbert H. Flanz, ed., Oceana Publications, 1997). In
Article 253, the constitution also specifically empowers "Parliament... to
make any law... for implementing any treaty...." See AM. SOC'Y INT'L
LAW, supra at 106. According to commenters,
There is no provision in the Indian Constitution similar to Article
VI(2) of the United States Constitution, which proclaims treaties the
supreme law of the land. Article 253 of the Indian Constitution,
which confers legislative powers on Parliament, does not give clear
direction as to whether enactment by Parliament is required for the
implementation of treaties and agreements.. . . The question whether

a particular treaty or agreement calls for implementing legislation
depends very much upon its subject matter.
See id. at 91-92. In Vishaka, decided two years after this commentary, the
Court held that it was "implicit" in Article 51 and the enabling power of
Parliament that treaties not inconsistent with the Constitution should be "read
into it" so as to enlarge its guarantees, "[i]n the absence of domestic law
occupying the field." Vishaka v. Rajasthan, 3 Butterworths Human Rights
Cases 261, 264 (India, 1997).
84. Vishaka, 3 Butterworths Human Rights Cases at 264 (emphasis added).
The Court uses several formulations to describe the relationship between
international norms and domestic constitution. See id. (constitutional
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decision to support reading "international conventions and norms"
into judicial understandings of fundamental constitutional rights. 85 In
the United States, Justice Ginsburg has invoked both CEDAW and
the Covenant Against Race Discrimination in support of the idea that
"affirmative action" measures should be for a temporally limited
period of time-even though the United States has not ratified
CEDAW, and ratified the
Race Covenant with a reservation that it
6
self-executing.8
was not
provisions "permit" use of "international conventions and norms" in judicial
interpretation "in the absence of domestic law occupying the field"); id. at 265
(international norms on gender equality are of "great significance"); id. at 266
(referring to an "accepted rule of judicial construction" to consider
international law). See also Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India, 1 LRI 353, *8
(India, 1999) (stating that domestic courts "are under an obligation to give due
regard to international conventions and norms for construing domestic laws
when there is no inconsistency between them," referring to CEDAW and
interpreting guardianship law to allow mothers as well as fathers to serve). For
other Indian Supreme Court cases in which judges invoked international law or
foreign decisions as interpretive aids in resolving constitutional questions, see
for example, Shri D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1996) S.C.C. 416
(India) (addressing custodial violence as human rights violation); Madhu
Kishwar v. State of Bihar, (1996) 5 S.C.C. 125 (India) (Judgment of
Ramaswamy, J.) (citing CEDAW as well as Indian constitutional provisions to
challenge customary inheritance rules that disfavored women). According to
the Women's Rights Resource Center, the outcome of the latter case was that
women who were dependent on the land could not be removed from the land
but did not inherit, while the right of male succession was in "suspended
animation"; Ramaswamy's dissenting opinion would have recognized greater
rights for the female heirs. See Bora Laskin Law Library, University of
Toronto, Women's Human Rights Resources Web Page, at
http://eir.library.utoronto.ca/whrr (type "madhu kishwar" in search box) (last
visited Oct. 20, 2003) [hereinafter WHRR Web Page].
85. See Vishaka, 3 Butterworths Human Rights Cases at 266 (citing
Minister of Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh, (1995) 183 CLR 273
(Austl.)).
86. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2347-48 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (noting that the Court's view that affirmative action measures
should be temporally limited "accords with the international understanding of
the office of affirmative action" and expressing hope, but not "firm[] forecast,"
that within a generation such measures would not be needed). Justice
Ginsburg relied first on the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, id. at 2347, which the United States has
ratified but with a reservation that it was not self-executing. See U.S. Senate
Resolution of Advice and Consent Ratification of the International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess., 140 CONG. REc. S7634 (daily ed. June 24, 1994). She then cited and
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International human rights norms and comparative constitutional
decisions may both be referred to, reflecting a "blurring of
international law into comparative [constitutional] law." 87 Justice
Breyer, in the United States, has invoked the constitutional
experience of "roughly comparable" countries on the death penalty,
and has noted that the United States' reservation to the ICCPR on the
death penalty might not extend to claims that delay in carrying out
the death penalty because they violate prohibitions on cruel
punishments,88 in a context suggesting that the ICCPR supports a
reading of the U.S. Constitution to prohibit such delayed
executions. 89 In Quilter v. Attorney-General,90 New Zealand Court
quoted from CEDAW, see Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2347, which the United States

has signed but not yet ratified.
87. Knop, supranote 23, at 525.

88. See Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 996-97 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (discussing decisions of European Court of
Human Rights, the Privy Council on the Jamaican death penalty, the Indian,
Zimbabwean and Canadian Supreme Courts, the views of the U.N. Human
Rights Committee, and U.S. reservations to the ICCPR). See also Foster v.
Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 992-93 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (referring to decisions of other countries on effects of delay in
constitutionality of carrying out death penalty); Patterson v. Texas, 536 U.S.
984, 985 (2002) (Stevens, J. dissenting from denial of certiorari) (referring to a
consensus among states and the international community against the death
penalty for juveniles).
89. Alternatively Justice Breyer may have been suggesting that the ICCPR
directly applied to prohibit such executions, notwithstanding that the U.S.
ratification of the ICCPR specified that it was not self-executing. See Knight v.
Florida, 528 U.S. at 996-97; see also U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and
Consent to Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil And Political
Rights, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 138 CONG. REc. S4781 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992);
see generally Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural
Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1593 n.177
(2003) (compilation of recent ratifications of treaties specified by the Senate as
non-self-executing). At the outset of his opinion Justice Breyer identified the
issue in the case as one of U.S. constitutional law alone. See Knight, 528 U.S.
at 993 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). I thus think it is fair to
read his discussion of the ICCPR as bearing on interpretation of the
constitutional question.
90. [1998] 1 N.Z.L.R. 523, 1997 NZLR LEXIS 644 (three justices,
Richardson, Keith and Gault, finding that the Marriage Act, limiting marriage
to a union between a man and a woman, did not breach the anti-discrimination
provision of Section 19 the 1990 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act). Justice
Thomas, by contrast, found that the Marriage Act was in violation of Section
19 of the Bill of Rights Act, id. at 528, 1997 NZLR LEXIS at *13-15, while
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of Appeals justices with differing perspectives on a challenge to the
exclusion of gay marriages from the statutory definition of marriage
referred extensively to other courts' constitutional decisions and
international sources. 91
In Unity Dow v. Botswana,92 the Botswanan High Court and
Court of Appeals struck down a statutory discrimination against
female citizens' capacities to pass on citizenship to their children and
rejected a reading of the Botswana Constitution as excluding
protection from gender discrimination. They did so even though the
Constitution's equality clause defined discrimination by reference to
prohibited classifications which did not include gender 93 and the
Justice Tipping found an apparent discrimination that was at least arguably
justifiable. Id. at 571, 577, 1997 NZLR LEXIS at *136, *153. Section 19 of
the Bill of Rights in effect applies to discrimination based on sex and sexual
orientation, but while the Bill of Rights Act requires the interpretation of other
statutes in a manner consistent with the rights set forth if possible, it does not

permit the Court to invalidate legislation on that basis.

See Stephen

Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J.
COMP. L. 707, 728-29 (2001); Paul Rishworth, Review: Human Rights, 2003
N.Z. L. REv. 261, 273-74 (2003).
91. See Quilter v. Attorney-General, [1998] 1 N.Z.L.R. at 528, 531, 545,
1997 NZLR LEXIS at *14-15, *21-22, *62-63 (Thomas, J.) (citing, inter alia,
Canadian, United States and Hawaii cases); see also id. at 566, 1997 NZLR
LEXIS at *122-23 (Keith, J.) (noting both Romer and Bowers). For a
discussion of CEDAW and the ICCPR, see id. at 550, 1997 NZLR LEXIS at
*76-86 (Thomas, J.). The justices disagreed on whether international law
could be relied on to contract, as well as to expand, the meaning of the rights
protected under the New Zealand Bill of Rights. Compare id. at 552-54, 1997
NZLR LEXIS at *82-89 (Thomas, J.) (rejecting argument that limited reach of
ICCPR equality provisions should limit scope of equality provisions of Section
19 of New Zealand Bill of Rights), with id. at 560-63, 1997 NZLR LEXIS at
* 105-13 (Keith, J.) (relying on understandings that ICCPR would not require
gay marriage to limit scope of equality clause).
92. See Unity Dow v. Att'y Gen., reprintedin 15 HuM. RTS Q. 614 (Bots.
High Ct. 1991), affirmed in relevantpart, Unity Dow v. Att'y Gen., 103 I.L.R.
128, (Bots. Ct. App. 1992) (1996).
93. Section 15(1) of the Botswana Constitution provided, with some
qualifications, that "no law shall make any provision that is discriminatory
either of itself or in its effect." Unity Dow, 103 I.L.R. at 149 (Amissah, J.).
Section 15(3) stated "In this section, the expression 'discriminatory' means
affording different treatment to different persons, attributable wholly or mainly
to their respective descriptions by race, tribe, place of origin, political opinions,
colour or creed ... ." Id. Section 15(4) went on to exclude from the application
of Section(15)1 certain laws, including "personal law[s]" relating to adoption,
marriage and so forth. See id. (Amissah, J.). The government argued that the

Fall 2003]

GENDER EQUALITY

original Constitution itself included a gender distinction in
citizenship. 94 Both courts relied in part on international and
transnational legal sources, including the African Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights ban on sex discrimination, 95 even though the
African Charter had not been made enforceable by domestic
legislation.9 6 The Botswanan opinions also invoked the Universal
purpose of excluding gender from Section 15 was to preserve the "patrilineal"
character of Botswanan society. Id. at 136 (Amissah, J.), 188 (Bizosja, J.). The
majority judges, although noting the "difficulty" of the question, concluded in
light of Section 3 of the Constitution as well as international law's
commitment to gender equality that the listing of categories in Section 15 was
illustrative, not comprehensive. Id. at 161 (Amissah, J.) (justifying use of
international human rights materials "in the interpretation of what no doubt are
some difficult provisions of the Constitution"). Section 3 of the Constitution
stated in part:
Whereas every person in Botswana is entitled to the fundamental
rights and freedoms of the individual, that is to say, the right, whatever
his race, place of origin, political question, colour, creed or sex.., to
each and all of the following, namely--(a) life, liberty, security of the
person and the protection of law; (b) freedom of conscience... (c)
protection for the privacy of his home.. .and from deprivation of
property without compensation ....
Id. at 140 (Amissah, J.P.).
94. See id. at 158 (Amissah, J.P.); id. at 192 (Schreiner, J., dissenting). The
government's argument in support of the statute rested not only on the
omission of gender as a prohibited ground of discrimination in Section 15 of
the Constitution but also on the fact that another chapter of the original
constitution had explicitly provided one citizenship rule more favorable for
men than for women. The latter point, Justice Schreiner said in dissent, was a
"very fair indication" that Section 15 was not intended to prohibit
discrimination against women. Id. The significance of the international
materials relied on looms larger in the face of domestic legal support for a
contrary interpretation.
95. See Unity Dow, 13 Hum. Rts. Q. at 623; Unity Dow, 103 I.L.R. at 161.
96. See Unity Dow, 13 Hum. Rts. Q. at 623 ("I bear in mind that signing the
Convention does not give it the power of law in Botswana but the effect of the
adherence by Botswana to the Convention must show that a construction" of
Section 15 should extend, "in harmony with the convention" to ban sex
discrimination); Unity Dow, 103 I.L.R. at 161 (Assimah, J.P.) (assuming that
Universal Declaration and African Charter "do not confer enforceable rights on
individuals," they may still be referred to as aids in interpreting the
constitution). Moreover, one Court of Appeals justice relied on the reasoning
of a New Zealand judge that "[a]n international treaty, even one not acceded to
by New Zealand, can be looked at by the court on the basis that in the absence
of express words Parliament would not have wanted a decision-maker to act
contrary to such a treaty." Id. at 178 (Aguda, J.), citing Birds Galore Ltd v.
Attorney General, [1989] LRC (Const.) 928, 939, reprinted in 90 I.L.R. 567,
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Declaration of Human Rights, Privy Council decisions reviewing
cases from Zimbabwe and Australia and referring to the "comity of
civilised nations," the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women (1967) and CEDAW.97 Unity Dow,
98
in turn, has been invoked by the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe
along with decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and the
Human Rights Committee of the U.N. 99
578 (N.Z. High Ct. 1988) (1992); see also Unity Dow, 103 I.L.R. at 159
(Amissah, J.P.) (relying on statutory Interpretation Act 1984 authorizing
"regard to... any relevant international treaty, agreement or convention" as an
aid to "construction of the enactment... including the pre-existing
Constitution where its provisions were not clear"). But cf id. at 202 (Puckrin,
J., dissenting) (suggesting danger to national sovereignty in relying on
international declarations where the Constitution sought to be interpreted is
unambiguous).
97. See Unity Dow, 103 I.L.R. at 159-61 (Amissah, J.P.) (referring to
African Charter, Declaration on Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women; discussing Lord Wilberforce's opinion concerning the constitution of
Bermuda, framed in light of the European Convention and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and stating that Botswana's Constitution had the
same antecedents "with regard to the imperatives of the international
community;" describing Botswana as "member of a comity of civilized
nations"), 177-78 (Aguda, J.) (CEDAW and African Charter on Human and
People's Rights). See also id. at 139 (Assimah, J.) (referring to decisions in
Canada, Nigeria, Namibia and the United States); Unity Dow, 13 Hum Rts Q.
at 617-19, 623-24, 626 (discussing African Charter, European Convention,
Declaration on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, as well as Lord
Wilberforce's Bermuda constitution opinion, Zimbabwe and Australian
decisions).
98. Rattigan v. Immigration Office, 103 I.L.R. 224, 228, 1995 (2) SA 182,
185 (Zimb. 1994) (referring to Unity Dow); see also 103 I.L.R.. at 231, 1995
(2) SA at 188 (citing U.S. Supreme Court decisions). Rattigan found a
violation of the constitutional right to freedom of movement where the law
provided that a foreign born husband of a Zimbabwe citizen, unlike a foreign
born wife, was not entitled to stay in the country.
99. See Rattigan, 103 I.L.R. at 232-33, 1995 (2) SA at 189-90 (discussing
Aumeeruddy-Cziffa v. Mauritius decision of the Human Rights Committee and
Abdulaziz Cabales v. United Kingdom decision of the ECHR). For other
references to international norms in resolving gender disputes in African
countries, see Longwe v. Intercontinental Hotels, [1993] 4 LRC 221, 227-31
(Zambia High Ct. 1992) (concluding that a private hotel's refusal to serve
women in its bar violated the Constitution, referring to both the African
Charter and CEDAW); Ephrahim v. Pastory, [1990] LRC 757, reprinted in 87
I.L.R. 106, 110 (Tanz. High Ct. 1990) (referring both to the Universal
Declaration and to CEDAW to conclude that a sex discriminatory bar on
women's selling clan land was condemned by Tanzanian constitution). Note
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A caveat: I do not mean to suggest that all of the constitutional
courts of the world are involved in this kind of discourse, 00 nor that
those which do refer on occasion to transnational sources do so
consistently or for the same reasons, or generally act in accordance
with international human rights law or with equality rights-protecting
foreign constitutional court decisions, in resolving domestic
constitutional challenges. 10 1 There are cases in which domestic
courts note international legal norms but conclude, sometimes with
evident reluctance, that conflicting domestic norms control. 10 2 There
that the African Charter has been invoked not only to reject but on occasion to
uphold gender discrimination. See Magaya v. Magaya, [1999] 3 LRC 35, 49
(Zimb.) (referring to scholarly discussion of preamble to African Charter on
Human and People's Rights and its emphasis on the virtues of African
"historical tradition" in course of upholding customary inheritance law
discriminating in favor of male progeny).
100. Perhaps because of the common British colonial influence and patterns
of comparison in Privy Council review, many of the decisions noted come
from Commonwealth nations. See also infra note 130. My ability to read
cases is limited by their availability in English, a limitation which itself may
result in over-attention to decisions of Commonwealth or former
Commonwealth countries, albeit in different parts of the world. But even
among countries sharing a Commonwealth legal background, there are vast
differences, and some appear more likely to engage in transnational references
than others. See also infra note 130.
101. See, e.g., Sharifan v. Fed'n of Pakistan, P.L.D. 1998 Lahore 59, 50 All
Pak. Legal Decisions 59, 62-63 (1997) (Lahore) (rejecting challenge to gender
discrimination in citizenship law, noting sources from the U.S. and Privy
Council in nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, India in the mid-1970s and
"private international law" of the mid-twentieth century); Magaya v. Magaya,
[1999] 3 L.R.C. 35 (Zimb. Sup. Ct.) (rejecting challenge to discrimination
against women in customary inheritance rights); see also Knop, supra note 23,
at 524-25 ("domestic interpretation of international law is not everywhere the
same nor, indeed, everywhere good or everywhere bad"); McCrudden, supra
note 1, at 507 (noting concerns about inconsistency in courts' consideration of
foreign cases); cf Hannum, supra note 75, at 312 (noting that "mere recitation"
of human rights values "may not necessarily reflect an honest intention to
adhere to them"); Mumbi Mathangani, Women's Rights in Kenya: A Review of
Government Policy, 8 HARV. HuM. RTS. J. 179, 191 (1995) (describing
violations of CEDAW by legislative, executive and judicial branches of
government and asserting that in practice, courts in Kenya have "completely
disregarded" CEDAW).
102. See, e.g., Bahdi, supra note 41, at 581-82 (discussing Dunghana v.
Nepal decision, refusing to strike down a law conditioning daughters' rights to
inherit on being unmarried at age 35); UNIFEM, BRINGrNG EQuALrrY HoME
22-23 (Ilana Landsburg-Lewis ed., 1998) (describing decision in Dhungana v.
Nepal, Writ No. 3392 (1993)(SC)(unreported and unofficial). Although
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are also instances in which a court appears interested in using
international human rights law as an aid to interpretation on some
issues, but rejects them on others. 10 3 What interpretive principles
CEDAW had domestic status in Nepal, the Court declined to invalidate the
law; according to Bahdi and UNIFEM, the Nepalese court ordered discussions
in the political arena concerning the impact of the legislation on equality rights,
thus arguably invoking a dialogical model of rights definition. Cf Quilter v.
Attorney Gen., [1998] 1 N.Z.L.R. 523, 528-30, 1997 NZLR LEXIS 644, at
*13-18 (Thomas, J.) (finding discrimination but agreeing that under New
Zealand Bill of Rights court lacked power to invalidate statute). See also
Magaya, 3 LRC at 49 (arguing that it is for the legislature, not the court, to
address gender inequality in customary inheritance law); Kishwar v. State of
Bihar, (1996) 5 S.C.C. 125 (Punchhi, J.) (India) (expressing concern for
judicial activism and need for legislation to deal with intricacies of change in
customary land inheritance). For discussion of the benefits of a "dialogic"
model in mediating competing currents in Muslim countries on gender
equality, secularism and religious identity, see Sunder, supra note 24, at 143341.
103. Thus, notwithstanding its Rattigan decision, supra notes 98-99, the
Zimbabwe Supreme Court later upheld customary laws that deny daughters
inheritance rights. See Magaya, 3 L.R.C. at 41-2 (treating customary law as
exempt from constitutional gender equality challenge because Section 23
(which, like Section 15 of the Botswana Constitution discussed in Unity Dow,
forbids discrimintation but does not specifically include gender as a prohibited
basis) has an explicit exception for laws relating to "devolution of property on
death" or the application of African customary law). The Magaya court treated
the customary law basis for the gender discrimination as having overriding
force in constitutional interpretation. See id. at 41 (relying on Section 23(3) of
the Constitution as an exception to the gender equality norm for the application
of African customary law in cases involving Africans). Although in Rattigan
(which rested on the right to freedom of movement) the Court held that Section
11 of the Zimbabwe Constitution (which, like Section 3 of the Botswana
Constitution discussed above, guarantees "fundamental rights and freedoms" to
each individual "whatever his race, tribe. .. or sex") was not merely
preambulatory but was meant to establish substantive rights, in Magaya the
Court expressed some doubt whether the Constitution forbade discrimination
based on sex, but noted that it might be construed to do so "on account of
Zimbabwe's adherence to gender equality enshrined in international human
rights instruments." Id. at 41. Nonetheless, the Court accepted that "allowing
female children to inherit in a broadly patrilineal society.., would disrupt the
African customary laws" which had been constitutionally protected in Section
23(3). Id. at 44; cf Bayefsky, supra note 10, at 247-48 (describing Canadian
defense in 1980 of gender discrimination in Indian status law based on
patrilineality). Furthermore, the Magaya court found it "prudent to pursue a
pragmatic and gradual change which would win long term acceptance" through
appeals to the legislature "rather than legal revolution initiated by the courts."
Id. at 49. For critique, see J. Oloka-Onyango, Human Rights and Sustainable
Development in ContemporaryAfrica: A New Dawn, or RetreatingHorizons?,
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influence what transnational authorities are considered and for what
purposes is not always made clear.1°4 In some instances, courts rely
on international human rights law, constitutional decisions of other
courts and their own constitutional provisions to reach a decision, as
if these different materials were an entirely congruent body of
overlapping legal sources.105

At other times, international legal

conventions are discussed separately and treated as having force in
the interpretation of domestic constitutional law, even if not yet
implemented by domestic legislation.'0 6 These divergent and at
times inconsistent practices, however, should not obscure the
6 BUFF. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 39, 64-66 (2000) (criticizing Magaya's deference
to customary law and absence of concern for international law including
CEDAW). Courts in other African nations have found, to the contrary, that
gender discrimination in customary law is trumped by constitutional and
international gender equality norms. See Ephrahim v. Pastory, 1990 LRC 757,
reprintedin 87 I.L.R. 106, 110 (Tanz. High Ct. 1990) (discussing CEDAW).
104. Compare Magaya, 3 L.R.C. at 44, 49 (discussing African Charter as
suggesting the importance of traditional African values, apparently including
women's status as a "junior male") with Unity Dow v. Attorney General, 103
I.L.R. 128, 161 (Bots. Ct. App. 1992) (1996) (Amissah, J.P.) (discussing
African Charter's commitments to gender equality). It has been suggested that
commitments to gender equality are inconsistent with other international law
guarantees of the right of peoples to self -governance and to the preservation of
their cultural heritage. See, e.g., David M. Bigge & Amdlie von Briesen, Note,
Conflict in the Zimbabwean Courts: Women's Rights and Indigenous SelfDetermination in Magaya v. Magaya, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 289, 296-99
(2000). This position depends on contestable claims about the authenticity and
stability of that which we call culture, but bears mention because such claims
point out the complexity and arguable tensions within the domain of
international human rights law.
105. See, e.g., Unity Dow, 13 HuM. RTs. Q. at 616-25 (1991); Rattigan v.
Chief Immigration Officer, 1995 (2) SA 182, 186-90 (Zimb.) (discussing
European Court of Human Rights, U.S., Botswanan, and UN Human Rights
Commission decisions). For discussion, see Bahdi, supra note 41, at 586
(noting instances in which "judges invoke international and comparative legal
sources as a package; they bundle together legally binding sources such as
ratified treaties with sources that cannot give rise to legal obligations such as
the national constitutions of other states and instruments from regional systems
that do not apply to the state in question"); Knop, supra note 23, at 525-33
(noting advantages of blurring of distinctions between international and
foreign law in the interpretive processes of domestic courts).
106. See, e.g., Vishaka v. Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3011, reprinted in 3
Butterworths Human Rights Cases 261 (India 1997); see also Knight v.
Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 996-97 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
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increasingly common phenomenon of judicial reference to
transnational sources of international and foreign constitutional law.
3. Obligations to consider nonbinding law?
The simultaneous acknowledgment of the nonbinding character
of external sources of law and an obligatory sense that they must be
considered, displayed in some instances of transnational
constitutional discourse, is especially noteworthy. 10 7 Courts not only
are citing to international materials which (if not presently binding)
are potentially binding in the future on their legal orders, but they are
also citing to (and at times even distinguishing) plainly nonbinding
authority consisting of the decisions of other national courts-in
India, New Zealand, South Africa, and Canada. 10 8 In some of these
cases the challenged discrimination is upheld: In President of the
Republic of South Africa v. Hugo, 10 9 the Constitutional Court of
South Africa rejected a challenge to a law authorizing the President
to extend pardons to incarcerated mothers of young children but not

107. See Mima E. Adjami, African Courts, International Law and
Comparative Case Law: Chimera or Emerging Human Rights Jurisprudence?,
24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 103, 108-13, 147 (2002) (noting that African courts draw
on nonbinding international sources without explicit constitutional approval,
and do not give greater deference to binding international instruments, such as
African Charter, than to nonbinding law, like the European Convention); see
also supra note 105.
108. See e,.g., Vishaka, 3 Butterworths Human Rights Cases at 266 (citing
Australian High Court decision); Quilter v. Attorney Gen., [1998] 1 N.Z.L.R.
523, 528, 545, 1997 NZLR LEXIS 644, *14-15, *62-63 (Thomas, J.) (citing
Canadian and U.S. Supreme Court decisions); State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (6)
BCLR 665, 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218, at *77-102, 107-15 (distinguishing,
inter alia, U.S. and Indian death penalty cases in reaching conclusion that
death penalty violated South African constitution); R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3
S.C.R. 697, 738-45, 749-55 (Can.) (citing and discussing U.S. First
Amendment caselaw, European Convention, ICCPR, and other international
instruments); R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, 503 (Can.) (discussing U.S.
First Amendment law on obscenity in challenge to anti-pornography statute).
For a discussion of these Canadian cases, see Vicki C. Jackson, Gender and
TransnationalLegal Discourse,14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 377, 381-85 (2002)
[hereinafter Jackson, Transnational Legal Discourse]; see also Slaughter,
Global Community, supra note 7, at 199 (noting "rise in persuasive authority");
Slaughter, Globalization,supra note 7, at 1116-17 (noting many citations to
nonbinding authority); McCrudden, supra note 1, at 512 (noting that courts are
distinguishing cases that are plainly not binding).
109. 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC), 1997 SACLR LEXIS 91.
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to incarcerated fathers. Both the majority and the dissent cited and
discussed foreign constitutional caselaw: "l 0 the majority concluded
that, while there was a gender discrimination, it was not an "unfair"
one in light of differences in the situations of mothers and fathers of
young children, and the dissent concluded that the distinction
reinforced stereotypes and assumptions that underlay women's
subordination and was prohibited by the South African
Constitution."' What is of interest here is the number of judges in
courts around the world that feel impelled to acknowledge the
decisions of others.
New Zealand cases have particularly advanced the idea that
courts have an obligation to consult international human rights law in
resolving domestic legal questions. In 1977 in Van Gorkom v.
Attorney-General,"2 a challenge to an administrative policy that
discriminated with regard to payment of moving expenses for male
and female teachers, the lower court wrote:
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights . . . [and]

The Declaration on Elimination of Discrimination against
Women... [are not] part of our domestic law[,] [t]hey
represent goals towards which members of the United
Nations are expected to work... [and thus] might influence
the courts in the interpretation of statute law[.]...
[C]omparatively new [legal powers]... should not without
compelling reason be taken to allow the introduction of a
110. See id. at *66-69 (Goldstone, J.) (discussing Canadian case law on
equality); id. at *106-07 nn.87, 89 (Kriegler, J., dissenting) (discussing
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) and
Canadian caselaw). The majority opinion spent more time discussing
comparative law on pardons than on gender equality and, interestingly, did not
discuss CEDAW, even though it had been ratified by South Africa in 1995.
(Justice Kriegler, in dissent, commented that the case was "hard" because "it
seems mean spirited in the extreme to scrutinise closely the validity of an act
of clemency by the newly inaugerated President aimed at enabling a few
hundred women prisoners, sentenced for less reprehensible crimes, to care for
their young children." Id. at *89-90 n.80.)
111. Id. at *64 (majority) (noting also that women bore much more of the
burden of childrearing and that there were far fewer women in prison than
men); id. at *106 (Kriegler, J., dissenting) (condemning the gender
discrimination here as stemming from a view that is a "relic and a feature of
the patriarchy which the Constitution so vehemently condemns")
112. [1977] 1 N.Z.L.R. 535, 1977 NZLR LEXIS 609 (N.Z. Sup. Ct.
Wellington).
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policy conflicting with the spirit of international
standards
3
documents."l
Nations
United
the
by
proclaimed
In Tavita v. Minister of Immigration, 1 4 a foreigner married to a
New Zealander sought to obtain legal residency in New Zealand, and
invoked the ICCPR and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, in
interpreting New Zealand's Bill of Rights Act (which, despite its
statutory character, is treated as requiring unusually broad remedial
interpretation). 15 The government's argument that the international
obligations were unenforceable was, according to the court, an
"unattractive argument" suggesting that international obligations
were "at least partly window-dressing." ' 16 Even though the Human
Rights Committee's decisions on individual complaints are not, as a
formal matter, binding judgments on New Zealand as a matter of

113. Id. at 542-43, 1977 NZLR LEXIS at *23-25 (internal quotations

omitted). The court also took note of the International Labor Organization's

("ILO") Equal Remuneration Convention, and of the fact that it was not then
ratified in New Zealand. See Sir Kenneth Keith K.B.E, The Application of
InternationalHuman Rights Law in New Zealand, 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 401, 408
(1997) (treating Van Gorkom as an instance of an unincorporated treaty being
relied upon as evidence of public policy or as an aid to the interpretation of a
statute). According to Keith, New Zealand follows most Commonwealth
countries in the practice that treaties do not automatically become judicially
enforceable law; "[I]f a change in rights and duties under the law is required
then there must be appropriate legislative action." Id. at 406.
114. [1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. 257 (C.A.), 1993 NZLR LEXIS 634.
115. See, e.g., id. at 260, 1993 NZLR LEXIS at *11-12; Coburn v. Human
Rights Commission, [1994] 3 N.Z.L.R. 323, 333-34, 1994 NZLR LEXIS 626,
*33-34 (N.Z. High Ct. Auckland) (citing other New Zealand precedent); N.
Reg'l Health Auth. v. Human Rights Comm'n [1998] 2 N.Z.L.R. 218, 234-35,
1997 NZLR LEXIS 659, *44-48 (N.Z. High Ct. Auckland). (For a brief
description of the distinctive quasi-constitutional approach to the protection of
human rights in New Zealand, see supra note 90.) As the New Zealand courts
have frequently noted, the ICCPR inspired the New Zealand Bill of Rights act.
See, e.g., N. Reg'l Health Auth., [1998] 2 N.Z.L.R. at 232-33, 1997 NZLR
LEXIS at *39-41. Here, as in many other post-World War II constitutional
and human rights documents, the model for enactment invites recourse to
comparative and international sources in subsequent interpretation.
116. Tavita v. Minister of Organization, [1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. 257, 265-66,
1993 NZLR LEXIS 47, *28-29. Reem Bahdi characterizes this form of
reasoning as invoking the rule of law, the idea that, even where treaty
obligations have not been made domestically enforceable, "the state must be
held accountable for its promises made in international instruments." Bahdi,
supra note 41, at 560.
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international law,1 17 its decisions have nonetheless become important
(and in a sense obligatory) to consider: New Zealand having
acceded to the Optional Protocol of the ICCPR, the United Nations
Human Rights Committee was "in a sense part of this country's
to New Zealand
judicial structure, in that individuals subject
'' 18
jurisdiction have direct rights of recourse to it."
What is different here is the sense of joint purpose, of being
embedded not only in a community of nations making decisions
about similar issues under similar domestic constitutional
instruments, but of an overarching legal order of internationally
recognized human rights norms that, whether or not domestically
incorporated, provides reason to strive to meet the international
standard and to be mindful of other interpretations in doing so.119
This sense of connectedness seems new, and is in part reflected in
117. See Steven R. Ratner, New Democracies, Old Atrocities: An Inquiry In
InternationalLaw, 87 GEo L.J. 707, 724-25 (1999).
118. Tavita, [1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. at 266, 1993 NZLR LEXIS 47, *30-31. The
court also commented that a "failure to give practical effect to international
instruments... may attract criticism," id., and noted the Balliol Statement's
reference "to the duty of the judiciary to interpret and apply national
constitutions, ordinary legislation and the common law in light of the
universality of human rights." Id. at *28-29. The Tavita court did not decide
exactly what bearing international human rights law had on domestic law, but
suggested a reconsideration by the Minister in light of the international human
rights implications. See also N. Reg ' Health Auth. 2 N.Z.L.R. at 233-34, 1997
NZLR LEXIS 659, *42-44 (referring to General Comments of the UN Human
Rights Committee); Tavita, [1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. at 262-63, 1993 NZLR LEXIS
47, *17-21 (discussing caselaw of the European Court of Human Rights); cf
Atty-Gen'l v. Refugee Council of New Zealand, Inc., [2003] 2 N.Z.L.R. 577,
Para. 103 (2003) (discussing difference between a duty to "give effect" to an
international obligation and duty to "have regard" for it).
119. Professor Slaughter has emphasized the increasing role of courts as
institutions engaging in dialogue and relationships with each other both in
adjudicatory decisions and in nonadjudicatory collegial settings. See Slaughter,
supra note 1,at 1120-23; Slaughter, Global Community, supra note 7, at 19395; McCrudden, supra note 1, at 506. The sense of obligation to consider
nonbinding legal sources that I have described is written about by judges as
much (if not more) as an obligation to the law than as a relationship to other
tribunals, though these two phenomena appear to be closely related and
mutually reinforcing. Compare Tavita, [1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. at 266, 1993 NZLR
LEXIS 47, *30-31 (discussing the UN Human Rights Committee and a
relationship with that tribunal as a result of the optional protocol), with Van
Gorkom, [1977] 1 N.Z.L.R. at 542-43, 1977 NZLR LEXIS at *24-25
(discussing the Universal Declaration as a source of law).
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the almost casual admixture of international sources and sources
based on the domestic law of other nations found in some
12 0
decisions.
But at the same time New Zealand judges assert that comments
of the Human Rights Committee "and similar statements emerging
from other
committees
monitoring U.N.
human
rights
instruments, ' 12 1 can provide assistance (as can comparative
constitutional interpretation), they may also assert that they are not
binding in New Zealand courts. 122 Why, then, must they be
considered? Why must the Indian Constitution's equality provisions
be read in light of CEDAW? 12 3 Why must the South African
constitutional court consider international human rights law in
interpreting domestic constitutional rights, even when that
international law is not binding?12 4 Is there a new kind of
"stickiness" or attraction of international and comparative human
rights precedents, that create a sense of obligation to consider even if
not to follow?

120. See also Tavita, [1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. at 266,1993 NZLR LEXIS 47, *2829 (referring to the Balliol and Bloemfontein statements developed at meetings
of judges of Commonwealth nations encouraging resort to international human
rights law in the interpretation of domestic constitutions, statutory and
common law). But cf Longwe v. Intercontinental Hotels, [1993] 4 L.R.C. 221,
233 (Zambia High Court) (distinguishing appropriate effect of Bangalore
principles, as mere resolution of a jurists' meeting, from international
conventions entered into by Zambia).
121. See, e.g., N. Reg'l Health Auth. v. Human Rights Comm'n, [1998] 2
N.Z.L.R. 218, 235, 1997 NZLR LEXIS 659, *46-47 (1997) (N.Z. High Ct.
Auckland) ("[n]one of the principles or statements are binding" though they
should be considered); Quilter v. Attorney General, [ 1998] N.Z.L.R. 523, 531,
1997 NZLR LEXIS 644, *21 (Thomas, J.).
122. See e.g., Quilter, [1998] N.Z.L.R. at 531, 1997 NZLR LEXIS 644, *21
(Thomas, J.); N. Reg'l Health Auth. v. Human Rights Comm'n, [1998] 2
N.Z.L.R. 218, 235, 1997 NZLR LEXIS 659, *46-47. The judge in Northern
Regional wrote: "Any analysis of policy which may... discriminate must be
done in the light of the international principles and experience as stated in the
relevant conventions and covenants and, where appropriate, assistance may be
drawn from overseas cases, whether directed at domestic issues or emanating
from statements of international committees or colloquia. Any such assistance
as can be derived is just that: assistance. None of the principles or statements
are bindingon New ZealandCourts." (emphasis added).
123. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
124. See S. AFR.CONST., § 39(1)(b) (1997); supranote 78.
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B. Some Explanations

Cross-references in individual rights cases today must be
understood in a different light than those of earlier times. First, the
very concept of human rights is in tension with commitments to
strongly positive and particularist notions of law. Gerald Neuman
has referred to the "suprapositive" aspect of human rights, 125 a word
that resonates with a sense that rights have existence outside of
positive law, a moral force derived from the nature of human
beings. 126 The founding of the United Nations, the promulgation of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 127 and the growth in the
125. Gerald L. Neuman, Human Rights and ConstitutionalRights: Harmony

and Dissonance, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1863, 1868-69 (2003). The universality of
human rights, both in general and with respect to particular norms, including
gender equality, has been challenged. See, e.g., Sunder, supra note 24, at
1413 & n.56; Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, State Responsibility to Change
Religious and Customary Laws, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN, supra note 23,
at 172 (explaining that international human rights are not universally accepted
but urging "high standard of proof' for those who would challenge their
applicability). See also infra note 128.
126. See Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: of Continuities and
Comparative Constitutional Experience, 51 DuKE L.J. 223, 272-73 n.207
(2001) [hereinafter Narratives].
127. U.S. Supreme Court Justices have, on occasion, acknowledged the U.N.
Charter in their reasoning. See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 650
n.4 (1948) (Black, J. concurring, in case invalidating application of state laws
that discriminated against U.S. citizens of Japanese descent); cf Re Drummond
Wren, [1945] O.R. 778, 781-84, 1945 Ont. Rep. LEXIS 36, *7-13. But cf Sei
Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 619-22, 630 (Cal. 1952) (holding that U.N.
Charter is not self-executing and thus does not provide basis for invalidating
law discriminating against aliens in land ownership but finding that the state
law violated the Fourteenth Amendment). The U.N. Charter was noted as a
possible basis to support federal voting rights legislation, but one the Court
need not reach, in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 647 n.5 (1965). See
also Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 28 n.4 (1948) (noting but not deciding claim
that enforcement of racially restrictive covenants would violate the UN
Charter); United States v. Alvaraz-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 678-79 n.20 (1992)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). References to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights are found on occasion in opinions for the Court. See Zemel v. Rusk,
381 U.S. 1, 15, n.13 (1965); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 161
n.16 (1963); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 521 n.14 (1970) (Marshall,
J., dissenting); Int'l Assn. of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 776-77 (1961)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (citing debate concerning the Declaration). After
1970 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was not cited in the Supreme
Court again until Justice Breyer's dissent from denial of certiorari in Knight v.
Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 996 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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formal levels of adherence to major human rights covenantsincluding but not limited to CEDAW and the ICCPR--cast in a new
light domestic courts' references to international human rights norms
or comparative constitutional law. In the wake of gross violations of
human rights in World War II, the world community experienced
something akin to a post-war constitutional moment leading to
commitments that, insofar as they seek to protect individual rights,
feel unmistakeably legal as well as political in character. 2 8 The
courts in many nations recognize the legal content of these
international human rights commitments and treat them as ones that
should be considered even if not legally binding.' 29 Cross-references
may reflect how at least some significant actors in the international
community13 are moving away from highly positivist notions of law,
128. The post-World War II founding moment and world commitment to the
idea of human rights occurred over a number of years and perhaps primarily
among a set of governing elites; moreover, like some constitutional moments
in U.S. history, it was limited by the absence of independent participation from
many countries, then still in the status of colonies. On constitutional moments
in the U.S., see BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6-7, 26688 (1991) (identifying more specific political parameters of "mobilized
deliberation" that define U.S. constitutional moments). For critique of the
claimed universality of the Universal Declaration, see, for example,
Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab, Human Rights: A Western Construct with
Limited Applicability, in HUMAN RIGHTS: CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES 4 (Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab eds. 1979) (noting that
Charter and Universal Declaration were adopted "at a time when most Third
World countries were still under colonial rule"); see also supra note 125.
Nonetheless, adoption of the Universal Declaration constituted an important
moment of significant change beginning in basic conceptions of sovereignty
and rights leading to subsequently adopted human rights conventions. See
generally LOUIs HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 286 (1999) (describing
significance of Universal Declaration).
129. See Michael Kirby, The Role of the Judge in Advancing Human Rights
By Reference to InternationalHuman Rights Norms, 62 AUSTL. L.J. 514, 516
(1988) [hereinafter Kirby, Role of the Judge].
130. As noted above, supra note 100, countries differ significantly in their
participation in transnational discourse, and many of the cases discussed in this
article are from present or former Commonwealth members. This apparent
over-attention to their decisions may reflect not only their relatively easy
accessibility in English but also the influence of Commonwealth legal
institutions on receptivity to comparative analysis. Different national histories,
legal structures and traditions, political institutions, languages and alliances
may all affect national courts' willingness or capacity to look beyond their own
borders at foreign or international law, as well as the likelihood that a
particular national court's decisions will be considered or referred to by others.
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less worried about particular sources and their authority, and more
concerned with the coalescence of domestic, and international
sources, around core normative ideas. This new normativity of
human rights law is reflected in the way references to other
constitutional courts' decisions are often accompanied by references
to international legal norms as well. The sense of distinctive
sovereignties is diminished, as is the strong distinction between
law and international legal norms in areas of
domestic constitutional
13
human rights.

'

The concept of human rights, moreover, has become a source of
self-identification for the role of judges in many countries around the
world. Justices in Australia, Canada, Israel, and South Africa have
Though not the focus of this article, differential interest in transnational
discourse surely warrants study. For one interesting treatment of differential
receptivity to comparative analysis of constitutional questions, see Harding,
supra note 5.
131. Cf Oscar M. Garibaldi, General Limitations on Human Rights: The

Principle of Legality, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 503, 517 (1976) (asserting that the
criterion determining the "boundaries of human rights is not law (especially
written law) but justice"). One manifestation of the internationalization of
domestic law (as well as of the significant position of the U.S.) is the interest
that other countries and international organizations have taken in the
development of U.S. constitutional law. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001)
involved a constitutional challenge to a gender discrimination in the capacity
of unwed mothers and unwed fathers to pass on U.S. citizenship eligibility to
children born abroad. One amicus brief was filed by a group including the
International Commission of Jurists, the International Federation of Women
Jurists, the Argentine Association of Women Judges, and the Ethiopian
Women Judges Association, as well as Equality Now's Women's Action
Network (which, according to the statement of interest in the amicus brief,
consists "of more than 5,000 groups and individuals in more than 100 countries
around the world including the United States, [who] have written to United
States government officials, urging them to work for the adoption of the same
legal standard, based on equality, for U.S. citizen fathers and mothers to
transmit citizenship to their children born abroad and out-of-wedlock"). See
Brief of Equality Now et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, at ii,
Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (No. 99-2071) [hereafter "Brief of Equality
Now"]. International participation as amicus curiae also occurred in McCarver
v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2001) (dismissing certiorari as improvidently
granted). See Brief of Amicus Curiae The European Union in Support of
Petitioner, McCarver v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2001) (No. 00-8727);
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (citing the EU's McCarver
Amicus Brief); see also Brief of Mary Robinson et al. as Amicus Curiae,
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (No. 02-102) [hereinafter Robinson
Brief].
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published extrajudicial accounts of this kind of self-understanding. 132
These descriptions should not be dismissed as merely the specialized
account of a small and unusually privileged group of justices from a
small and limited group of nations, for they are reflected, as well, in
statements of self-description by international associations of judges.
Thus, the International Commission of Jurists describes itself as
"dedicated to the primacy, coherence and implementation of
international law and principles that advance human rights.' 33 The
International Association of Judges describes itself as having as its
"main aim... to safeguard the independence of the judiciary, as an
essential requirement of the judicial function and guarantee of human
rights and freedom."' 34 These organizational statements of identity
reinforce Professor Slaughter's claim that judges in a number of
countries around the world have developed a "particular selfconception" of their task as including the protection of human rights
vis-A-vis governments. 35 This self-conception is also reflected in
statements of principle concerning the judicial role in using
international human rights law in domestic adjudication, formed in
36
meetings of judges, for example, of the Commonwealth nations,
and of the LAWASIA region.137
132. See, e.g., Kirby, Role of the Judge, supra note 129, at 525-31;
L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 1; Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role
of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARv. L. REv. 16, 20-21, 26 (2002);
Beverley McLachlin, The Civilization of Difference, The Fourth Annual
LaFontaine-Baldwin
Lecture,
(March
7,
2003)
available at
http://www.operation-dialogue.com/lafontaine-baldwin/e/2003__speech_1 .html
(last visited Oct. 20, 2003); Sachs, supra note 74, at 1387-88; see also Smith,
supra note 81, at 110-11 (emphasizing, as Chief Justice of Norway, importance
of courts protecting "civil and political rights").
133. See Intemational Commission of Jurists, at http://www.icj.org (last
visited Sept. 17,2003).
134. See International Association of Judges, at http://www.iajuim.org/ENG/mainframe.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2003).
135. See Slaughter, supra note 1, at 128; see also id. at 128-29 (describing
judicial "awareness of the similarity or commonality of the judicial enterprise
across countries, an awareness bolstered in turn by a mutual recognition of a
common judicial identity and an openness to persuasive authority").
136. See "Report of Judicial Colloquium on the Domestic Application of
International Human Rights Norms, Bangalore, India", reproduced as
Appendix in Kirby, Role of the Judge, supra note 129, at 531-32 (stating that
"[f]undamental human rights and freedoms are inherent in all humankind and
find expression in constitutions... throughout the world;" that "international
human rights instruments provide important guidance in cases concerning
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Third, international legal instruments have influenced the
formation of many post-World War II bills of rights in national laws
and in regional conventions.' 3 8 Lord Wilberforce in an oft-quoted
passage notes the influence of the Universal Declaration on the
drafting of the European Convention on Human Rights. 139 New
Zealand's statutory Bill of Rights Act is understood as intended to
carry forward the spirit of the ICCPR, though its language differs in

fundamental human rights;" and praising the "growing tendency for national
courts to have regard to" international norms in cases where "domestic lawwhether constitutional, statute or common law - is uncertain or incomplete");
see also Michael Kirby, The Roadfrom Bangalore:The First Ten Years of the
Bangalore Principles on The Domestic Application of International Human
www. lawfoundation.net.au/resources/kirby/papers/
Rights
Norms,
at
19981226_html (last visited Sept. 12, 2003) [hereinafter Kirby, Road from
Bangalore]. The Bangalore Principles encourage use of international human
rights law on open interpretive questions in domestic law and have been cited
in support of the practice of consulting international law in national
constitutional decisions. See, e.g., Unity Dow v. Attorney Gen., 103 I.L.R.
128, J76 (Bots. Ct. App., 1992) (1996) (Aguda, J., concurring). These
principles were intended as a "new approach" to the use of international law in
domestic courts and were formulated at a meeting in 1988 in Bangalore, called
by the Commonwealth Secretariat, and attended inter alia by former Indian
Chief Justice P.N Bhagwati, Michael Kirby, Anthony Lester of Britain, then
Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg and judges from Maritius and Zimbabwe. For
further description of Bangalore and subsequent meetings and statements at
Harare, Zimbabwe, Balliol College, England, and Bloemfontain, South Africa,
see Adjami, supra note 107, at 125-29. For reliance on the Balliol and
Bloemfontain statements, see for example, Tavita v. Minister of Immigration,
[1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. 257, 266, 1993 N.Z.L.R. LEXIS 634, *29 (N.Z., Ct. App.);
N. Reg'l. Health Auth. v. Human Rights Comm'n, [1998] 2 N.Z.L.R. 218, 235,
1997 NZLR LEXIS 659, *46-47 (N.Z., High Ct, Auckland). But cf Longwe v.
Intercontinental Hotels, [1993] 4 LRC 221, 233 (Zambia, High Ct, 1992)
(doubting effect to be given to the Bangalore Principle as a mere resolution of
a meeting of jurists).
137. See Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3011, reprintedin 3
Butterworths Human Rights Cases 261, 265 (India, 1997) (quoting from the
provision of the Beijing Statement of the chief judges of the LAWASIA
region on the judicial function aspiring "to promote... the observance and the
attainment of human rights").
138. See Slaughter, supra note 1, at 131-32; McCrudden, supra note 1, at
500-01; Hannum, supra note 75, at 298-300 (noting influence of Universal
Declaration on constitutions in Canada and India).
139. See Minister of Home Affairs v. Fisher, 1980 App. Cas. 319, 328-29
(P.C. 1979) (appeal taken from Bermuda).
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some respects from ICCPR provisions.140 The German Basic Law,
the Italian Constitution, and the Indian Constitution, all reflect a
common store of awareness of basic rights, as well as some marked
variations. 14 The rights commitments expressed in the U.N. Charter
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights had influence well
before the 1966 Covenants,142 as is illustrated by the many references
to "human dignity" that begin to appear in constitutions in the postwar period and in U.S. constitutional decisions. 43 The United
States' Bill of Rights was influential in the formulation of some of
these international covenants (which in turn have entered, albeit in
140. See New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 1990, Preamble, available at
http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/nz01000_.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2003)
(stating Act's purposes as including "affirm[ing] New Zealand's commitment
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights"); see also Quilter
v. Attorney-General, [1998] 1 N.Z.L.R. 523, 530, 1997 NZLR LEXIS 644, at
*18 (quoting purpose of 1993 Human Rights Act as being "to provide better
protection of human rights in New Zealand in general accordance with United
Nations Covenants or Conventions").
141. See, e.g., GERMAN BASIC LAW, articles 1-19; ITALY CONST. arts. 2, 3, 9

and pt. I (Rights and Duties of Citizens); INDIA CONST. pt. IIn (Fundamental
Rights). Each of these, for example, includes some explicit guarantee of
freedom of movement. See ITALY CONST., art. 16; GERMAN BASIC LAW, art.
11; INDIA CONST., art. 19(d). Each includes guarantees of equality, with some
particularities, see, for example, INDIA CONST., art. 15(2)(b) (equality
provision names "caste" as prohibited basis and specifically prohibits
discrimination in access to "the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and
places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or
dedicated to the use of general public"); ITALY CONST. art. 3 (declaring equal
"social status" and equality before law and declaring "duty" of state to remove
social and economic obstacles to full individual development); GERMAN BASIC
LAW, art. 3(2) (state supports effective realization of equality of women and
men).
142. See McLachlin, supra note 132, at 8 (noting provincial development of
bills of rights that "dove-tailed with the momentum building at the
international level around the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights"); Hannum, supra note 75, at 318 (Universal Declaration, according to
Eleanor Roosevelt, would "serve as a common standard of achievement for all
peoples of all nations").
143. See e.g., DONALD KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 312-13 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing
role of human dignity in German Basic Law); see also Vicki C. Jackson,
Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and Transnational
ConstitutionalDiscourse,MONT. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2004) [hereinafter
Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity]; cf Resnik & Suk,
supra note 48, at 1934-41 (noting appearance of term "human dignity" in U.S.
reports starting in World War H1).
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limited fashion, U.S. judicial discourse about constitutional
rights). 144 And the regional human rights covenants borrow from
U.N. rights' statements. These "genetic" relationships among rights
provisions provides a basis for shared learning by all
generations still
45
participating in their elaboration and enforcement.1
Finally, the development of this web of international human
rights obligations-whatever their precise status in international law
as ratified or unratified treaties, customary international law or in
some cases as jus cogens--emphasizes the increased likelihood that
international law will be implicated by the conduct of a nation's
government to its own people (and even if not binding now may
become so in the future). 146 Constitutional courts may be more
aware of their own role, however small, in developing the body of
legalized practices in "civilized nations" which can influence
recognition of principles of international law.1 47 And international
legal actors are aware as well of the influence of some domestic
constitutional courts in shaping understandings of international

144. See Louis Henkin, Introduction, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS:
THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD 1, 2 (Louis

Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal eds., 1990); supra note 127; Resnik & Suk,
supra note 48 at 1934-41; Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and Human
Dignity, supra note 143, at n. 92 (identifying state court decisions referring to
transnational human rights sources).
145. See Henkin, supra note 144, at 2, 12-15; Louis Henkin, A New Birth of
Constitutionalism: Genetic Influences and Genetic Defects, 14 CARDOZO L.
REv. 533, 536-37 (1993); see also Choudhry, supra note 6, at 866-85
(distinguishing "genetic" and "genealogical" influences); U.S v. Then, 56 F.3d
464, 469 (2d. Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring) ("[w]ise parents do not
hesitate to learn from their children").
146. See Dugard, supra note 78, at 189 (noting "potential" application of
international conventions to South Africa) For discussion of international
human rights influence in Australia, see Anthony Mason, The Influence of
International and Transnational Law in Australian Municipal Law, 7 PUB.
L.R. 20 (1996).
147. See Arthur M. Weisburd, The Significance and Determination of
Customary InternationalHuman Rights Law: The Effect of Treaties and Other
FormalInternationalActs on the Customary Law ofHuman Rights, 25 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 99, 104 (1996)("all states are eligible at all times to take
part in the creation of customary international law... [A]ny act of a state,
including a violation of an existing rule of law, may contribute to the
development of a new rule of law."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 701, n.2 (1987).
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law. 148 Thus, the developing sense of "relational" authority--of an
obligation to consider, even if not to follow, decisions on similar
human rights issues by other tribunals-may also be informed by

some recognition that the legal actions of the domestic national
courts of the world have a role to play in defining the content of
customary international law with respect to rights protected in the
major international human rights documents. 149 Given the relatively
weak channels of international human rights enforcement, 150 the
content of these rights is to some extent up for grabs between the
multitude of state signatories, the U.N. monitoring bodies, the
regional human rights tribunals that interpret often similar provisions
in their regional human rights documents, and the various national
courts that may have occasion to refer to those norms. On this view,

national courts' participation as international actors influences not
only what happens in their own countries but the status of norms in
international legal understandings.'I'
148. Non-domestic actors have concern over domestic law not only in the
sense of ideological conviction, or in the sense of identification with the
discriminations suffered by particular rights-asserters, see supra note 131, but
also in some cases by a concern that domestic law will have an impact on
international understandings. Thus, in I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415
(1999), the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees filed an amicus brief
explaining that "[r]esolution of this case is likely to affect not only the
interpretation by the United States of the provisions of the Convention relating
to who is and who is not entitled to the internationally protected status of
refugee, but also the manner in which other countries interpret those
provisions. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
therefore, has a direct interest in ensuring that this Court's ruling is consistent
with its own interpretation of the Convention." Brief of Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as Amicus Curiae at 1, INS v.
Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999) (No. 97-1754).
149. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38,
59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993 (court in deciding disputes in accord with
international law is to apply international conventions, international custom,
"general principles of law recognized by civilized nations," and, as subsidiary
means for determining rules of law, "judicial decisions" and teachings of
scholars).
150. See text at note 117, supra; BAYEFSKY, UNIVERSALITY, supra note 21,
at 7 (discussing "shortfalls" in implementation scheme of human rights
treaties)
151. Cf U.S. v. Bums, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, 287 (characterizing Canada's
position as an international leader in opposition to the death penalty). Courts
also occasionally become objects of transnational legal attention, including
filing of amicus briefs, because of the impact of domestic judicial
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What vocabulary can help describe this shifting sense of a
relationship among courts and tribunals in the elaboration of human
rights norms? The existing distinction between "binding" precedent
and "persuasive authority" could be used to identify most, if not all,
of the above uses. But, as noted earlier, the idea of "persuasive
authority" may be quite broad and includes a number of distinctive
categories. 152 The sense of an obligation to consider legal material
which may not be binding and the aspiration to constitute
overarching law through a fabric of nonbinding decisions reflect
what I would call the "relational authority" of human
rights norms so
153
interestingly at work in these more recent cases.
In their important article in 1997, Professors Heifer and
Slaughter described the development of "overlapping networks of
national, regional, and global tribunals" that could engage in
"collective deliberation about common legal questions," thereby
"reinforc[ing the courts'] legitimacy and independence from political
interference," and "promot[ing] a global conception of the rule of
law."' 54 The sense of connection, of "relational authority" in the
increased use of persuasive precedent, is perhaps one example of this
webbed set of relationships amongst tribunals anticipated by Helfer
and Slaughter. These connected relationships may, indeed, be part of
a broader trend in the reconception of public law-both
constitutional law and international human rights law-to be less
concerned with the hierarchy of law's commands and more
concerned with participation, discussion and negotiation across a
wide range of actors, public and private, 55 as a basis for both rights
56
articulation and implementation.1
understandings of international human rights obligations. See supra notes 131,
148 (describing amicus filings by international organizations in U.S. courts).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 39-61 (noting inter alia negative
precedents, precedents cited for reasons unrelated to their deliberative
assistance in deciding the case (e.g., national legitimacy, political alliances),

precedents cited because they analyze comparable problems in comparable
contexts, and precedents cited because additionally they are addressing
comparable problems in a binding (or potentially binding) international legal
order).
153. See supra notes 105, 107.
154. Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 3, at 282.

155. In a separate paper I am exploring this possible trend in public law,
which might be described as one more interested in coordinated relationships
than in hierarchy; more concerned with wide participation in decision-making
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than speed of decision; in tentative rather than final decisions; and in
discussion and negotiation rather than judgment, in a variety of settings.
Examples might be found (1) in the implementation process for CEDAW and
other human rights treaties, processes that involve reporting, information
sharing and recommendations by the monitoring committee, rather than
judgments or sanctions; (2) in the development of constitutional theories of
democratic experimentalism, with an emphasis on "learning by monitoring"
and on decentralized implementation and shaping of common norms, see
Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); Michael C. Dorf, Legal
Indeterminacy and InstitutionalDesign, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875 (2003); (3) in
decisions like Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 220,
holding that, in the event of clear vote on a clear majority in favor of secession
in one province, the rest of the country would have a duty to discuss possible
secession and negotiate in accordance with values of rule of law, democracy,
federalism and protection of minority rights; (4) in new arrangements for
courts to interpret constitutional rights in a way that legislatures can overcome
or disagree with, see Gardbaum, supra note 90, at 746 (arguing that
Commonwealth models of protecting rights subject to legislative derogations
may replace "judicial monopoly and monologue on... constitutional rights"
with "inter-institutional dialogue between courts and legislatures that would
improve the quality and dimensions of constitutional analysis"); (5) in
emerging international norms requiring democratic participation in constitution
making, described by Vivien Hart, Democratic Constitution Making, 107 U.S.
INST. OF PEACE 1, (2003), available at www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/
srl07.html; and (6) in the reconstruction of the international law of self
determination in light of competing claims of identity and participation,
described in KNOP, DIVERSITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION, supra note 14 at
380-81 (noting as well broader implications for legal interpretation in plural
societies). See generally Harding, supra note 5, and especially at 462-65
(distinguishing "dialogic" and "enforcement" models of judicial reasoning and
noting relationships of global influences to local processes of interpreting law
in "dialogic" model).
156. The connection between a court's decision and its implementation
cannot be assumed. After Unity Dow, Botswana amended its citizenship
statutes to eliminate the gender discrimination condemned by the court; after
Rattigan, however, the Constitution of Zimbabwe was amended to authorize
the citizenship discrimination the court had condemned. See Adjami, supra
note 107 at 157-58. But cf Karen Knop & Christine Chinkin, Remembering
Chrystal MacMillan: Woman's Equality and Nationality in InternationalLaw,
22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 523, 533 (2001) (indicating that the Zimbabwe Court had
resisted so interpreting the constitutional change). Implementation and
enforcement are important questions in both international and domestic rights
protection, which are the subject of increasing literature, see infra note 205; I
note here only that, even when a country has ratified conventions and adopted
rights-protecting constitutions and issued judgments upholding human rights,
those judgments will not necessarily be given effect.
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Professor Slaughter's "transjudicialism" is reflected in a
particular kind of "persuasive authority"-authority that courts in
some sense "must" consider, although it is not binding upon them,
because of its relationship to their court and their work. 5 7 The
suggestions that these "transjudicial" exchanges reflect a new
community of judging (not for all countries or all courts, to be sure)
related to an increasingly global (though not universal) community
of law, capture important aspects of these exchanges. 58 But it is not
only a community of judges, for its participants include
nonadjudicatory fora like the U.N. human rights committees as well
as NGOs, grassroots activists and legal scholars.1 59 Nor is it only a
community of shared law-for the scope of the felt obligation to
consider external sources is not limited to those areas in which the
external sources are positively binding in accord with domestic
norms. Perhaps we might also see the relationships underlying these
judicial exchanges as reflecting shared legal values and historic
experience, born of a very specific moment in the wake of World
War II, which engendered a reaction against human rights abuses,
including but not limited to racism and other forms of discrimination,
with the understanding that those shared values may be expressed in

157. See Slaughter, Globalization, supra note 7, at 1109-12 (discussing
influence of decisions of the European Court of Human Rights on courts
outside of Europe).

158. Id. at 1122-24 (noting increasing judicial meetings to promote dialogue
among judges of different courts).
159. Although some of the U.N. human rights committees may be assuming
a role closer to those of courts, their judgments are not generally viewed as
binding and enforceable under international law, and some still do not have
well-functioning individual complaint procedures. See Ratner, supra note 117,
at 724-25; cf Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 3 at 366-85 (suggesting changes
in procedure to move U.N. Human Rights Committee closer to role of
European courts); BAYEFSKY, UNIVERSALITY, supra note 21 at ii-iii (urging
changes in role of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights and
consolidation of the different UN human rights committees). But cf Henkin,
supra note 128, at 504-05 (raising question whether committee's views should
be seen as legally binding). On sociological reasons for possible further
convergences, see Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional
Theory of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1749 (2003) (describing sociological
processes of institutional isomorphism, not necessarily reflecting basic values
or functional similarity, but nonetheless resulting in the convergence of basic
elements of governmental design).
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very different legal ways-a community of legal values born of
shared experience, if not a community of law.
Notwithstanding each of these descriptions' emphasis on some
form of global community (of judging, of law, or of shared
experiences and values), 160 national states will continue for the
foreseeable future to be a primary location for the enforcement of
human rights, 161 including rights of gender equality. It is thus
important to consider the objections that have arisen to domestic
courts even considering such foreign and international sources.
II. NONBINDING TRANSNATIONAL AUTHORITY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW AND GENDER EQUALITY

Many of the references discussed above involved
under national constitutions, which in some respects
particularly hostile locations for the emergence of
comparative methodology, since national constitutions
understood as expressions of national particularity. 162

challenges
might be
a deeply
are often
National

160. See, e.g., Quilter v. Attorney-General, [1998] 1 N.Z.L.R. 523, 531,
1997 NZLR LEXIS 644, *22 (Thomas, J.) (referring to "basic values"); id. at
559-60, 1997 NZLR LEXIS at *103-05 (Keith, J.); cf Kirby, Role of the
Judge, supra note 129, at 530 ("in the world after Hiroshima, all educated
people have a responsibility to... act as citizens of a wider world"). As noted
earlier, supra note 12, gender equality was not a central concern in the postwar 1940s, though formal international commitments to gender equality are
made at this time. See supra note 15.
161. Transnational judicial discourse on human rights may also be a
reflection of a shift too large and ongoing to be seen clearly yet, from preWorld War II understandings of the significance of state boundaries, to a
twenty-first century understanding that national sovereignty is only one of
several locations for the exercise of political power, legal constraint, and
communal self-expression in the world, an anticipation of a new regime in
which communities of people exist in both hierarchical and nonhierarchical
patterns whose connectedness, permeability, and differential allocation of
functions to different levels of governance, may be overtaking the very idea of
sovereignty itself. For a related discussion of a "post-sovereign" Europe, see
NEIL MACCORMICK, QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY: LAW, STATE AND NATION
IN THE EUROPEAN COMMONWEALTH 74-75, 76-78, 102-21, 123-36 (1999).
162. See Schauer, supra note 26, at 257 (noting that even in countries willing
to borrow U.S. approaches to bankruptcy or corporate law, borrowing
constitutional law may "suggest a loss of sovereignty, control and much of the
essence of what helps to constitute a nation as a nation in the first place."). The
role of other constitutions may be one of differentiation or dialogue in the
project of national self-definition, however. See supra text at notes 44, 64-65.
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constitutions serve many goals, including not only the protection of
rights (many comparable to international human rights) and the
definition of structures for workable governance, but also the
expression of national self-understandings and the assertion of equal
sovereignty in the world setting. Although the meaning of rights
(such as gender equality, or freedom of speech) may be more
amenable to transnational analysis than questions about nationally
specific constitutional structures of governance,1 63 the specific
expressions of a "human right" may also vary with the broader
structures and suppositions of particular national constitutional
regimes. 164 Moreover, the age of a constitutional regime may matter:
comparative experience may be less useful in highly developed
systems of constitutional law (on issues already well worked out in
stable doctrine or practices) than in newer constitutional systems.
Comparative constitutional experience and international law as
nonbinding sources of interpretation might offer both substantial
attractions, 165 and difficulties, 166 for newly developing constitutional

163. Thus, as I have suggested elsewhere, comparative constitutional law
may be less directly helpful to jurists on structural issues of federalism than on
human rights questions. See Jackson, Narratives, supra note 126, at 272-76;
Vicki C. Jackson, Comparative ConstitutionalFederalism and Transnational
JudicialDiscourse,2 INT'L J. CONST. L. (I'CON) (forthcoming January, 2004)
[hereinafter Jackson, ConstitutionalFederalism].
164. Cf Neuman, supra note 125, at 1869-72 (noting "institutional" aspects
of rights). For Neuman the institutional aspects of rights refer to the particular
structures for enforcement of the rights. Id. at 1869. The broader institutional
context, including general structures of governance, may also impact
understandings and implementations of rights.
165. Not only may new regimes find it helpful to consider established
doctrinal approaches elsewhere to similar problems, but referring to
international and comparative experience may help signal, both internally and
externally, abandonment of repressive practices of prior regimes and the
willingness to be held to account under world standards of human rights. See
e.g., Schauer, supra note 26, at 259 (describing South Africa's resort to foreign
and international law as "a reaction against South Africa's recent history as an
outcast or pariah nation" by coming "into harmony with international
standards," independent of their merits); see also McCrudden, supra note 1, at
500-01 (noting that citation to foreign jurisprudence may be "regarded... as a
sign of a particular orientation towards human rights").
166. Some scholars have raised concern that considerations of foreign or
international sources is inconsistent with the development of an authentically
national constitutional tradition.
See Carlos F. Rosenkrantz, Against
Borrowings and Other Nonauthoritative Uses of Foreign Law, 1 INT'L J.
CONST. L. (I-CON) 269, 285-86 (2003); see also Schauer, supra note 26, at
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orders.
In some kinds of cases, however, comparative and international
experience is worth considering, both in those constitutional orders
with highly elaborated doctrine and those with newer constitutional
regimes. First, issues unforeseen by prior lawmakers are generated
by new phenomena, such as the development of new technologies
(for example, informational privacy issues created by new
information technologies, or genetic engineering and human
reproduction). 167 Deciding on constitutional approaches to such new

problems may be ongoing simultaneously in a number of courts,
whose deliberation could only be better informed by considering the
range of approaches being taken or considered elsewhere.' 6 8 Second,
there are sets of hard issues (which sometimes overlap with "new"
issues), often driven by developments in claims of rights resulting
from mobilization of new understandings of individual or group
identity, and presenting issues over which there is deep-seated legal,
political and moral division. The presence of deep controversy over

254-55 (suggesting that countries emerging from colonial or communist rule
focus on establishing indigenous constitutional culture).
167. For illustrative discussion of one such area, see Daniel J. Solove,
Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information
Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1393, 1440, 1460-61 (2001) (discussing database
privacy in U.S. and favorably discussing E.U.'s approach); New York Times
Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 506 n.13 (2000) (comparing other nations'
copyright protection for copying of information in electronic databases).
Approaches of other countries to new technology issues may directly affect
constitutional adjudication. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 20506 (2003) (rejecting constitutional challenge to federal copyright extension,
and noting legitimacy of government interest in changing U.S. law to
harmonize US statute with Europe's); id. at 206-08 (noting, in addition to
"international concerns," changes in demography, economy and technology as
rational bases on which to uphold the legislation); cf Amer. Ins. Assn v.
Garimendi, 123 S. Ct. 2374, 2392 (2003) (expressing concern that state law
would undercut German privacy policies).
168. In this setting the notion that with more deliberating bodies exchanging
views on constitutional problems better solutions will emerge may have
particular salience. See Slaughter, Global Community, supra note 7, at 193,
201; see also GLENDON, supra note 31, at 159 (criticizing U.S. "arrogance,"
"willful ignorance" and "unconscious insularity" of "how other high courts
ha[ve] dealt with the same vexing issues"). On the other hand, it may not be
reasonable to expect judicial systems with highly developed and complex
jurisprudence on a well-worn field to continually be open to new ideas, both
for rule of law and judicial efficiency reasons.

GENDER EQUALITY

Fall 2003]

internal norms, as is often encountered in gender equality issues,
might be itself a particular reason to look outside-not for the
purpose of adopting external norms,16 9 but rather to critically
interrogate our own "instincts" or predispositions which, in deeply
controversial cases, it is so important to become aware of before
coming to judgment. 170 Third, there are issues of particular concern
to legal communities beyond the country of decision-because, for
example, they concern treatment of foreign nationals, 71 or the status
of aliens as claimants for citizenship 172 (though the areas experienced
as being of special concern may be expanding). 173 Awareness of the
legal framework within which domestic decisions will be viewed, at
may be a prudent component of constitutional
least on some issues,
74
interpretation. 1

169. But cf Brian R. Opeskin, Constitutional Modelling: The Domestic
Effect of InternationalLaw in Commonwealth Countries, 2000 PUBLIC LAW
607, 625 (suggesting that in some countries with turbulent group relations,

references to "neutral" laws from beyond their own country may be helpful in
resolving internal divisions).
170. See also L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 1, at 39 ("considering and
comparing judgments from various jurisdictions makes for stronger, more
considered decisions, even if the result is the same"); cf BENJAMIN N.
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 172-73, 176 (1921)
(suggesting that greater spirit of self-searching can help judges decide cases
free from "unconscious prejudices"); JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN
MIND 114, 362 (6th ed. 1949) (arguing that greater awareness of factors that
influence judicial judgments will enable "sound intelligence to play a larger
part in the process ofjudging").
171. See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
172. See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
173. See, e.g., supra notes 131, 148( noting EU and UN High Commissioner
amicus briefs). The spread of human rights consciousness and other recent
developments reflected in these amicus filings and also, e.g., in the
establishment of the International Criminal Court, suggest that we may see
increasing interest or concern by other countries in constitutional decisions in
the United States, at least in part for reasons of principle (apart from possible
political tactics in dealing with the U.S. as a world power).
174. See Jackson, Narratives, supra note 126, at 261-62, 266-68
(contrasting internal and external "legitimacy" as reasons sometimes
supporting and sometimes cautioning against overt reference to foreign or
international authority). Concern for how a decision, or its reasoning, would be
viewed by its audience might be understood to involve prudential
considerations. For a classic treatment of the role of prudence in constitutional
adjudication, see

ALEXANDER

132-33 (2d ed. 1986).

M. BICKEL,

THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH
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Recent references to transnational legal materials have appeared
in U.S. Supreme Court cases dealing with issues that are "hard" in an
176
175
Thus, in Lawrence v. Texas,
intensely controversial way.
Justice Kennedy, writing for the U.S. Supreme Court, used the
European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR") jurisprudence
prohibiting laws against consensual homosexual conduct not only to
rebut assumptions made by an earlier Court (and thus support the
overruling of its earlier precedent) 177 but also to help understand in a
substantive way the liberty protected by the U.S. Constitution. 78 In
Grutterv. Bollinger,179 one of the Michigan affirmative action cases,
Justice Ginsburg invoked international human rights treaties
apparently to reinforce the legitimacy of a constitutional rule
expressly designed to be temporary-a major innovation for the U.S.
Supreme Court.'80 And in Atkins v. Virginia 18 the Court invoked
foreign practice in resolving the issue that the execution of mentally
retarded convicted murderers was inconsistent with the Eighth
Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishments, returning to the
Court's earlier practice of looking to other nations' approaches on
Eighth Amendment issues.' 82 In these cases international and
comparative materials were used in three ways: first, to interrogate

175. See, e.g., Washington. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 734 (1997) (citing
to Dutch practice on euthanasia); id. at 718 n.16 (referencing foreign debate on
euthanasia).
176. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003)
177. See id. at 2481 (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 52
(1981)). Lawrence overrules Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). See
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
178. See id. at 2483. After noting a number of other European Court of
Human Rights cases following Dudgeon, not Bowers, as well as the Amicus
Brief for Mary Robinson and others, the Court wrote:
"The right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an
integral part of human freedom in many other countries. There has
been no showing that in this country the governmental interest in
circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate or
urgent."
Id. In so arguing the Court looked to the practices elsewhere to help identify
integral aspects of human freedom and evaluate the asserted justifications for
the government limitation.
179. 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
180. Id. at 2347 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
181. 536U.S. 304, 316n.1 (2002).
182. Id. at 317. (citing the Brief of the European Union filed in McCarver).
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domestic assumptions or answer questions about legal facts that the
Constitution or the Court's own caselaw had made relevant to the
domestic constitutional question;'8 3 second, to help identify the
scope of constitutionally protected liberty and examine the adequacy
of justifications for its restriction;' 84 and third, to support the
legitimacy of a constitutional innovation of a time-limited power to
take race into account, driven by domestic constitutional doctrine
(that is, the 8"narrow
tailoring" requirement of the "compelling
5
interest" test).'1

Though perhaps the start of a new trend, the three cases
discussed above stand out as departures from the Court's late
twentieth century ambivalence about transnational discourse.'8 6 In at
least two significant gender equality cases in recent years, Nguyen v.
88
INS'87 and United States v. Morrison,1
the Court essentially ignored
183. That is, as to the universality vel non of legal condemnation of
homosexuality, or the unusualness or cruelty of a penalty. Cf Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989) (noting limited purpose for
considering practices of other countries in the Eighth Amendment analysis, in
determining that views of American people are not a "historical accident" but
reflect what is implicit in "ordered liberty"').
184. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. at 2483 (quoted supra note 178).
185. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2347 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting that
international human rights conventions on gender and race discrimination
specifically authorize temporary measures that take race into account to redress
inequality but require that such measures "'shall in no case entail... the
maintenance of unequal or separate rights for different racial groups after the
objectives for which they were taken have been achieved"' (quoting U.N.
GAOR 20 th Sess., Annex, Supp. No. 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965)); id. at
2341-47 (O'Connor, J., for the Court) (emphasizing that even where there is a
compelling interest in using a racial classification, the means chosen must be
"narrowly tailored" and any use of race must be "limited in time").
186. For evidence of the continuing disagreement in the U.S. Court over the
relevance of foreign or international law in resolving U.S. constitutional
questions, compare, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2003)
(noting views of E.U., among many other sources, and stating that "within the
world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by
mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved"), with id. at 347
(Scalia, J. dissenting) (stating that "views of... the 'world community'whose
notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people," were
irrelevant to Eighth Amendment question); id. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (consideration of foreign law in constitutional interpretation is
inconsistent with federalism).
187. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
188. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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efforts by amicus groups to bring transnational human rights sources
to bear in resolving domestic constitutional questions.' 89 The reasons
for this stance are no doubt varied, and may include the relatively
well-established character of U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, 190 the
hesitation of the U.S. government to ratify or make fully selfexecuting some human rights conventions, as well as inward-looking
aspects of American legal education and training. 191 But two justices
have persistently objected to the legitimacy of considering
transnational
sources
in deciding
domestic constitutional
questions, 192 and the Court's relative reticence in this area might
reflect those concerns about the legitimacy (or perceived legitimacy)
of transnational discourse on constitutional rights.' 93 Debate in the
189. See Brief Amici Curiae on Behalf of International Law Scholars and
Human Rights Experts in Support of Petitioners, United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000)(Nos. 99-05, 99-29) [hereafter "Brief Amici Curiae of
International Law Scholars"]; Brief of Equality Now, supra note 131. In two
other cases raising significant questions of gender equality, the Court likewise
did not address either foreign or international legal sources, though there do
not appear to have been significant efforts by amicus curiae or parties to
inform the Court of relevant gender equality developments. Nev. Dep't. of
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003); United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515 (1996) (one amicus brief, by Employment Law Center et al., in one
footnote referred to the ICCPR and the Race Convention, to support the idea
that remedial programs for girls or women to make up for past discrimination
might be permissible).
190. See McCrudden, supra note 1, at 523-24 (noting use of foreign
decisions to fill vacuum left by temporary absence of indigenous law and
predicting decline in use of foreign law once national jurisprudence is
developed).
191. See Jackson, supra note 72, at 592-600; see also McCrudden, supra
note 1, at 526.
192. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 (1997)(Scalia, J.);
Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990-91 (1999)(Thomas, J., concurring in
denial of certiori).
193. See also Jackson, supra note 126, at 263-67 (noting two kinds of
legitimacy concerns, one normative and the other empirical, and discussing
legitimacy in terms of the audience for the Court's decision). Note that
concerns about audience may also reflect what materials lawyers present to the
Court. Lawyers' perceptions of what legal materials will be regarded as helpful
may have reinforced the Court's disinclinations to consider transnational
sources, for it is unlikely that the Court will identify persuasive (but not
binding) foreign and international sources when neither the parties nor amici
bring them to the Court's attention. In light of Lawrence, see supra note 178,
lawyers may feel more invited to present relevant transnational legal material
to the Court.
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United States has been less about whether courts must consider
nonbinding international and transnational authority, than whether it
is permissible to do so. I consider here two sets of objections to the
use of contemporary transnational 194
legal sources on interpretive
Constitution.
U.S.
the
under
questions
A. DemocraticSelf-Rule, the Rule of Law andNondomestic
Legal Sources
One persistent objection to reliance on non-U.S. sources of law
arises from an asserted tension between democratic self-rule under
the Constitution and reliance on transnational sources of law.' 95 The

194. 1 am not here concerned with such uses of foreign or international
authority as illuminating the original intent of the Constitution's drafters, as in
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 756 (1996) (debating understanding of
the Framers, from English law, of scope of court martials). Nor do I further
address possible objections to the use of nonbinding authority in relatively new
constitutional regimes where there is concern for the development of an
authentic internal form of constitutionalism, see supra note 166, a concern far
less apposite in the United States.
195. See, e.g., Printz,521 U.S. at 921 n.l 1 (asserting that comparative
constitutional law is relevant in drafting, not interpreting, constitutions);
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989) (Scalia, J. for the Court)
(it is "American conceptions of decency" with which evolving law of the
Eighth Amendment is concerned). However, U.S. Justices are by no means all
in accord with this view. Note the differing views expressed, for example, in
Knight, 528 U.S. at 995-97 (Breyer, J. dissenting from denial of certiorari);
Atkins, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002); id. at 322-23 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting);
Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 991 (2002) (Thomas, J., on denial of
certiorari); id. at 991-93 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). In the
past the Court has, at times, been more receptive to considering foreign and
international sources at least on some questions. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 489-90 (1996); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958).
The objection to the external is analytically distinct from but reinforced
by concerns over the processes of developing transnational legal norms, to the
extent that universalized norms are argued to be established by loosely
organized processes including both practices and reasoning of an assortment of
actors, some public, and some private. See supra note 155 (noting possible
trend towards decentralization, non-hierarchic, and negotiation approaches to
public law). The U.S. Court's hesitation to consider international and foreign
materials is interestingly (though not exactly) mirrored in a debate over
whether other countries should consider international or foreign legal norms, in
light of the asserted hegemonic influence of the United States on those norms.
See Knop, supra note 23, at 522-23, 527; see also Schauer, supra note 26, at
253-54 (noting increased association of law with "indigeneity" in areas casting
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tension emerges in a number of settings: the effect of international
treaties on the scope of constitutional powers; 196 the self-executing
character vel non of treaties that the U.S. has ratified and the legal
significance of ratified but non-self-executing treaties; 197 and the
198
content, status and application of customary international law.
off colonial or other forms of outside domination in Eastern Europe, former
Soviet Union and South Africa).
196. For scholarly disagreement, compare e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The
Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390 (1998), and
Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part II, 99
MICH. L. REV. 98 (2000) (arguing against "nationalist" view of treaty power),
with, e.g., David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical
Foundationsof the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 1075 (2000). In the caselaw, compare Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,
433-34 (1920) (treaty may provide constitutional basis for federal legislation
notwithstanding the Tenth Amendment) with Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-16
(1957) (Black, J., for plurality) (treaty may not authorize government conduct
in violation of individual constitutional rights). Although as a formal matter
binding the nation to the requirements of treaties agreed to by the Senate
responds to concerns for self-rule under the Constitution, as a substantive
matter some methods of binding oneself contemplate greater levels of
participation and awareness than others, and arguably have greater claim to
democratic legitimacy thereby.
197. See also infra text accompanying note 204; compare, e.g., Bradley,
supra note 89 at 1587-95 (in praise of non-self execution), Curtis A. Bradley,
Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51
STAN. L. REV. 529, 539-43 (1999), and John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public
Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 2218 (1999), with, e.g., Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Breard,
Printz and the Treaty Power, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1317 (1999) and Carlos
Manuel Vizquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L.J 2154 (1999)
(challenging claim that treaties should be presumptively non-self-executing).
198. For differing views on the status and nature of customary international
law and whether it is "federal law" for purposes of the Supremacy Clause,
compare, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern
Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997), with Louis Henkin, A Century of
Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 867-78 (1987)
and Harold Koh, Is InternationalLaw Really State Law?, 111 HARv. L. REV.
1824 (1998). For intermediate positions, see, e.g., Alex Aleinikoff, Ending the
Debate, Beginning the Discussion: Customary International Law and
Sovereignty, AM. J. INT'L. L. (forthcoming 2003) (suggesting that customary
international law today should be regarded as a form of general law applicable
in federal courts but not necessarily in state courts); Ernest A. Young, Sorting
Out the Debate over Customary InternationalLaw, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 365
(2002) and Weisburd, supra note 147 For other settings in which international
or foreign law is considered in U.S. courts, see Paul B. Stephan, A Becoming
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Apart from objections to the binding character of international norms
from democratic self-rule (and from the particular demands of
democratic federalism), 99 scholars have also argued that there is
tension between the U.S. institutional system of checks and balances
designed to make government action more difficult and cumbersome
and allowing new binding norms to be developed through customary
international law outside of those structures of checks and
balances. 20 0 All of these issues concern the priority and application
of assertedly binding legal norms. But questions have also arisen
Modesty - U.S. Litigation in the Mirror of InternationalLaw, 52 DEPAUL L.
REv. 627 (2002) (looking at cases in which US courts reach to decide issues of
foreign law in an effort to influence development of foreign law and
identifying costs and risks of such "expressive" decisions).
199. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 322-23 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(arguing that reliance on foreign law to interpret the Eighth Amendment is
inconsistent with federalism because "any 'permanent prohibition upon all
units of democratic government must [be apparent] in the operative acts (laws
and the application of laws) that the people have approved"' (quoting Stanford
v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 377 (1989) (Scalia, J. for plurality)). The objection
from federalism here draws much of its force from the more general objection
from democratic self-rule. Cf Young, supra note 198, at 403-04 (arguing that
where customary international law declared by federal courts binds states,
states are denied "procedural safeguards" of participation in the national
legislative process). The force of the objection from democracy depends
importantly on whether external sources are being treated as independently
binding-in which case there are questions of self rule that must be addressed
to establish the legitimacy of such bindingness. See Aldridge v. Booth, (1988)
80 A.L.R. 1 (upholding federal statute because, Australia having ratified
CEDAW, statute prohibiting sex harassment of women came within federal
external affairs power). Federalism concerns may also go to assuring the
continued capabilities of the states to serve as counterbalances to central
power. But it bears noting that federalism also provides opportunities for
decentralized consideration and infusion of transnational legal sources through
decision-making at state and local levels. For discussion, see, e.g., Catherine
Powell, Dialogic Federalism:ConstitutionalPossibilitiesfor Incorporationof
Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 245, 276-80
(2001) (noting local implementation or endorsement of CEDAW in 39 cities,
17 counties, and 16 states in U.S. despite lack of Senate ratification); see also
Jackson, ConstitutionalDialogue and Human Dignity,supra note 143.
200. See Young, supranote 198, at 396-97; cf Bradley & Goldsmith, supra
note 198, at 861 (raising separation of powers concern that application of
customary international law by the courts is inconsistent with "political branch
hegemony" in foreign affairs). (The "checks and balances" in some respects
themselves thwart the immediate expression of democratic will, but, one could
say, if "the people" have chosen to bind themselves to more deliberative
methods of lawmaking that is their democratic choice. But cf. infra note 211.)
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about the relevance or appropriateness of considering the
constitutional law of other countries or of international norms not yet
having the status of binding law, in the interpretation of a domestic
constitution, 20210 2 at least in the absence of explicit constitutional
authorization.
There are genuine tensions between commitments to democracy
and self-rule, on the one hand, and judicial enforcement of rights, on
the other, a tension that is pervasive in constitutionalism. 20 3 This
tension is magnified when the basis for judicial determinations is2 °a4
source of law beyond the control of the judges' own polity.

Arguments that ignore the objections from self-rule risk undermining
important values of democratic decision-making.
Democratic
participation in decision-making in smaller communities is in some
respects a good in itself, and one that may be threatened by external
constraints. Moreover, the efficacy of human rights norms is
importantly determined by the mobilization of domestic
constituencies-within the domestic polity-to effect change on the
ground and by the development of a legal culture that supports the
practice of rights.20 5 And there is much that is attractive about the
201. See Printzv. United States, 521 U.S. 898,921 n.11 (1997).

202. See Tushnet, supra note 4, at 1270 n.215.
203. Cf Bahdi, supra note 41, at 574 (noting a similar tension in India,

where the Indian Supreme Court, in Bahdi's words, "dismissed the

significance of India's reservations to the CEDAW" as an example of courts
tending to "ignore rules of international law that render the right
nonjusticiable" and thus one for political branches to implement, when they
see rights in a universalist light). For earlier discussion of Vishaka, see text at
notes 82-84.
204. Cf Young, supra note 198, at 388-89 (noting concerns both for the
indeterminacy and extra-territorial sources of customary international law).
205. International human rights sources may, though, help provide focus for
effective mobilizations for domestic legal change. See, e.g., UNIFEM,
BRINGING EQUALITY HOME, supra note 102, at 13-14, 24-25, 33-34 (referring
to views of Rebecca Cook) (discussing the women's movements' use of
CEDAW in Costa Rica, Colombia and Uganda). Consider also the argument
made by Sunder of the value of internal and localized engagements over
gender equality issues within different religious communities including Islam.
See Sunder, supra note 24, at 1434-57, 1463-64; see also Andra Nahal
Behrouz, Note, TransformingIslamic FamilyLaw: State Responsibility and the
Role of Internal Initiative, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1136 (2003). The role of
international law in affecting behavior is the subject of longstanding debate
among international lawyers and political scientists, though the importance of
domestic governments in human rights enforcement is widely acknowledged.
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epistemological humility and value pluralism behind approaches to
judicial review designed to enhance the quality of participatory
decision-making. 20 6 But the tensions between democratic self-rule
and judicial rights enforcement, though real, are also very
complicated, and their existence does not dictate simple answers to
questions about the application or consideration of foreign or
international law.
Gerald Neuman has characterized human rights as having three
aspects: consensual, institutional and "suprapositive." 20 7
The
consensual basis of rights, according to Neuman, is that they "derive
their positive force from some political act that expresses the consent

For recent disagreement about whether ratification of human rights treaties has
any effect, and in what direction, and by what mechanisms, on effective
protection or enforcement of rights, compare, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Do
Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 2022-23
(2002) (finding that treaty ratification is associated with a decline in human
rights compliance in all but the most fully democratic nations, urging more
stringent enforcement mechanisms and less focus on widespread ratification);
Oona A. Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN L. REV. 1821 (2003)
(suggesting that countries will take into account costs of compliance (including
likelihood of compliance) in deciding whether to ratify); Linda Camp Keith,
The United Nations InternationalCovenant on Civil andPoliticalRights: Does
It Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?, 36 J. PEACE RES. 95 (1999)
(finding no differences in state parties behavior before and after ratification of
ICCPR), with Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human
Rights Treaties, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 171 (2003) (criticizing Hathaway's
empirical study); Goodman & Jinks, supra note 159, at 1783-85 (arguing for
sociological and institutional model of compliance with international law, and
favoring widespread ratification efforts because expressive functions of
international human rights law are likely to promote compliance with human
rights). For an interesting argument on the perverse effects of legalized
enforcement of human rights, see Lawrence Helfer, Overlegalizing Human
Rights: International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Carribean
Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1832 (2002).
206. See Dorf& Sabel, supra note 155, at 274-83; see also Barry Friedman,
Dialogue and JudicialReview, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577, 580-81 (1993).
207. See Neuman, supra note 125, at 1866-72. As he argues, the
"consensual" (or "positive") and "institutional" aspects of constitution rights
may come into conflict with their "suprapositive" or transnational character as
human rights. Id. at 1879-80. For an implicit challenge to efforts to demarcate
"positive" U.S. law from transnational influence, see Resnik & Suk, supra note
48, at 1926-27, 1939-40 (emphasizing permeability of U.S. law).
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of relevant political actors, or of peoples." 20 8 In a constitutional
democracy, where "the people" are the relevant "political actors" for
constitutional change, the idea is that rights, like other parts of a
constitution, may legitimately obstruct later popular decision-making
only if they are in some sense agreed to.
The powerful constitutional rhetoric of "We, the people"
notwithstanding, the positive aspects of the rights and government
structures set forth in our Constitution should not obscure some
important limitations to strong claims of the Constitution's
consensual character, particularly when coupled with strong forms of
originalist interpretive methodology. The Constitution was written
and ratified (for the most part) long ago; its extension to current
generations requires some more indirect narrative of consent by
acquiescence. 209 We continue to live under the positive law and thus
"consent" to it because we have not changed it.2 10 The general
intertemporal problem of attributing the consent of past generations
to new generations is compounded for those groups excluded from
participation in original acts of consent. Although the 1789
Constitution was consented to, consent came from a very limited
group that did not include women or slaves.2 1 Extension of the vote
208. Id. at 1866. Neuman recognizes that "consent" can be determined not
only through originalist but other interpretive methods, including more
evolutionary ones focused on current understandings of rights. Id.
209. The literature on the more general intertemporal problem of
constitutional law is vast. For a useful introduction, see JON ELSTER, ULYSSES
AND THE SIRENS 36-111 (Cambridge University Press, 1979); Bruce
Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J.
1013, 1058-60 (1984).
210. And we accept significant evolution in the understanding of rights and
concepts, at least in part through a process of judicial interpretation in
important degree under the control of unelected and essentially unremovable
and very long-serving judges. For thoughtful exploration of constitutional
"construction"

by

nonjudicial

actors,

CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTIoN: DIVIDED

see KEITH
POWERS AND

WHrTTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL

MEANING (1999).
211. To speak of what the polity has "consented to" depends on what one
takes to be the fair baseline for measuring consent or acquiescence. The status
quo ante of the U.S. constitution is a document constructed by a polity that
excluded most of the population at the time of initial framing, and excluded
women until after the First World War, as numerous scholars have noted. See,
e.g., Sullivan, supra note 30, at 735-38; Mary Becker, Conservative Free
Speech and the Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 975,
976-77 (1993); Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine,
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to minorities and women in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries does not of itself provide democratic legitimacy to the very
high threshold for amendment of the rest of the Constitution, in large
part fixed by a polity that excluded them.212 This Constitution still
specifies a procedure for its own amendment that was enacted in
1789, a procedure that puts
the Constitution's text well beyond
213
ordinary democratic change.
Relying on this difficult-to-amend Constitution to invalidate
more recently enacted national laws designed to protect against
114 HARv. L. REV. 26, 35-39 (2000); Kenneth Karst, Woman's Constitution,
1984 DuKE L.J. 447, 486 (1984).
212. Of course, all of the current population was excluded from the decision
on the amendment process of Article V. In some respects, we are all either
bound, or not bound, to respect the Constitution's amendment process as the
legitimate mechanism for textual change, by virtue of living in the ongoing
community constituted by it. To the extent that identifiable portions of the
population were excluded, insistence on the legal text's interpretive isolation
from other currents of change on grounds of democracy does not have as much
persuasive force. But cf Young, supra note 198, at 394-404 (expressing
concern that use of customary international law bypasses constitutional
structures including separation of powers, limits on judicial lawmaking and
federalism).
213. The double super-majority voting requirements in Congress and in the
states needed to change the U.S. Constitution is among the most stringent in
the world. See Donald Lutz, Toward a Theory of ConstitutionalAmendment,
88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355, 362, 369 (1994); cf Becker, supra note 211, at
1025-30 (noting as one basis for skepticism about binding judicial review
concerns that the Constitution as a substantive matter better meets the needs of
elite propertied men than of other groups and was created through a process
that excluded women). Not only were women excluded at the 1787 founding
but they were also excluded from voting participation in the process that
produced the Reconstruction amendments, which so importantly shifted federal
power and moved equality from a subordinate to a dominant constitutional
norm. Id. at 1026-27; see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 53132 (1996) (noting women's exclusion from the making of the Constitution).
Indeed, in some versions of what Akhil Amar calls "intratextualism," a now
superseded provision of the Fourteenth Amendment could be read as
approving the political exclusion of women. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2
(providing a rule privileging male voters by reducing congressional
representation for states that did not permit all adult men to vote in federal
elections); see also Ward Farnsworth, Women under Reconstruction: The
Congressional Understanding, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 1229 (2000) (concluding
that originalist view of the Fourteenth Amendment was not to disturb laws
subordinating women); cf. Amar, supra note 211, at 52-53 (suggesting that the
Fourteenth Amendment could be understood historically as an effort to extend
to African-Americans the rights then enjoyed by unmarried white women).
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gender-motivated violence, as in United States v. Morrison,214 thus
itself raises complex questions about constitutionalism and
democracy. 215 The Court's invalidation of legislation to prevent
violence against women was in some sense in conflict with
democratic "self-rule" at the national level in a time of "ordinary
politics";

216

and the constitutional limitations interpreted to bar the

law were among those that became part of the Constitution before
women were allowed to vote.217 Bearing in mind the possible
214. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). The Court's interpretation was, arguably,
originalist in form, looking to past understandings of limitations on national
power. See id. at 618("we preserve one of the few principles that has been
consistent since the [Commerce] Clause was adopted"); id. at 621 (citing 1883
cases on scope of Congress' power under the 14"' amendment).
215. Cf Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalismand Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REV.
633, 634-35 (1991) (arguing that entrenched pre-commitments facilitate
democratic self-rule in a variety of ways); Walter Murphy, Civil Law, Common
Law and Constitutional Democracy, 52 LA. L. REV. 91, 101-09 (1991)
(emphasizing that it is commitment to human dignity that underlies both
democracy and constitutionalism).
216. But cf ACKERMAN, supra note 128, at 6-7 (distinguishing between
"normal lawmaking" by government and "higher lawmaking" by the people).
The "counter majoritarian difficulty" with judicial invalidation of national
statutes has, of course, generated an enormous literature. Professor
Ackerman's theory responds to that difficulty by conceiving of "the people" as
engaged in self-rule in a two track or dualist system of law-making, so that
invalidation of "ordinary politics" legislation can be seen to vindicate, rather
than contradict, self-rule under the constitution adopted by the people in
"constitutional moments." This view in turn depends on the nature of "the
people" whose capacities to vote and participate in public decisions help
legitimate giving priority to their constitutional decisions. See also id. at 31516 (arguing that although women and African-Americans were excluded from
the Constitution's initial creation, the institutional structure of dualist
lawmaking provides a good vehicle for working towards full equality).
217. Notwithstanding amicus briefing, the Court did not even refer to the
bearing of a Senate-ratified human rights convention, the ICCPR, on the scope
of national power to protect against gender motivated violence. Cf Concluding
Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: United States of America,
03/10/95, CCPR/C/79/Add.50; A/50/40, para. 276 (noting "the position
expressed by the [U.S.] delegation that, notwithstanding the non-self-executing
declaration of the United States, American courts are not prevented from
seeking guidance from the Covenant in interpreting American law"). One
amicus brief argued that the ICCPR, to which the U.S. became a party in 1992,
provided an arguable basis for upholding the Violence Against Women Act
civil rights remedy. See Brief Amicus Curiae of International Law Scholars,
supra note 189. The brief argued that the ICCPR had been interpreted not only
to prohibit violence against women but to require state parties to take
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complications of claims about the democratic character of the U.S.
Constitution softens the force of objections from democratic self-rule
2 18
to considering transnational sources in constitutional interpretation
(and notwithstanding critiques of international law as built on
foundations from which women were excluded).2 19
affirmative measures to prevent and remedy such violence. Whether the
ICCPR would have provided a sufficient basis for an alternative interpretation
of the scope of federal power under the Constitution as authorizing the
legislation was vigorously disputed by other amici briefs. See Brief of Amicus
Curiae Eagle Forum Education and Defense Fund in Support of Respondents,
at United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Brief of National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae In Support of
Respondents, at United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). The Court's
failure to address the issue (even though it was raised only by an amicus)
before invalidating a federal statute is noteworthy. See also infra note 266.
218. If one were deeply committed to the idea that constitutional provisions
are designed, in Justice Scalia's words, to "obstruct modernity" through
originalist interpretation, see Antonin Scalia, Modernity and the Constitution,
in CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE UNDER OLD CONSTITUTIONS 313 (Eivind Smith,
ed. 1995), then the views of more contemporary majorities would be generally
irrelevant. My own view is that, particularly given the difficulty of amendment
and the brevity of its terms, the Constitution must be read in a way that not
only gives attention to original understandings but also permits evolution of
constitutional understandings, informed by (but also controlling the legality of)
contemporary legislative enactments. An interpretive theory that allows for
evolution may be particularly important for those whose interests were
excluded from consideration in initial lawmaking. Cf, e.g., L'Heureux-Dub6,
supra note 1, at 33 (noting widespread acceptance in Canada of the "notion
that the rights and other provisions in our Constitution should be interpreted,
'as a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits' in
the words of Lord Sankey in a 1930 Privy Council case from Canada about
whether the term 'persons' in our Cdnstitution included women"); Adam
Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon: "Women Suffragists and the Living
Constitution," 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1456 (2001) (describing women's efforts to
develop evolutionary approach to constitutional interpretation).
219. See HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 1, 195 (Manchester

University Press, 2000)(critiquing international law for having been largely
developed without participation from women and for privileging male
experience and perspectives as shown, e.g., by international law's failure to
place gender discrimination on the same plane as race discrimination for
purposes of being condemned as jus cogens). Although this may put
international human rights law at a disadvantage when compared to some more
modem constitutions, the more recent development of international human
rights law may have provided more opportunities for women's voices to help
shape their content than in the draffing of eighteenth and nineteenth century
constitutions. Cf KNOP, DIVERSITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION, supra note
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The objection from democratic self-rule to judicial imposition of
outside norms is not without force, 22 even if in the field of
constitutional interpretation it is complicated by the "democracy
deficits" of U.S. constitutional history. Other considerations may
also caution against efforts to bind the polity through judicial
incorporation of international norms that have not been agreed to by
more democratic internal processes. 22 1 Another important component
of constitutionalism is the commitment to the rule of law. The
stability and consistency generated by adherence to the rule of law,
including the use of existing mechanisms for legal change as the
vehicle for change, offer important goods to all members of the
polity, even if they disadvantage portions of the population excluded
from earlier moments of decision-making. "Hard" features of
established law provide benefit to existing rights holders, now
including women in the United States, in their ability to invoke law
to protect those rights. The rule of law also facilitates democracy in

14, at 284-300, 349-57, 358-81(describing women's participation in variety
of settings involving, formation, implementation and interpretation of
international norms and emphasizing importance of interpretive activities).
For example, there were a small number of women representatives at the
founding conference of U.N. in 1945, see Hilkka Pietili, Engendering the
Global Agenda: The Story of Women and the United Nations, UN-NGLS
Publications,
at
http://www.unsystem.org/ngls/
documents/publications.en/develop.dossier/dd.06, and involved in the creation
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See MARY ANN GLENDON, A
WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 35, 54, 90 (2001); Sandra Day O'Connor,

The Legal Status of Women: The Journey Toward Equality, 15 J.L. &
29, 33-34 (2000-2001) (noting insistence by female delegates that
Universal Declaration refer to "all human beings" instead of "all men").
Customary international law, by virtue of its decentralized sources of authority,
is perhaps more open to participation from groups historically excluded from
political power in long-established constitutional systems.
220. And it is a strong reason for advocates of U.S. adherence to
international legal rules to engage with democratic processes in national, state
and local legislative bodies for enactment of implementing legislation.
221. As I will argue below, giving consideration to foreign and international
norms in the resolution of domestic questions should not be seen as an effort to
bind through external norms but as an effort to expand the deliberative
materials through which we, through constitutional organs of government, give
meaning to our own law. See also Knop, supra note 23, at 531-32 (discussing
Jennifer Nedelsky's work); supra note 199.
RELIGION
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that it specifies the procedures by which democratic decision-making
proceeds.222
But these rule-of-law values should not preclude resort to the
decisions of non-U.S. tribunals as an effort at genuine interpretation
of existing U.S. legal texts, including the Constitution. 223 Rule-oflaw considerations may even favor interpretive rules that assume a
national preference to be in conformity with international human
rights law, as The Schooner Charming Betsy presumes with respect
to statutes.224 Consideration of foreign and international law is
consistent with some of our oldest constitutional traditions. 22 5 In its
founding decades, the United States Supreme Court resorted to the
"law of nations" not only as a set of independent decisional rules in
areas such as admiralty or cases affecting ambassadors, 226 but also as
222. See Sunstein, supra note 215, at 638-39.
223. Cf Hannum, supra note 75, at 292, 298-311 (noting countries that treat
their own constitution as supreme over customary international law but
nonetheless refer to international human rights norms in resolving cases). I do
not mean to suggest that international law would "trump" U.S. constitutional
law but that it may be helpful in its interpretation.
224. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
Bradley and Goldsmith have stressed the more expansive and intrusive scope
of international law today as compared to in the Founding period as a reason
for resistance to treating it as binding in U.S. courts. See Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 198, at 821.
The difficulty of constitutional
"translation" here, see Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint,65 FORDHAM
L. REv. 1365, 1371-76 (1997), is considerable. In this context, should we
assume that the more important value to be translated is preserving areas for
state resolution or instead is compliance with international law? Rule of law
arguments may exist on both sides of this question, though given the strong
desire of the Constitution's framers to provide for a unitary voice in foreign
affairs and the foreign affairs difficulties state noncompliance with
international law may entail, there would plainly be grounds for concern about
treating clearly established customary international law as without any legal
force with respect to the states. For illuminating disagreements, see sources
cited supra note 198.
225. The U.S. Constitution does not include an explicit authorization to
consider foreign or international law in interpreting the Constitution, as is the
case in South Africa. See Tushnet, supra note 4, at 1270 n.215 (questioning
authority of courts absent such authorization). Certainly the presence of such
an explicit provision largely eliminates legitimacy based challenges to the
practice of considering foreign law. But judicial practice can itself generate
legitimacy for particular interpretive practices. See also Harding, supra note 5,
at 460.
226. See William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of
the JudiciaryAct of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L.
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an interpretive guide to constitutional meaning. Sometimes the law
of nations was explained as a background norm that the Constitution
was intended to depart from.227 In other cases the law of nations was
treated as a form of persuasive authority for one constitutional
22
interpretation over another.28
Consideration of transnational legal
REv. 1513, 1517 (1984); (describing eighteenth and nineteenth century
understandings in U.S. of "general common law," a law "not attached to any
particular sovereign," that "rather... existed by common practice and consent
among a number of sovereigns").
227. For pre-Civil War opinions treating the law of nations as a "negative"
precedent that particular constitutional clauses were intended to modify, see for
example, Nelson v. Carland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 265, 280 (1843) (reprinting
opinion of Catron, J., sitting as Circuit Justice in In re Klein, 14. F. Cas. 716,
718 (D. Mo. 1843)) (contrasting bankruptcy decrees under the law of nations,
which relied only on comity to secure respect of decree by other sovereigns,
with Congress' bankruptcy power, intended to provide for discharge binding
on all of the states); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 611 (1842)
(referring to law of nations, which would have allowed one state to refuse to
recognize slave property based on municipal laws in another state, as reason
for fugitive slave clause in the Constitution).
228. For examples of persuasive uses of the law of nations in construing
constitutional powers, see Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561
(1832) (relying on the law of nations to help determine Indian tribes' status
within the United States and concluding that, under the Constitution, Indian
tribes retained rights of self government with which state could not interfere);
Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 569-72 (1840) (Taney, C.J.,
opinion for 4 justices) (interpreting the Constitution's provisions on treaties in
light of the practice of nations as to the subjects appropriate for treaties and
concluding that because treaties dealt with surrender of fugitives the federal
treaty power should be read to preclude state governor from deciding to
extradite a fugitive to Canada); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 227
(1824) (Johnson, J. concurring) (relying in part on law of nations to conclude
that the federal power to regulate interstate commerce must be exclusive). For
other uses of or references to the law of nations in early Supreme Court
decisions touching on federal powers, federal relations or federal statutes, see,
for example, Schooner Exch. v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137-38
(1812) (looking to practices of the "whole civilized world" in concluding that
vessel of foreign sovereign has sovereign immunity from in rem jurisdiction in
U.S. ports); United States v. The Schooner Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518,
594, 596 (1841) (treating the law of nations as constraining U.S. in dealing
with foreign subjects); Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. at 118 (indicating that federal
statutes should generally be construed in ways consistent with international
law); Davis v. Packard, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 276, 284-85 (1833) (referring to the
law of nations and practice in England to hold that a foreign consul did not
waive immunity by failing to object at the trial level); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796)(Wilson, J.) ("When the United States declared their
independence, they were bound to receive the law of nations, in its modem
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materials as interpretive sources, then, consists
with some of our
229
interpretation.
constitutional
of
oldest forms
Apart from this general receptivity to considering transnational
sources in the older cases, there are particular reasons within our
interpretive traditions to consider those sources in gender equality
cases. 230 First, the legal movements for women's suffrage and
gender equality in the United States developed in conjunction with,
were influenced by and exerted influence on, similar movements in
other countries. 23 1 From its inception, the idea of women's suffrage,
state of purity and refinement."); see also James H. Lengel, The Role of
InternationalLaw in the Development of ConstitutionalJurisprudence in the
Supreme Court: The Marshall Court and American Indians, 43 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 117 (1999); cf.Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 589-90
(1839) (applying rules of international comity to the question of whether a
corporation chartered in one state could make a contract in another). Until late
in the nineteenth century, U.S. courts treated international law as routinely
applicable in a variety of cases, including admiralty, cases affecting
ambassadors and public ministers, and disputes between American states. See
Koh, TransnationalPublic Law Litigation, supra note 33, at 2353-54. And in
ascertaining the scope of that domestically applicable law of nations, the Court
commented that "[t]he decisions of the Courts of every country... will be
received, not as authority, but with respect." Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v.
Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 198 (1815).
229. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304, 335 (1816)
(noting that the Constitution's grants of subject matter jurisdiction to Article III
courts meant that the jurisdiction over cases under the Constitution, federal
laws and treaties would "affect not only our internal policy, but our foreign
relations [and it] would, therefore, be perilous to restrain it in any manner
whatsoever, inasmuch as it might hazard the national safety"); id. (noting other
categories of federal jurisdiction, including admiralty, "in the correct
adjudication of which foreign nations are deeply interested... [and] in which
the principles of the law and comity of nations often form an essential
inquiry.") That the Court may have manifested greater attention to the law of
nations in its early years of decisions than it does today is perhaps not
surprising. Cf McCrudden, supra note 1, at 503, 514, 523 (noting reasons of
economy, given absence of legal development in early years of constitutional
regimes, that may lead courts to look to other courts' decisions as aids). What
is less understandable is the strong resistance to the legitimacy of considering
foreign or international sources as aids to interpretation that Justices Thomas
and Scalia have at times expressed.
230. For additional reasons to consider such transnational sources, see infra
text accompanying notes 259-62.
231. The transnational origins of the women's movement in the United
States are both intellectual and political in character. Mary Wollstonecraft's
Vindication of the Rights of Women, published in Britain in 1792 and soon
translated into German and French, see LEILA J. RUPP, WORLDS OF WOMEN:
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its implications and the principles for which it stood were the subject
of a rich transnational discourse and some formal international
organization. 232 Looking to comparative and international sources on
is
widely regarded as the intellectual inspiration for the early women's suffrage
movement. And the political spur to the relationships among women
abolitionists that then led to the Seneca Falls Convention of 1848, with its
ringing declaration of women's rights, was the ejection of women
representatives from a meeting in Britain of the Anti-Slavery Society in 1840.
See Judith Resnik, Women, Meeting (Again), in and Beyond the United States,
THE MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 14 (1997),

in THE DIFFERENCE "DIFFERENCE" MAKES 203-06 (Deborah Rhode ed.,

2003); CHARLESWORTH & CHrNKIN, supra note 219, at 14-20. On
transnational aspects of the women's movement and the U.S., see Judith
Resnik, Sisterhood,Slavery and Sovereignty: TransnationalAntislavery Work,
Women's Rights Movements, and the Ambivalent Role of United States
Lawmakers, in SISTERHOOD AND SLAVERY (Katherine Sklar and James
Stewart eds., Yale Univ. Press) (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript of Sept. 12,
2003 on file with author) (describing how "transatlantic crossings" in
antislavery movement of nineteenth century established paradigms for
subsequent women's activities on behalf of equality carried forward in various
ways at the international level and noting U.S. leadership in international antitrafficking initiatives). For individual examples, note that Carrie Chapman
Catt, whose organizational skills are widely credited as important to securing
passage and ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, had served for several
years as head of the International Council of Women. Rosika Schwimmer,
whose application for U.S. citizenship was famously rejected by the Supreme
Court (because she refused to swear to take up arms for the U.S. at a time
when she would not have been allowed to do so, see United States v.
Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929)), and who was originally from Hungary,
served as the International Press Secretary, headquartered in London, of the
International Women's Suffrage Alliance before coming to the U.S. See
Stephanie A. Levin, Women and Violence: Reflections on Ending the Combat
Exclusion, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 805, 818 (1992). Mary Clark's study of the
first 20 women admitted to the bar of the U.S. Supreme Court reveals that a
number were also involved with international women lawyer associations,
international conferences and organizations. See Mary Clark, The First
Women Members of the Supreme Court Bar, 1879-1900, 36 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 87, 88, 120-26 (1999). See also Sylvia Law, CrystalEastman: Organizer
for Women's Rights, Peace and Civil Liberties in the 1910s, 28 VAL. U.L.
REV.
1305 (1994) (noting Crystal Eastman's involvements in both
international women's suffrage and U.S. suffrage activities)
232. See supra note 231; see also KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 12, at 51-60.

Connections between the women's suffrage movement in the U.S. and
international women's organizations have in recent years become the subject
of significant scholarship. See Rupp, supra note 231 at 4 (explaining how her
research on the U.S. National Women's Party led to her "discovery of U.S.
women's involvement in the transnational struggle for equal rights").
According to Rupp, trans-border organizations of women began in the late
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gender equality in law as part of the process by which we now
interpret our constitutional commitments to equality is thus
consistent with the broader history that gave rise to the constitutional
change and may accordingly shed light on its meaning.233
Second, as I argue elsewhere, comparative constitutional law
may be of particular assistance to the United States in addressing the
enduring problem of how to integrate newer constitutional
commitments with older ones. 234 Ours is a constitutional system in
which governmental structures and liberty-protecting rights were
nineteenth century: the first international women's conference was held in
Paris in 1878; the second, called by the U.S. National Women Suffrage
Association took place in Washington D.C. in 1888 and led to the creation of
the International Council of Women. Id. at 13, 15. International women's
organizations and national chapters grew in numbers and cross-affiliations.
See id. at 16-18; Nitza Berkovitch, The InternationalWomen's Movement, in
CONSTRUCTING WORLD CULTURE: INTERNATIONAL NGOs SINCE 1875 100,
104, 117 (John Boli & George M. Thomas eds., 1999). The International
Alliance of Women for Suffrage and Legal Citizenship (now known as the
International Alliance of Women) was founded in 1904 at a meeting in Berlin,
through earlier work of representatives from the U.S., England, Australia,
Canada, Norway, Sweden, Germany, Russia, Turkey and Chile; its founding
declaration of principles asserted that "men and women are equally free and
independent members of the human race and equally entitled to the free
exercise of their individual rights and liberties." Id. at 105. By 1913, twentysix countries had national sections. See Rupp, supra note 231, at 16. Members
self-consciously identified bonds of commonality with women from other
nations in pursuit of their goals. See id. at 82-83, 218-22; Jane Connors,
NGOs and the Human Rights of Women at the United Nations, in THE
CONSCIENCE OF THE WORLD:

ORGANIZATIONS IN THE

THE INFLUENCE OF NON-GOvERNMENTAL

UN SYSTEM 147, 149-50 (Peter Willetts ed., 1996)

(discussing involvement of at least twenty women's organizations in League of
Nations related matters in Geneva after World War I including "British and US
women's societies"); CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 219 at 14
(noting that over 1500 women met in an International Congress of Women in
the Hague to discuss linkages between women's participation in politics and
the prevention of war).
233. Cf Sandra Day O'Connor, The History of the Women's Suffrage
Movement, 49 VAND. L. REv. 657, 659, 665 (1994) (noting exclusion of
women from the 1840 London meeting and also noting that in the early 1900s,
the American suffrage movement received a "necessary jolt" from the political
tactics of women suffragists in England).
234. Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation, Comparative Constitutionalism and Fissian Freedoms, U. MIAMI L. REv. (forthcoming 2003-04)
[hereinafter "Fissian Freedoms"]; Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation:
Fitzpatrickv. Bitzer and Our Bifurcated Constitution, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1259,
1298-1301 (2001) [hereinafter Holistic Interpretation].
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adopted well ahead of commitments to human equality, including
women's equality, as bedrock principles.2 35 We have had to "evolve"
our understandings of equality in the Fourteenth Amendment from
one focused on slavery and racial discrimination to embrace the
equality of women,236 arguably reading that equality-protecting
amendment in the light of the Nineteenth Amendment's expansion of
suffrage 237 in order to develop even the most basic antidiscrimination principles on gender. After a seventy-year struggle
for gender equality in voting (from 1848 to 1920), it was another
fifty years before the Court began to realize the impact of this
commitment more pervasively on our understandings of earlier parts
of the Constitution, including the general guarantee of equality rights
in the Fourteenth Amendment. Newer constitutional systems from
their inception have combined commitments to liberty with
commitments to equality and have had to integrate those
commitments together with structural aspects of their systems (e.g.
federalism) in their constitutional jurisprudence.238 Their courts have

235. I have argued elsewhere that human equality was a subordinate theme
of the original constitution that only became central to constitutional selfunderstanding after the Civil War. See Jackson, FissianFreedoms, supra note
234. For a different view, see ROBERT GOLDWIN, WHY BLACKS, WOMEN AND
JEWS ARE NOT MENTIONED IN THE CONSTITUTION, AND OTHER UNORTHODOX

9-15 (1990) (arguing that Constitution was from the beginning founded
on principles of equality and that Constitution neither approved of slavery nor
excluded women, but required amendment to overcome state practices
inconsistent with basic constitutional vision of equality).
236. See, e.g., Winkler, supra note 218, at 1457 (describing arguments of
suffragists for interpretive method of "living constitutionalism"); see also
Farnsworth, supra note 213, at 1291-95.
237. See Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex
Equality, Federalismand the Family, 118 HARV. L. REv. 947, 960-77 (2002);
Michael C. Dorf, Equal ProtecionIncorporation,88 VA. L. REv. 951, 979-80
(2002); Amar, supra note 211, at 51-52, 107-09; Jackson, Holistic
Interpretation,supra note 234, at 1284-92.
238. See, e.g., Jackson, Holistic Interpretation,supra note 234, at 1299-1301
(discussing Canadian decision in which Justice Frazer, of the Alberta Court of
Appeals, read the federal power over criminal law expansively in light of
Charter commitments to women's equality). Countries that have developed
their basic constitutional framework with participation from women as well as
men may cast valuable light on how a twenty-first century constitution now
committed to gender equality and representative government ought to be
understood. In this regard the Canadian Charter of 1982, the South African
Constitution of 1996, the Colombian Constitution of 1993, and the Ugandan
VIEWS
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elaborated on equality norms in their relationship with other
important human rights values in polities less encumbered by a
binding eighteenth century document (in whose framing women
were excluded and which was committed only to a very particular
understanding of who was entitled to be treated equally). Their
jurisprudence might thus be of particular assistance to developing
understandings of how to integrate our relatively newer found
commitment
to gender equality into the rest of U.S. constitutional
9
law.

23

B. JudicialDiscretion,Expertise and Constraint
Discretion and Power. A distinct objection to the consideration
foreign
precedents focuses on the question of judicial discretion
of
and constraint in interpretation. Professor Charles Fried has recently
argued that a judge, unlike a scholar, is constrained (by virtue of
having the power of judgment) to engage only in interpretation of
legal materials, and has suggested that "expand[ing] the authoritative
canon" of sources for constitutional interpretation to include
comparative materials would threaten that constraint. 24° But a

Constitution of 1995 are among those notable for the organized involvement of
women in their development.
239. For discussion of possible differences between decisions of domestic
courts and general statements of international human rights, for purpose of
influencing domestic legal interpretation, see infra text accompanying notes
250-55.
240. See Charles Fried, Scholars and Judges: Reason and Power, 23 HARV.
J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 807, 818-29 (2000) (arguing that judges, unlike scholars,
exercise power and in so doing are bound by a limited interpretive canon). In
contrast to scholars, who may redefine what the interpretive canon is, Fried
says, a court must be confined by law.
What does it mean to be confined by the law? It means that however
much freedom the interpretative task may seem to leave judges, still,
they do interpret the law. They interpret the legal materials out of
which they construct a legal theory that carries them forward to the
new decision they must make, and there is a limit beyond which it is
simply no longer plausible to claim that a decision is interpreting those
materials rather than twisting or ignoring them.
Id. at 811. Fried describes Justice Breyer's dissent in Printz, invoking
comparative constitutional law as "one of the few instances of a deliberate
attempt by a Justice to expand the canon of authoritative materials from which
constitutional common law reasoning might go forward." Id. at 819. Professor
Fried thus appears implicitly to approve of Justice Scalia's effort to prevent
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commitment to interpretation as a distinctive feature of judging does
not of itself rule in or out particular sources. Early uses of the "law
of nations" in constitutional interpretation suggest that our
authoritative canon may have been more inclusive in the past and is
capable of change over time. 241 Rather than increasing judicial
discretion by expanding the sources available to be considered, a
practice of considering other courts' approaches to analogous issues
may, by eliciting reasoning about distinctions or similarities between
U.S. constitutional commitments and conditions and 242
others, increase
the deliberative quality and accountability ofjudging.
Professor McCrudden and others, however, have questioned
whether resort to foreign decision is not more likely simply to reflect
a judge's predisposition, and to allow judges to give vent to their
preferences because it expands the range of views for which some
precedent can be found.2 4 3 I think this objection is best answered by
Professor Glenn's observation that having to confront foreign
decisions offers far greater opportunity for critical reflection on one's
own first instincts than otherwise. 244 A judge's instincts are likely
conditioned by the legal system in which she already functions; it
seems most unlikely that a judge would be predisposed to a result
that had no support already in her own tradition (or that judges

this expansion of the canon because it would allow too much room for
"twisting" interpretation beyond any sense of constraint. See id. at 811.
241. See supra notes 225-29; Fontana, supra note 4, at 544-52; Jackson,
Ambivalent Resistance,supra note 72, at 584-91.
242. See Jackson, Narratives,supra note 126, at 259-61; see also id. at 26371 (noting possibility of moderating effects on U.S. concerns from broader
comparative knowledge of other constitutional systems); cf Klug, supra note
44, at 616 ("The emergence of a world constitutionalism... provides an
opportunity to United States judges and lawyers... to advance their own
constitutional endeavors .

. .

. [B]y joining this emerging constitutional

discussion, the United States Supreme Court would enrich its own discussion
of constitutional alternatives ... even if it distinguished or rejected foreign
arguments...").
243. See McCrudden, supra note 1, at 507. There is no question that
international legal sources stand for multiple values and will be subject to
divergent interpretations in different courts of different countries. See
generally Knop, supra note 23, at 526-31 (emphasizing role of culture in
interpretation of international law). For conflicting approaches to gender
equality and customary law in Africa, see, e.g., cases cited supra note 99.
244. See Glenn, supra note 63, at 264.
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would act upon such a view on finding foreign support).24 5 It seems
more likely that consideration of foreign decisions and approaches
would produce decision-making more aware of the possibility of
interpretive choices, and thus more likely to respond by reasoning
rather than by an instinctive assumption that one has the right
answer.
Expertise. A more substantial objection to transnational judicial
discourse goes to expertise or competence. Most U.S. judges today
were not educated in law school or in practice about international
and foreign law.246 Contextualized understandings of other countries'
legal systems are important for fair use of foreign cases; there is a
significant risk that doctrines, rules or principles that make sense in
one context will change meaning or lose value in another context.
And there are risks of sheer confusion, about the scope and content
of international law and of how to understand constitutional
decisions of other courts.247 Given the varying degrees to which
foreign or international law is likely to be helpful in resolving
domestic constitutional issues, judges may be understandably
reluctant either to invest the time needed to feel comfortable relying
on those sources or to risk error in relying on them without adequate
knowledge and understanding of their meaning and status. Until law
schools do more to train lawyers to understand these external
materials and lawyers in turn alert domestic judges to the possible
utility or applicability of foreign or international legal sources,
judicial hesitation will likely continue.
Foreign judgments and international law. Whatever the
outcome of current debates over the self-executing character of
treaties or the status of customary international law,248 or of what

245. Thus I do not deny that judges sometimes cite selectively to foreign or
transnational sources because they conform to the judge's views of how the
case should be resolved. Rather, I am skeptical of the capacity of foreign or
international materials to influence a judge's choice beyond those choices
already supported within the domestic interpretive tradition.
246. See Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance, supranote 72, at 592-95.
247. For example, Canadian Section 1 rights cases cannot be read without
some understanding of the proportionality doctrine. For a brief explanation, see
Jackson, TransnationalLegal Discourse,supra note 108, at 385 n. 45.

248. See supra notes 196-98.
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norms are embraced within the jus cogens,249 it is clear that a
decision of the Canadian Supreme Court on the meaning of the
federalism and equality provisions of its own Charter, or of the
Indian Supreme Court on the need for the government to protect
women from sexual harassment (however helpful they may be to a
fuller understanding of what it may mean to be constitutionally
committed to equality25°) are not "binding" in the United States. Yet
those judgments are binding in their own polities. To the extent that
other nations' reasoned judicial decisions reflect actual judgments
affecting real litigants by judges with responsibilities in an ongoing
government, they may be regarded by other judges as more
persuasive accounts than those found in scholarly writings or in
unenforceable or under-enforced standards of international law.
Among nonbinding "outside" sources, it may bear considering
whether there are systematic differences between comparative
constitutional law and international human rights law with respect to
their helpfulness to or influence on domestic courts. Unlike
international human rights law, the constitutional law of individual
rights in other countries is embedded in an entire system of
governance; judicial judgments on constitutional questions in
domestic courts thus may not only reflect the special concentration of
the mind to which Professor Fried refers but an awareness of how the
judgment fits with an overall system of governance. 251
Thus,
domestic court decisions upholding claims of right may in some
respects be more persuasive than statements of human rights
249. See CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 219, at 16-17.
(complaining that gender discrimination is not treated asjus cogens); cf Ladan
Askari, Girls Rights Under InternationalLaw: An Argument for Establishing
Gender Equality as Jus Cogens, 8 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STuD. 23
(1998) (arguing that gender discrimination should be treated asjus cogens).
250. See infra text at notes 291-98.
251. Cf Fried, supra note 240, at 823 ("one substantial advantage the judge
enjoys over the scholar comes from the fact that just because the judge

exercises power, because her decision directly effects lives, she will have
thought differently and perhaps more deeply, more responsibly....
Responsibility - like the prospect of hanging - concentrates the mind.").
Some of the objections raised to customary international law seem to resonate
with Judge Fried's point about how the greater responsibility of judges (to give

actual judgments) requires them to think differently ("more responsibly") than
scholars. Cf, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 198, at 839 (raising
concern that today customary international law is less tied to actual state
practices and based more on international pronouncements).
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principles issued by bodies with no other governmental
responsibilities. To the extent that part of the special responsibility
of judging comes from the power of giving a coercive or effective
judgment within a governmental system,252 domestic courts may fmd
more reason to pay attention to what their judicial counterparts in
other countries have to say.253 Yet to the extent international sources
reflect an actual international consensus about human rights, such as
the meaning of gender equality, they may be more readily
assimilated into domestic legal interpretation through presumptions
favoring interpretations of ambiguous law in ways consistent with
international law.254
C. NationalDistinctivenessand GenderEquality in the U.S.
Supreme Court: The Sounds of TransnationalSilence
One important function of a constitution is to give expression to
a distinctive national identity and historical experience.
I have
noted elsewhere the possibility that the Court's ambivalence about
referring to foreign authority might reflect concern about diminishing
the acceptability of the Court's reasoning and results before its
relevant domestic audiences, particularly when "exceptionalist"
strands in U.S. political thought are ascendent.256 But there is no
252. See supra note 251; Fried, supra note 240, at 823 ("The prospect of the
real life effect of her decision gives off the vapors which the judge inhales to
nourish her prophetic utterances."); see generally id. at 821-26 (distinguishing
judicial decisions on constitutional questions from scholarly writings).
253. See also

Kirby, Road from Bangalore, supra note 136 (noting

skepticism about international tribunals and committees, and the generality of
expression in many international human rights instruments); Kirby, Role of the
Judge, supra note 129, at 523 (noting concerns for "hypocrisy and double
standards" in the process of norm development in international law in which
"authoritarian regimes indifferent to human rights" purport to lay down law for
others in "vaguely worded instruments").
254. These presumptions might have particular appeal where an international
instrument is binding on the country (because, for example, a treaty has been
ratified), but is not independently judicially enforceable (because the treaty is
non self-executing). A non-self executing treaty provision is one that is not
judicially enforceable without implementing legislation. For critical discussion
and debate over this doctrine, see sources cited supra note 197.
255. See Tushnet, supra note 4, at 1270-81, 1307; Choudhry, supra note 6,
at 835, 838 (on dialogic uses of comparison and other countries' constitutional
experience as negative precedent.)
256. See Jackson, Narratives,supra note 126, at 265-66.
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reason why a constitutional democracy, including the United States,
cannot see itself as having a national legal identity concerned with
whether its own practices meet transnational and international norms,
and at times in its history the United States has embraced such
concerns. 257 It may now be particularly important for the stature of
the United States in the international legal community for its courts
at least to acknowledge widely held views on human rights norms,
including gender equality, whatever position is ultimately taken as a
matter of U.S. law.2 58 Considering other sources of law and
explaining why they are or not persuasive or relevant in the domestic
setting permits a broader dialogue within the course of the
259
adjudication and may increase participants' sense of fair process.
And if the Court increasingly incorporates consideration of
international and transnational sources on human rights, legitimacy
for this interpretive practice is likely to follow.

257. See supra notes 225-29; cf United States v. Bums, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283
(Canadian Supreme Court clearly aligns Canada with leadership in
international human rights on death penalty, as part of national identity).
Despite recent scholarly interest in the Bricker Amendment (a proposed
constitutional amendment in the 1950s, one version of which would have
provided that treaties can be effective as internal law only through legislation
valid in the absence of the treaty), it is important to remember that the Bricker
Amendment (unlike the ERA) never passed out of Congress. See Golove,
supra note 196, at 1273-78.
258. Some prominent. jurists have suggested that national supreme courts
that ignore transnational judicial discourse do so at the risk of declining
influence. See, e.g., L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 1, at 29-30. Although
influencing the courts of other nations may not be high on the list of what a
national supreme court should care about, the Court's and the nation's interest
may well be served by at least demonstrating knowledge of and respect for
what goes on elsewhere. Cf Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895)
(defining comity of one nation to another as "neither a matter of absolute
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the
other").
259. Professor Glenn interestingly suggests that too internal a view of
"binding" national law may be dangerous for the very concept of law itself:
In seeking to bind it fails to persuade and resistance becomes easier to
justify than adherence. Opponents to laws made by the State are
excluded from the world of law and are driven to attack it.
Multiplying the sources of law, however, means multiplying the
sources of legal dialogue. Law is less precise but more communal and
there are more possibilities of persuasion ....
Glenn, supra note 63, at 297.
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Yet there remains the question why domestic courts in the
United States should invest the effort required to understand
transnational legal sources. U.S. legal practice has made real
contributions to the idea of gender equality and its legal protection;
we have a rich body of domestic law and research that bears on
gender equality issues. Why, given the time and effort required to
avoid misunderstandings, should lawyers and judges look beyond
U.S. law?
Among the reason for comparative study generally, 260 the
capacity of comparative study to provide perspective on one's own
situation has particular resonance for legal approaches to gender
inequalities. The deeply entrenched sense of the "naturalness" of
gender distinctions, in the hearts and minds of many, provides a
special opportunity for the benefits of reflective comparison with
external sources and practices-its capacity to challenge assumptions
that existing ways of proceeding are "necessary" or "natural. ' ' 261
Moreover, the mistreatment of women thrives on darkness and
obscurity, often associated with the realm of the "private." Insistence
on the autonomy of the "private" from "public" intervention has been
a tool of the continued subordination of women, for example, as
victims of domestic violence.262 Shedding light, making information
260. Benefits to judges'deliberative process from comparative constitutional
knowledge include illuminating shared constitutional concepts such as human
dignity and equality; better understanding one's own tradition by comparing it
with others; developing knowledge of the range of functional solutions to
constitutional problems and of their consequences; and in so doing,
strengthening the reason-giving capacities of courts. See Jackson, Narratives,
supra note 126, at 254-63. Further, some degree of comparison with what one
believes about constitutional experience in other countries is inevitable in the
highly interconnected information age in which we live; given the inevitability
of comparison, it should be well-informed. See Jackson, Ambivalent
Resistance, supranote 72, at 600-01.
261. Cf VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 169 (Foundation Press 1999) (noting potential for
comparative constitutional study to dispel a sense of false necessity about
existing arrangements).
262. See, e.g., Berta Esperanza Hemandez-Truyol, Sex, Culture and Rights:
A Re-Conceptualizationof Violence for the Twenty-First Century, 60 ALB. L.
REv. 607, 629-32 (1997) (discussing relationship between rape, domestic
violence and the "public/private" divide in law); Celina Romany, State
Responsibility Goes Private: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private
Distinction in International Human Rights Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF
WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 85 (Rebecca J. Cook
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available, about different practices, good and bad, in different
contexts around the world, is, I believe, likely in the long run to
improve the conditions of those who are oppressed-including, in
many parts of the world and in many aspects of life, women. So
apart from the benefits to the deliberative process that can accrue
from informed awareness of international and foreign approaches,
insisting on the legitimacy and sharedness of the enterprise of
promoting gender equality as both a human right and a right secured
by national law holds the promise of improved conditions for women
around the world, as well as in the United States.
There are, of course, important differences in the scope of the
rights recognized in international and regional legal regimes and in
other constitutions that in particular settings may limit the utility 2of
63
transnational materials except for the purpose of differentiation.
For example, to the extent that the U.S. Constitution is read to stand
generally against principles of "positive rights," international legal
norms requiring states to affirmatively take action may have little
traction; consider United States v. Morrison,264 where the Court
struck down the civil rights remedy in the Violence Against Women
Act in part because there was insufficient "state action." 265 To the
extent CEDAW (which the U.S. has not ratified) requires
governments to take positive action, it may be dismissed by some as
inconsistent with basic normative commitments of the U.S.
Constitution to protecting a broader realm of private liberty through
the requirement of "state action., 266 Moreover, given the wide range
ed., 1994); see also Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110 HARV.

L. REV. 1657, 1671-75 (1997)(summarizing feminist objections to "publicprivate" dichotomy).
263. The U.S. First Amendment law is a leading example. Another is the
absence of social welfare rights in the U.S. Constitution.
264. 529 U.S. 598, 621-25 (2000).
265. See id. at 621-27. For an important challenge to the Court's current
understanding of Fourteenth Amendment rights as "negative" only, see ROBIN
WEST,

PROGRESSIVE

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

CONSTITUTIONALISM:

RECONSTRUCTING

THE

(Duke University Press 1994) (arguing that the

requirement of "equal protection of the laws" should be understood to impose

affirmative duties of protection on government).
266. Comparative constitutional decisions on federalism might also have
been thought relevant to the issue in Morrison, notwithstanding important
differences among federal systems. In both Canada and Australia, courts have
upheld expansive understandings of national government power to prevent
gender-motivated harassment or violence. See Reference re Firearms Act, 219
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of actual practices with respect to gender equality by nations that
have ratified both the ICCPR and the CEDAW,267 appeals to
transnational practices under such instruments may have less
persuasive force.
Moreover, the institutional settings of different constitutions and
constitutional courts vary widely, 268 and may yield complex and
highly particular doctrine not easily amenable to transnational
comparisons. In Nevada Department of Human Resources v.
Hibbs, 2 69 which concerned the enforceability of the Family and

Medical Leave Act (FMLA), there was no discussion in the Court's
A.R. 201 (Alta Ct. App. 1998) (Fraser, C.J.A.) (relying inter alia on national
interest in preventing domestic violence to support national power to require
gun licensing and registration), affd, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 783, 2000 Can. Sup. Ct.
LEXIS 29, discussed in Jackson, Holistic Interpretation,supra note 234, at
1299-1301; Aldridge v. Booth, 80 A.L.R. 1 (Austl. 1988) (upholding federal
sex harassment statute against challenge to its scope as beyond proper exercise
of external affairs power to implement CEDAW). Although the United States,
unlike Australia, has not ratified CEDAW, it did ratify the ICCPR, which bars
gender discrimination in the rights it guarantees. See Brief Amici Curiae of
International Law Scholars, supra note 189 (arguing that VAWA could be
upheld as an implementation of the ICCPR obligations, or as an exercise of
Congress' power to define offenses against nations in light of customary
international law). On the difficulty of direct comparison of the meanings of
power-allocating clauses in federal constitutions, see Jackson, Constitutional
Federalism,supra note 163.
267. Cf Kirby, Road from Bangalore, supra note 136; Kirby, Role of the
Judge, supra note 129, at 523 (noting concerns about hypocrisy in ratification
of international human rights standards and the vagueness of those standards in
international documents). The failures of many parties to comply with the
ICCPR or CEDAW may undermine the willingness of a U.S. court to give
those documents significant weight in determining what customary
international law requires. See supra text at notes 251-53.
268. See generally Neuman, supra note 125, at 1869-72. The United States,
for example, has a decentralized system of constitutional review which may
require more bright line approaches than in smaller countries with more unified
judiciaries or with specialized constitutional courts.
269. 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1976-77, 1981-83 (2003) (upholding FMLA as
exercise of Congress' power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
and thus upholding provisions permitting suits for violation of the Act against
a state). The arcane complexity of the Court's current doctrine on the
amenability of states to suits under federal law holds that states cannot be sued
under valid and applicable federal statutes enacted under Congress' Article I
powers, but may be sued under valid and applicable statutes enacted under the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996). It appears that no party or amicus brief in Hibbs (searchable on
WESTLAW) referred to comparative materials.
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opinions of the wide range of European and other approaches to how
to achieve more gender equality in the distribution of employment
and family responsibilities and benefits.2 70 The question in Hibbs
was whether the FMLA could be regarded as Fourteenth Amendment
27
legislation in order to authorize suit for violation against the state; '
under the Court's recent cases, this question turned on tests of the
"proportionality" and "congruence" of the statutory means to a
constitutional purpose, an analysis to be based in significant
measure on the nature of the record before the Congress.2 72 The
complexity of U.S. jurisprudence on the constitutional questions
presented, and its internal focus on what Congress considered,273
may help account for the Hibbs Court's silence on transnational
sources on the role
of different forms of family leave in promoting
2 74
gender equality.

270. For a helpful description of one European system, see Amlaug Leira,

Caring as Social Right: Cash for Child Care and Daddy Leave, 5 Soc.
POLITICS 362, 370-73 (OUP, 1998)
(describing Norway's adoption, in

connection with a general expansion of family care benefits, of a "use it or lose

it 'daddy leave"' designed to encourage fathers to take leave).
271. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1976.
272. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 89-91 (2000); Bd. of Tr.

of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368-71 (2001); Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 637-41
(1999); Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530-32 (1997).

273. See, e.g., Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368-71; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89-91. It
appears that at least some in Congress considered the practice of other nations
in arguing for adoption of the FMLA. See, e.g., 139 Cong. Rec. H379, H384
(daily ed. Feb. 3, 1993) (statement of Rep. Schroeder) ("[L]et us get real about
that and let us realize that we do have to be both care-givers and good
employees. If every other country can get it, we can get it.").
274. To the extent there were questions whether the particular statute was
sufficiently likely to avoid or prevent gender discrimination, the comparative
approaches of other countries similarly committed to gender equality might
have been helpful in providing a context for deciding the "appropriateness" of
Congress' judgment. Cf U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. But divergence in
international and comparative legal authorities on whether, and to what degree,
commitments to gender equality should permit or forbid "protective" or
differentiated treatment of women and men in employment settings may have
made resort to such materials less attractive. See, e.g., Leira, supra note 270
(noting disagreement over whether social rights should be based on
"sameness" or "difference," and citing Carole Pateman's work); Case 184/83,
Hofnann v. Barmer Ersatzkasse, 1984 E.C.R. 3047 (1984) (European Court of
Justice decision upholding paid maternity leave only for women); CEDAW
convention art. 11.2, available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/
cedaw/econvention.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2003) (requiring maternity leave
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A notable example of a decision whose reasoning and result
might have been improved, within the Court's own doctrinal
framework for decision, by some engagement with comparative
constitutional decisions is Nguyen v. INS,275 upholding a gender
discrimination in the capacities of U.S. citizen mothers and fathers to
pass on U.S. citizenship for children born out-of-wedlock abroad.276
Under the relevant federal statute, children born abroad to an
unmarried U.S. citizen father had to meet requirements for
citizenship that went beyond those imposed on those born abroad to
unmarried U.S. citizen mothers, including, for children claiming
citizenship through unmarried fathers, a requirement that certain
formal proofs of parentage were established before age eighteen.
The Court in a five to four decision upheld the statute. 277

It

concluded that the distinction was appropriately designed to assure
opportunities for parent-child bonds to develop because mothers (in
contrast to fathers) are inevitably present at birth,278 so reasoning
notwithstanding the fact that in Nguyen itself, the child had been
but not referring to paternity leave and authorizing the provision of special
protection at work to pregnant women, subject to scientific assessments). For
discussion of tensions between the protective model for women workers and a
more gender-neutral non-discrimination model in the ILO standards, see, for
example, Aida Gonzalez-Martinez, Human Rights of Women, 5 WASH. U.J.L.
& POL'Y 157 (2001); Sean Cooney, Testing Times for the ILO: Institutional
Reform for the New International Political Economy, 20 COMP. LAB. L &
POL'Y J. 365, 369 (1999); Jane Dwasi, 1999 Kenya: A Study in International
Labor Standards and Their Effect on Working Women in Developing
Countries: The Casefor Integrationof EnforcmeentIssues in the World Bank's
Policies, 17 WIS. INT'L L.J. 347, 397 (1999); Katarina Tomasevski, European
Approaches to Enhancing Reproductive Freedom, 44 AM. U.L. REV. 1037,
1043-44 (1995).
275. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
276. Id. at 57. Nguyen was born out of wedlock in Vietnam to a U.S. citizen
father and a Vietnamese citizen mother. Although from an early age he lived
in Texas with and was raised by his father, a state court order of parentage,
based on DNA testing, was not obtained until well after he was 18. Id.
277. Id. at 73.
278. ld. at 64-66. The Court also found that the statute served a second
important government interest, that of assuring a biological connection with a
U.S. parent. See id. at 62-64. As I understand the facts, however, the major
barrier to Nguyen's citizenship claim was that the proof of biological
connection requirements were satisfied too late. And in its discussion of the
age limit the Court placed weight on the argument described in text above. See
id. at 68-69.
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raised in the United States by his U.S. citizen father since the age of
six. 279

The result was in considerable tension with what many

believed to be the requirements of "intermediate scrutiny" of gender
classifications, as the dissent vehemently argued.28° It was also at
least arguably inconsistent with the ICCPR, to which the United
States is a party,28 ' and with CEDAW.282 Decisions of several other

279. 533 U.S. at 57.
280. Under intermediate scrutiny, use of a gender discriminatory
classification is prohibited unless it is "substantially related" to the
achievement of an important government interest. See 533 U.S. at 60. As
Justice O'Connor argued in dissent, intermediate scrutiny is intended to
prohibit reliance on stereotypes, even when they are true, if individualized
determinations are possible. See id. at 74-79 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). To
the extent that the government had an important interest in extending
citizenship only to those children born abroad to unwed U.S. citizens who had
opportunities to develop a parent-child bond, there were individualized,
gender-neutral alternatives available to meet that interest (including proof,
after age 18, that a parental bond had been established earlier). See id at 85
(O'Connor, J. dissenting). Likewise, to the extent that the government interest
was in assuring a biological connection, requiring fathers, but not mothers, to
establish that link before age 18 did not substantially advance that interest as
required by intermediate scrutiny, especially in light of the availability of DNA
testing. See id at 80-81 (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
281. See e.g., Aumeeruddy-Cziffra v. Mauritius, U.N. GAOR, Human Rights
Comm., 12th Sess., Comm'n No. 35/1928, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/12/D/35/1978
(1981) (finding ICCPR violation in distinctions made between males and
females for purposes of obtaining residency permits for foreign spouses). In
contrast to Morrison, where the ICCPR would have provided an arguable basis
to uphold a federal statute, in Nguyen the ICCPR might have supported
invalidation of a federal statute. One might hypothesize that a Court would be
more hesitant to consider a non-self-executing treaty in making an interpretive
choice to invalidate, rather than to support, national legislation.
282. CEDAW, which the United States has signed but not ratified, provides
in article 9, paragraph 2 that "States Parties shall grant women equal rights
with men with respect to the nationality of their children." See CEDAW, supra
note 18, at art. 9, para. 2. The CEDAW Committee has emphasized in General
Recommendation 21 its view that the equality rights CEDAW secures with
respect to parents are symmetrical: "States parties should ensure that by their
laws both parents, regardless of their marital status and whether they live with
their children or not, share equal rights and responsibilities for their children."
U.N. G.A.O.R. 49th Sess. Supp. No. 38, at 1. See also Knop & Chinkin, supra
note 156, at 584-85 (describing International Law Association's position
favoring gender equality in nationality and citizenship rules, including
nondiscrimination based on sex in identifying the "personal relationships that
form the basis for preferential treatment under immigration and nationality
rules").
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tribunals have stricken gender qualifications related to citizenship or
rights of residency in Canada,283 Botswana,284 Costa Rica,28 5
Zimbabwe,286 and in the European Union.287
Gender based
Bangladesh 288
in
upheld
been
have
laws
citizenship
in
distinctions
and Pakistan, 289 in the latter case on reasoning, aspects of which
283. See Benner v. Canada, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358 (holding unconstitutional a
gender distinction that discriminated against mothers in the capacity to pass on
Canadian citizenship); see also id. at 399 (citing Elias v. U.S. Dep't of State,
721 F. Supp. 243 (N.D. Cal. 1989) in support of a finding of standing).
284. See Atty Gen. v. Unity Dow, (1992) 103 I.L.R. 128, reprinted in 13
Hum. Rts Q. 614 (1991).
285. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Amendments to the
NaturalizationProvisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica/Advisory Opinion,
5 HuM. RTs. L.J. 161 (1984).
286. See Rattigan v. Chief Immigr. Officer, 103 I.L.R. 224 (Zimb. Sup. Ct.
1994).
287. See Abdulaziz v. United Kingdom, 1985 Eur. Ct. H.R. 9214/80, 7 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 471 (1985) (striking down United Kingdom's gender distinction
between foreign spouses entitled to remain in the UK based on other spouse's
citizenship). According to the Women's Human Rights Resources database of
the Bora Laskin Law Library at the University of Toronto, in Judgment No. 30
of 28 January 1983, Italian Constitutional Court, (1983) 62 Raccolata Ufficiale
delle Sentenze e Ordinanze della Corte Constitutionale, "the Italian
Constitutional Court declared a law unconstitutional that provided that the
child of an Italian father was Italian by birth, without also providing that the
child of an Italian mother was Italian by birth." WHRR Web page, supra note
84, at http://eir.library.utoronto.ca/whrr (last modified Nov 2, 2003) (Note that
a direct URL is not available; to find this case description, go to "subject
areas" of "WHRR database", select "Nationality and Citizenship," then select
"Documents"). For a more detailed analysis of decisions around the world
addressing issues of gender discrimination in nationality laws, see FinalReport
on Women's Equality and Nationality in InternationalLaw, International Law
Assocation (London Conference, 2000) (prepared by Karen Knop,
Rapporteur); Kif Augustine-Adams, Gendered States: A Comparative
Construction of Citizenship and Nation, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 93 (2000); see also
KIM RUBENSTEIN, AUSTRALIAN CITIZENsHIP LAW IN CONTEXT, 55-58, 91,
95-99 (Lawbook Co. 2002).
288. See WHRR Web Page, supra note 84, (last visited Feb. 9, 2004)
(providing description of unreported decision in Bangl. v. Malkani, Supr. Ct.
Writ No. 3192 (1992)) (Malkani description last modified Feb. 9, 2004) (on
file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) (note that direct URL for this
description is unavailable. To access the description, enter the word "Malkani"
into the search function at the WHRR index page); see also KNOP & CHINKIN,
supra note 156, at 534-35, 547-48 (describing Malkani case and continued
inability of Bangladeshi mothers to pass on citizenship to their children).
289. See Sharifan v. Fed'n of Pakistan, P.L.D. 1998 Lahore 59, 50 All Pak.
Legal Decisions 59 (1997) (Lahore). The challenged law provided access to
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would in all likelihood not be accepted in the United States.29 °
Consideration of foreign constitutional approaches, then, would have
informed the U.S. Supreme Court that in at least some countries with
arguably analogous legal regimes and roles of courts (including
countries that are recipients of immigrants), 291 arguably similar
gender discriminations in citizenship laws had been disavowed.
For example, the Canadian decision emphasized the lack of
equality between men and women that was conveyed through the
gender discrimination in the ability to pass on citizenship to a child
born abroad. In invalidating a statute that provided for easier
acquisition of Canadian citizenship for children born abroad to
Canadian fathers than to Canadian mothers, the Court wrote, "[t]his
legislation continues to suggest that, at least in some cases, men and
women are not equally capable of passing on whatever it takes to be
Pakistani citizenship for a foreign female spouse but not to a foreign male
spouse of a Pakistani citizen. See id. at 61. One of the reasons given in the
judgment was that granting citizenship to foreign husbands of Pakistani
women would result in an uncontrollable influx of foreigners becoming
citizens, a national concern trumping equality rights. See id. at 63. This
concern has some resonance with Nguyen's discussion of the larger number of
male than female soldiers abroad, and the concomitant concern about
potentially large numbers of claims for "citizenship by male parentage"
resulting from the activity of American servicemen. See Nguyen v. INS, 533
U.S. 53, 65-66 (2001); cf President of the Republic of South Africa v. Hugo,
1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC), 1997 SACLR LEXIS 91, *91, *74, *63-65
(upholding pardons for incarcerated mothers of young children against a
discrimination challenge brought by an incarcerated father and noting the large
numbers of male, as opposed to female, prisoners, and the likelihood of fathers
having less responsibility for childrearing than mothers).
290. See infra text accompanying note 303 (describing Pakistani court's
reliance on a rule that a woman's domicile must follow her husband's); note
306.
291. One could imagine the Court distinguishing decisions from countries
that do not face the prospect of many applicants for citizenship, but in Canada
and the EU there is net immigration. Canada accepts more immigrants per
capita than any other country in the world, see International Immigration
Agency, Immigration and Relocation to Canada, at http://how2immigrate.net/
canada/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2003), and Canada has had net in-migration
since as early as 1900.
See U.C. DAVIS MIGRATION NEWS, at
http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=294902-0 (last visited Sept.
23, 2003). The EU, as well, has enjoyed net in-migration for many years. See
THE
EUROPEAN
UNION
ONLINE,
at www.europa.eu.int/comm/
eurostat/Public/datashop/print-product/EN?catalogue=Eurostat&product=-3po020in-EN&mode=download. (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).
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a good Canadian citizen. 2 92 The U.S. Court, by contrast, ignored
the expressive meaning of gender distinctions as to the capacity to
pass on citizenship, albeit in a case in which the classification

disadvantaged men, not women, in their capacity to pass on
citizenship.29 3

292. Benner v. Canada, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358, 403.
Although the
discrimination at issue in Benner (one imposing greater burdens on a bornabroad child claiming citizenship through a Canadian mother than through a
Canadian father) is similar, it is not identical to that in Nguyen. Nonetheless
the Canadian Court's reasoning suggests that, were it faced with the identical
discrimination, it would have scrutinized the statute more aggressively than did
the majority in Nguyen.
293. The U.S. Court may have reached the conclusion it did because of a
concern about permitting a wider range of persons to become U.S. citizens
than Congress could have intended. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 66; see also id. at
73 (Scalia, J., concurring) (doubting whether Court had constitutional authority
to permit citizenship to be granted where Congress had not so specified); see
generally David A. Martin, Behind the Scenes on a Different Set: What
Congress Needs to Do in the Aftermath of St. Cyr and Nguyen, 16 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 313, 333-35 (2002)(suggesting that it was fear of the large
consequences for many would-be citizens that motivated the decision in
Nguyen, given the Court's commitment to a rigid rule that its decisions must be
given complete retroactive effect). Both U.S. and foreign constitutional law
may have offered alternatives to the feared result, possibly by delaying the
effective date of the decision to allow time for a constitutionally acceptable
legislative response, though such efforts would have raised other constitutional
questions. See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458
U.S. 50, 88 (1982) (the Court stayed its judgment for several months to allow
Congress time to enact a replacement scheme); Re Manitoba Language Rights,
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, 721-22 (holding that all statutes in Manitoba were invalid
for not having been enacted simultaneously in French as well as English, but
staying the effect of its decision by concluding that the unconstitutional laws
were to have "temporary force and effect" in order to allow the legislature time
to enact substitute legislation). For discussion of the Canadian case, see PETER
HOGG, CoNsTIrUTIoNAL LAW OF CANADA § 37(d), § 55.8 (3d ed. 1997). On
proposed solutions to the Nguyen concern, see Martin, supra at 336-37
(arguing that Court could have given its holding prospective effect only and
urging Congress to redress the statutory discrimination in Nguyen but with
prospective effect only). But cf., e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316
(1989) (implying that it would offend Article I judicial power to announce a
new rule of constitutional law but not apply it to release the petitioner who
brought the challenge); Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 95-97
(1993) (indicating that non-retroactive, prospective decisionmaking is for
legislatures, not courts).
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Nguyen was not a "new technology" case,
nor was it as
intensely divisive a case as some discussed earlier. Yet Nguyen was a
case in which reasonable jurists might well have considered available
transnational sources, not least because the subject matter was one of
international concern whose result could affect other nations.295
Moreover, as noted earlier, gender equality cases may be particularly
likely to raise divisive questions as deeply engrained attitudes and
belief, derived from custom, tradition, family experience and/or
religion, are challenged.296 The Court's willingness in Nguyen to
accept the mother's supposed opportunity based on physical
childbirth to develop a relationship with the child as a basis for
excluding fathers from the same ability to pass on citizenship may
reflect at least a tolerance for such engrained attitudes. Where such
deeply held beliefs are in confrontation with emancipatory equality
commitments, a judge's greater knowledge of how other courts
around the world have responded may
help clarify reasoning about
297
both human rights and judicial roles.
Cases vindicating gender equality as against traditional norms
may have persuasive value through the force of their reasoning
combined with respect for the particular tribunal's willingness to
issue and reach a judgment of condemnation. 298 Cases rejecting
294. See supra text accompanying notes 167-68. However, members of the
majority in Nguyen may have been influenced by awareness that new
technologies made it increasingly easy to establish paternity long after a child
was conceived and born.
295. The Court's determination that a party lacks U.S. citizehship may quite
directly affect another country by leaving it responsible for another national.
296. Cf Karst, supra note 211, at 470-71 ("The chief mechanisms by which
the personal becomes political lie in the deepest recesses of the psyche. Neither
little boys nor adult male judges consciously choose to define the idea of
woman around their own needs for masculine self-identification. Each of us male or female... is born into a family and a culture.")
297. See Bayefsky, supra note 13, at 352-69; Knop, supra note 23, at 531-

34. One cannot, of course, assume that gender equality decisions from other
countries or international tribunals will always be progressive. See Jackson,
TransnationalLegal Discourse, supra note 108, at 391 n.76; supra text
accompanying notes 288-90 (discussing Hugo and Sharifan cases).
298. As a general matter, moreover, the persuasive value of particular
foreign decisions may also be reinforced if the passage of time and events
demonstrates that the decision's consequences are positive (or not destructive).
On consequentialism and comparison, see, for example, Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 976-77 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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gender equality challenges to discriminatory laws may also be
helpful for courts to consider. Such cases may persuade positivelythe majority's reasoning in Hugo bears a haunting resemblance to
aspects of the majority decision in Nguyen.299 But they may also
engender more critical stances, by making explicit the premises
behind gender distinctions and illuminating their subordinating or
invidious effects. One should consider here not only the dissent in
Hugo,30 0 but also the Sharifan30 1 case in Pakistan. The court there
rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of allowing foreign wives
of Pakistani husbands to claim Pakistani citizenship while access to
Pakistan citizenship based on marriage is denied to the husbands of
Pakistan wives. 30 2 A significant aspect of the court's reasoning was
that a woman's domicile must follow that of her husband under
"private international law," recognized in (older) Commonwealth
case law; 30 3 the court suggests that its interpretation of the Pakistani
Constitution and the statute itself were justified as in conformity with
international law.30 4 Invoking Pakistani decisions requiring a
299. See supra text accompanying notes 109-11; supra note 289 (discussing
South Africa v. Hugo, 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC), 1997 SACLR LEXIS 91)
300. See supra text accompanying notes 110-11.
301. Sharifan v. Fed'n of Pakistan, 50 All Pak. Legal Decisions 59 (1997)
(Lahore).
302. The challenge was based on article 25 of the Constitution, which
provides that: "(1) All citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal
protection of law. (2) There shall be no discrimination on the basis of sex
alone. (3) Nothing in this Article shall prevent the State from making any
special provision for the protection of women and children." PAK. CONST., pt.
II, ch. , art. 25. The Court first reasoned, formalistically, that because foreign
spouses are not already "citizens," they were outside the reach of Article 25.
See Sharifan, 50 All Pak. Legal Decisions, at 61 (further indicating that
citizenship, according to the Constitution, was to be determined by statute and
thus distinctions between men and women in access to citizenship could not be
"discrimination"). Alternatively, the Court said, the easier access of foreign
wives to citizenship could be regarded as a "special provision for the
protection of women" under Article 25 (3) (that is for the foreign noncitizen
spouses, not the Pakistani women with foreign husbands). Id.
303. Id. at 62 (emphasizing that a "woman by virtue of her marriage acquires
the domicile of her husband").
304. As noted earlier, the Court also invoked national interest on behalf of
the discrimination, assuming it did violate fundamental equality rights, but
stated that "[i]t is impossible to allow every foreigner to acquire citizenship of
Pakistan just by means of a marriage with a Pakistani lady," which could result
in a "flood and influx of foreigners becoming citizens... in indiscriminate
manner." Id. at 63. See supra note 289. The Court commented on the
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woman's domicile to follow that of her husband, the court seemed to
suggest the pervasiveness and naturalness of gender discriminations
relating to marriage and its effects. 30 5 Here is a case invoking
international law and the decisions of other nations to support gender
discrimination in access to citizenship based on marriage, choosing
sources that embrace a rule that women's domicile must follow their
husbands but offering no reasoned basis other than highly gendered
traditions. For those with "eyes to see," a court decision upholding a
gender distinction in citizenship for such a reason may prompt
reconsideration of how other gender distinctions should be regarded
in societies that would reject rigid gender-based rules of domicile.30 6
CONCLUDING REMARKS

Constitutional law is an important location for expressing
fundamental commitments to gender equality and for giving those
commitments meaning and enforcement. But constitutions do not
function solely as a charter of self-government, or an expression of
unique national identity. They also function to establish and
proclaim a country's status as a member of the community of
nations, an independent state entitled to be treated as such by other

"wisdom" of the current policy restricting citizenship rights, citing, inter alia,
the decision in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875), and
suggesting that citizens are members of the body politic entitled to vote.
Sharifan, 50 All Pak. Legal Decisions at 62. (A concern to limit "outsider"
voting influence could, however, be advanced through gender-neutral
numerical limits or other exclusions.)
305. Id. at 63. Notwithstanding its earlier approval of the "wisdom" of the
statute, the Court goes on to invite legislative change. Id. (acknowledging that
"women are no longer to be treated as a property of the male members of the
society" and that the "equal participation of the women.., in all walks of life
is essential" to national progress).
306. Although in the nineteenth century some U.S. Supreme Court justices
were willing to deny a wife, legally separated from her husband, the capacity
as a citizen of a diverse state to bring an action against her spouse in federal
court, see Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 603 (1859) (Daniel, J.
dissenting), it is difficult to imagine that today a state law requiring that wives
be treated as having the domicile of their husbands would pass constitutional
muster. See, e.g. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (invalidating a statute
giving a preference to men over women for purposes of appointing the
executors of estates of intestate decedents).
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national states and to engage with other nations on that basis. 30 7
Constitutions are thus adopted, and interpreted, not only with an eye
to the internal demands of the polity but also with an eye on the
stature and position of the nation state in the international arena 3 0 309
even arguably "dualist" constitutions like that of the United States.
And courts, in cases legitimately before them, are organs of
communication about the content of international law, though within
different procedural paradigms than the political branches. 310 As the

307. See Unity Dow v. Atty Gen., 103 I.L.R.
App.1992)(1996) ("Botswana was, at the time
promulgated, about to enter the comity of nations ..
308. See, e.g.,
H.W.O.
Okoth-Ogendo,
Constitutionalism: Reflections on an African

128, 159-60 (Bots. Ct.
the Constitution was
").
Constitutions Without
Political Paradox, in

CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND
DEMOCRACY:
TRANSITIONS
CONTEMPORARY WORLD 65-80 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds.,

IN

THE

1993) (noting

constitution's function in demonstrating the sovereign existence of the polity).
309. The Federalist Papers, for example, reveal a pervasive concern about
how the United States would be viewed by other countries. See, e.g., THE
FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay)(discussing fear of war and interest in commerce
with foreign countries and noting importance of having federal courts to
provide uniform interpretations to treaties); THE FEDERALIST No. 79
(Alexander Hamilton) (explaining that federal courts have jurisdiction over all
cases involving citizens of other countries in order to prevent creating a cause
for war from an unjust judicial decision). These comments are also
noteworthy:
An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every
government for two reasons: the one is, that, independently of the
merits of any particular plan or measure, it is desirable.., that it
should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and honorable
policy; the second is, that in doubtful cases, particularly where the
national councils may be warped by some strong passion or
momentary interest, the presumed or known opinion of the impartial
world may be the best guide that can be followed.
THE FEDERALIST No. 63 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) (discussing
role of Senate).
310. Cf. Stephan, supra note 198 at 644-46, 648-49, 654-55 (noting
"expressive" decisions in U.S. courts which have a pedagogical purpose with
respect to the content of foreign law and raising cautions based on the
comparative institutional advantage courts have in deciding on concrete facts).
Professor Stephan's analysis may undervalue the degree to which courts also
may have relative institutional advantages in habits of principled reasongiving. "Expressive" decisionmaking by courts is likely, then, to differ from
that of the political branches, for whom decidedly different norms of reason
giving and consistency apply. But cf Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial
Constitutional Interpretations: Three Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L.
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international legal order itself has evolved, 31' rigid insistence on the
autonomy of its own constitutional law from developing world
understandings of rights apparently shared among domestic
constitutions and the international human rights order may be seen in
the community of nations as inconsistent with the obligations of a
national state. The local and global functions of a domestic
constitution can be mediated by appropriate consideration of
international and foreign legal developments insofar as they are
helpful, even if not binding.
There is particular reason to look outside, as well as within, in
resolving constitutional claims that relate to gender equality. Most
of the world community of nations profess adherence to the norm of
gender equality, 312 although there is significant divergence in both
practice and in the legal justifications offered for deviations from
stated norms. Given the widespread subordination of women and
their exclusion from domestic or international power until the midtwentieth century, many polities have had to grapple in roughly the
same time period with how to realize newfound constitutional
commitments to gender equality.313 A number of constitutional

REV. 773, 813-25 (2002) (challenging idea that courts are unusually well

suited to reasoned deliberation).
311. The nineteenth and first part of the 20th century view was based on a
strong idea of sovereignty and independence, under which each state's
"[c]onsent to the regime of international law.., becomes the vehicle by which
the sovereign independence of states is reconciled with the practical
imperatives of co-existence with other states." 0. Schacter, Sovereignty, Then
and Now, in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF WANG TIEYA, 671, 675 (R. Macdonald
ed., 1993). The expansion of human rights law, as widely noted, pierces a
state's sovereignty to insist on norms of conduct between the state and its
citizens.
312. See supra text accompanying notes 8-10.
313. It should come as no surprise that women's groups-in Canada,
Uganda, Colombia-have been among the leaders in calls for broader
participation in constitution making, or that the CEDAW review process has
focused so much attention on female participation. See Lorraine E. Weinrib,
Canada's Charter of Rights: Paradigm Lost?, 6 REv. OF CONST. STUD. 119,
139 n.51 (2002); Penelope E. Andrews, From Gender Apartheid to NonSexism: The Pursuitof Women's Rights in South Africa, 26 N.C.J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 693, 717-18 (2001); Hart, supra note 155; CHARLESWORTH &
CHINKIN, supra note 156, at 189-216; cf Judith Resnik, Reconstructing
Equality: OfJustice, Justicia, and the Gender of Jurisdiction, 14 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 393, 399 (2002) (critiquing "the maintenance of jurisdictional
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courts, as well as international tribunals, have deliberated and
pronounced judgment on questions of gender equality, 3 14 sometimes

in directions that I think are consistent with stated commitments to
equality and sometimes not. In the face of highly gendered
distributions of benefits and responsibilities in most societies, the
struggle to re-understand our constitutional world through the lens of
gender equality, is ongoing. It is an effort that can benefit from all
the thinking and rethinking, in local, national and transnational
locations, informed by the experience of others, that can be
mustered.315

distinctions that constrain national powers to reduce the inequality of women
and men").
314. Although many would argue that gender equality norms (including
those in CEDAW) represent customary international law, see e.g., UNIFEM,
BRINGING EQUALITY HOME, supra note 102, at 9; Chantalle Forgues, Note, A
Global Hurdle: The Implementation of an International Nondiscrimination
Norm Protecting Women from Gender Discriminationin InternationalSports,
18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 247, 262 (2000); Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 702, comment I(noting possibility
that freedom from state policy of gender discrimination "may already be a
principle of customary international law"), others disagree. See, e.g.,
Weisburd, supra note 147, at 117-20 (doubting that CEDAW and the ICCPR
are now part of customary international law); An-Na'im, supra note 125, at
168 (stating that it would be "difficult to establish a principle of customary
international law prohibiting all forms of discrimination on grounds of
gender"); cf supra notes 219, 249 (noting feminist objections to exclusion of
gender discrimination fromjus cogens).
315. See Glenn, supra note 63, at 263. Glenn argues that legal development
preceding modern national states rested on a view of law necessarily open to
persuasive authority and that widespread reliance on nonbinding persuasive
authority represented an "ongoing commitment to better ideas." Id. at 268. As
law became an instrument of securing national states in Europe, concepts of
binding national law began to displace reliance on persuasive authority from
other sources, according to Glenn, while outside the West the idea of law as
national response was less persuasive and the idea of law as enquiry, as a
search for better ideas, persisted. See id. at 278-88. Although Glenn's historic
description associates nationalism with the idea of binding law and pluralism
with the idea of law as enquiry, see id. at 278-88, he concludes that both
concepts can co-exist because it "is in the nature of persuasive authority.. .to
tolerate assertions of local particularity." Id. at 289.
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